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A B S T R A C T
In this thesis I discuss aspects of Chaucer's interest in 
the relation of Language to the reality which it attempts 
to express and the relation of poetic fiction to Christian 
truth, and the type of readerly response invited by this 
interest. The method employed includes analysis of the 
structural development of the narrative frame and, to a 
lesser degree, of the entirety of the poem, as well as 
discussion of the historical context of the issues under 
consideration. These issues are raised in the narrative 
frame of the Canterbury Tales and are explored there and 
in the individual tales. Their treatment in the narrative 
frame is seminal and has provided the major focus of 
discussion in what follows.
The narrative frame structure operates dually. In the 
diachrony of a first reading of the poem, the frame 
world provides a correlative to the actual world in 
which man experiences serial time. The realignments 
of interpretation necossary because of its changing 
claims regarding its own nature — and hence its changing 
demands upon its readers — are constant reminders of the 
relativity of human judgment and experience in space 
and time. "rn the synchrony inevitable in a second or 
subsequent Lng, which comprehends the entirety of
the poem at each point in its linear progression, the 
reader's position outside the poem's time span of past, 
present and future, is analogous to the poet’s in his 
original conception of the poem and to God's in relation 
to the actual world, which the poem's world imitates.
After a first reading the reader sees that initially 
Chaucer's truth claim has enabled him to trust the 
authenticity of the account and to regard it not as 
poetic invention but as a report of historical truth.
an account describing part of God's book of history and 
therefore meriting careful attention. This claim is not 
literally true since the Canterbury Tales is fiction not 
historical report. Yet the reader's expectation of 'som 
vertuous matere' is not violated. The narrative frame 
develops a series of situations involving ethical choice. 
The first is the persona's decision to report the 
pilgrimage in full, the second is the Host's introduction 
of the concept of tale-telling for sentence and solaas, 
the third is the actual tale-telling.
Underlying all three sets of choices and the figure of 
pilgrimage itself, ethical principle provides the subject 
of the first issue of contention. The persona is con­
cerned with the problem of reconciling verisimilitude and 
decorum given that not all that happened and was said on 
the pilgrimage was moral. He decides that it is better 
to remain true to the actualities of the situation which 
do reflect enduring human truths than provide a decorous 
but inaccurate version of what happened. In the 
retraction, Chaucer finally assumes full responsibility 
as author of his fiction although there have been many 
earlier indications of the fictiveness of the account, 
most notable being the gap developed between poetic 'I' 
and author. The reader, first led to believe that the 
persona's account is literally true,is invwted to see 
that while this is a lie, the truth of the poet's 
understanding is still embodied in the text which still 
truly reflects the nature of reality. The ancient 
argument against poetry - that it deals in lies and is 
at best only diversionary, at worst immoral — cannot 
stand to condemn the Canterbury Tales. As St Augustine 
demonstrates in relation to literature in the Soliloquia 
some things are only true in so far as they are also false 
and if this is true there is no need to have 'such a 
dread of falsities' (2.10).
Within the narrative frame's dramatized justification of 
the true lie — the fiction in which truth is present — 
a number of associated topics are raised and explored.
The nature of language as moral act is explored through­
out the Canterbury Tales. The nature and function of 
literary language is also explicitly raised. These two 
areas of interest in language unite the concern with 
reality suggested by the historical claim and the concern 
that poetic language should be seen as a worthy reflector 
of human life. Action in the actual world is multifarious, 
in the world of the poem, whose realism reflects the 
actual world, the acts of the pilgrims t-ie primarily 
speech acts: they choose and tell tales. Yet, in the
traditional Christian view which Chaucer espouses, all 
acts, in reality or in the world of the narrative, 
share their basic wellspring, they are freely determined 
by their initiators and they reflect their origins.
Within the poem, what the pilgrims tell expresses 
aspects of their own being as well as having intrinsic 
quality. There is a high degree of consonancy between 
pilgrim tellers and tales told which the reader is 
invited to see. The Host's tale-telling game urges 
literary judgment, overtly from the pilgrim party, 
implicitly from Chaucer's readers. The poem itself 
incorporates the Host's concept of literary assessment 
and expands it, demonstrating how closely literature 
may be concerned with the exploration of human realities 
and ideals through the medium of poetic form and 
language.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
To attempt a discussion of the narrative coherence of the 
Canterbury Tales is to embark upon a perilous journey; the 
satisfaction of reading the poem and the difficulties of 
writing upon it both rest in the complexity with which 
Chaucer has compouned fals and soth (House of Fame, 2108) 
in his poem. In 'The Elusion of Clarity,11 E. Talbot 
Donaldson explores 1 Chaucer1s celebrated stylistic clarity" 
to demonstrate that 1 this clarity, while it is self-evident 
is often more apparent than real. It is, indeed, frequently 
an "illusion or deceptive appearance" by which Chaucer 
"deludes or befools a person" — namely the reader — and it 
is also a means by which he escapes dexterously from the 
danger of really being clear and from the pursuit of 
critics — a means by which he evades, for the sake of 
poetic complexity, the laws and obligations of logical 
simplicity1 (p. 23) . It is the nature of an aspect of 
this evasion of 1 the laws . . .  of logical simplicity1 
1 for the sake of poetic complexity1 that I shall explore, 
since in the conjunction of what is apparently simply 
offered and what is more complexedly present lies the 
enigmatic source of the coherence which reading the 
Canterbury Tales provides.
The narrative structure of the Canterbury Tales is super­
ficially extremely clear. It begins with a General 
Prologue introducing the cha -acters and the events which 
the whole is to incorporate, related by the poet who tells 
us that he participated in the pilgrimage which is to form 
the substance of his tale, and that he will endeavour to 
report it as accurately as possible. We are told of the 
Host's suggestion that the pilgrims should each ‘;ell tales 
to relieve the tedium of the journey, and that he will 
accompany them as governour, juge and reportour of their 
tales. The General Prologue ends with the beginning of 
the journey, and the Knight’s telling the first tale.
While the sheer mass of the Canterbury Tales consists of 
the actual tales told by the pilgrims, the pilgrimage 
provides the narrative thread of the whole. Every tale 
is attributed to one of the pilgrims, whose presence is 
felt throughout the Canterbury Tales not only as tale 
tellers but also as commentators and critics.2 what 
they criticise is frequently one another, and there are 
occasions when the Host's role as governour is no 
sinecure. At th. very end of the Canterbury Tales — 
for although the poem is unfinished, beginning and 
ending are clearly complete — the pilgrims have 
disappeared from the framework and Chaucer speaks 
directly, commending his soul to God and whatever is 
fruitful in his work to his audience.^
Nothing, it seems, could be clearer. But the clarity 
is achieved at the expense of ignoring those facts 
which collide with the ones sketched above. Faced by 
the narrative's actual unfolding we are confronted by 
a number of queries. Is it not fortuitous that 
together the pilgrims form so representative a social 
group, incorporating simultaneously object lessons in 
moral and estates distinctions? What, we may well 
wonder, has happened to the journey to and from 
Canterbury, or for that matter to Canterbury itself?
Why, if this is a realistic history of actual events - 
and there have oeen many indications, sugge.-^  ’d mainly 
by the narrator, that it is - do the pilgrV.ij disappear 
so unsatisfactorily during the Parson's sermon? And 
conversely why, since it is clear that whatever 
pilgrimages Chaucer may have gone upon, this journey 
was not undertaken in the flesh, does Chaucer go to 
such pains to claim the historicity of his account?
There are critics, citing the incomplete state of the 
whole, who have suggested that the problems raised by 
such questions are those attendant upon insufficient 
revision. This may well explain inconsistencies such 
as the curious geography revealed in the mention In the 
Ellesmere order of Sittingbourne [ill (D) 647], only 
thirty miles away from Canterbury, before Rochester 
[(B2) 3116] some ten miles further off. But no more; 
the literal inconsistencies of the narrative frame do 
not radically affect our way of viewing the poem.
It is the apparently major incongruities suggested by 
the questions above that urge attention. Unless 
Chaucer himself were undecided upon the basic nature 
of his material — did not know whether it was fact or 
fiction that he was writing, and to posit such 
indecision is patently absurd — it is clear that the 
questions cannot so readily be sidestepped. It is not 
because of his indecisiveness or limited artistic 
vision that Chaucer's depiction of the reality of his 
narrative framework presents his readers with problems 
of interpretation. It is because what is depicted is 
complex. While Chaucer’s art mirrors the reality of 
the actual world, it also states its own nature as 
fiction, and it is the interweaving of the two strands 
of naturalistic and fictive truth which both make and 
unmake the clarity depending upon the perspective of 
our view.
In this thesis I shall discuss aspects of these two 
strands in order to explore their distinctive natures 
and to highlight the nature of '- juxtaposition 
within the Canterbury Tale1*
1 THE TRUE Lli,: HISTORICAL
The role that Chaucer assumes In the poem is that of 
a scribe conveying in words a picture of the reality 
experienced not only by himself but also by his fellow 
pilgrims. It is soon clear when we read that this is 
not literally true; the carefully established realism 
of the narrative frame is itself a convention and 
literal truth is not the only truth with which Chaucer 
is concerned. Why then claim the historicity of the 
pilgrimage? At the most basic level because it gives 
an air of authenticity to the account. Actual 
experience carries its own authority: the weight of
what is real. What someone tells us might be the case 
is more easily dismissed than what he tells us did 
happen: the bias of response to hypothesis and
reported event differs substantially.
The authority of personal experience is frequently 
explicitly adduced in th . Canterbury Tales.4 When the 
Wife of Bath begins her t. — or rather her monologue 
on the subject closest tc ,.\_r heart which successfully 
prevents her tale for over eight hundred lines — she 
prefaces her account of the vagaries of life with her 
five husbands with a magisterial appeal to the power 
of experience:
Experience, though noon auctoritee
Were in this world, is right ynogh for me
To speke of wo that is in mariage . . .
[Ill (D) 1-3]
No less an authority than the Parson himself reiterates 
its power when, in describing the need to establish a 
harmonious relationship between husband and wife, he 
warns against allowing the wife maistrye:
For ther as the wontman hath the maistrie,
' she maketh to muche desray. Ther neden 
none ensaraples of this; the experience 
of day by day oghte suffise.
(X (I) 927]
That the Wife and the Parson place very different value 
upon experience is of course made perfectly clear in the 
poem. For the Parson knowledge is achieved both through 
personal experience and by studying auctorite; for the 
Wife of Bath, despite her unwitting dependence for 
existence upon the book learning she scorns - for her 
ancescry is undeniably literary — there is only one mode 
of knowing. However diverse their attitudes to the 
place of the personal in the realm of human experience, 
both share knowledge of its importance, and it is a 
knowledge shared not only by the other pilgrims but also 
by all men.
It is not only in this general sense that the truth 
claim operates to authenticate the narrative. Medieval 
attitude 1.0 the 'truth value' of art and reality were 
radicall -’istinguished. History being God’s work and 
evincing un i: herent image of His truth may always 
profitably be read: it is true because its Author is
Truth itself, and it is written ’pro salute nostra per 
divinam providentlam.1^  Attitud"n to poetry were more 
diverse.6 A characteristic and influential view held 
poets in low esteem: at best tV'uy are entertainers
composing fictions, at worst !.• --:i distorting reality, 
deliberately deluding their re .ir.s or distracting them 
from more meaningful pursuits." t.r+s view is Inherent 
in Lady Philosophy's hostile v ■ 'tude to the poetic 
muses in the first book of th-; "h isolation of 
Philosophy8 and, within the Canterbury Tales, in the 
Man of Law's anxiously expressed desire not to 'be likned 
. . .  to Muses that men clepe Pierides' [II (B1} 91-92J.
However carefully a poet composes his pcem, it is only 
his invention; the relation it bears tc truth is 
imitative, and a sense of its being spurious, not the 
real thing, was still very much alive in the fourteenth 
century.
In his Genealogy of the Gods Boccaccio finds it necessary, 
in justifying the virtue of writing and reading fiction - 
and it is significant that his justification is conceived 
in moral terms — to confront Plato's condemnation of poets 
in the Republic and attempt its refutation.9 The history 
of fiction's low status amongst tne liberal arts was long- 
sustained indeed.^ In claiming the historical 
authenticity of his pilgrimage Chaucer is claiming its 
literal reality and he can sidestep some of the 
associative pitfalls inherent in openly admitting the 
fictional nature of his poem. Not indefinitely, but for 
long enough to suggest that fiction, like history, has 
its own capacity to reflect truth. In order to see how 
this conclusion may be reached it is first necessary to 
discuss briefly what Chaucer is actually asserting when 
he implies the literal truth of what he tells. What he 
claims depends upon a specifically unristian view of 
history which illuminates the type of realism that is 
employed in the Canterbury Tales. In what follows, I 
have not attempted a comprehensive discussion of 
medieval Christian views of history for to do so would 
be both unnecessary and out of p l a c e . W h a t  I have 
attempted is to sketch those aspects of medieval 
historical theory which relate to an understanding of 
Chaucer's treatment of his pilgrimage as though it 
actually happened.
In the Christian view, which draws upon the judaic 
conception, history is divinely and benevolently 
ordained and provides a link between the temporal and 
the eternal. The universe and all God's creatures were
freely created by His ineffable love, and man, placed on 
earth for 'a litel space,' may choose to live in a way 
that will enable him to be united with God eternally.
Once Adam's fall brought all mankind into a state of 
disgrace, Christ, the second Adam, became incarnate and 
assumed the burden of the crucifixion in order to redeem 
mankind by His loving mercy. God's desire is that all 
men shoild ultimately achieve a perpetual resting place 
with Him in life everlasting1^  and the pattern of history 
manifests the divine plan whereby this is possible.
Central to this conception of history is the authorship 
of God and the linear temporality of His earthly 
creation. The linearity of history taay be seen both 
in its total pattern and in the pattern of each 
individual’s life. The whole pattern of history is 
not conceived, as the Greeks and Romans perceived it, 
as consisting of a series of endless cycles, nor does 
human life admit of the cyclic repetition of reincar­
nation.13 Movement through time, whether in the 
macrocosm of. the universe or in the microcosm of 
rjvery man's life, is one-way. Until God create t it, 
the universe was nonexistent,- Adam and Eve lived in 
Eden when 'natureel lawe was in his right poynt in 
paradys' [X (II 921], and when they disobeyed God, 
they left Eden never to return. Christ's becoming 
mortal to redeem mankind from the stain of Adam's sin 
is central to Christian history; 'quoniam quidem per 
hominem mors, et per hominem resurrectio mortuorum1 
(1 Cor. 15.21). Counterbalancing His first coming as 
redeemer is the historical event of His second coming 
in judgment.14 These major events in the unfolding 
pattern of history are incontrovertible: they exist,
or will exist literally; in their very essence they 
manifest the nature of God's creation of man to love 
Him: 'For soothly the lawe of God is the love of God'
IX (I) 125]. The pattern of history with its
resolution of t.e felix culpa is profoundly optimistic; 
it centres upon and circumscribes a movement towards 
union with God.*® This movement is also seen reflected 
in the very nature of each individual's passage through 
the world. Life in the world occurs in time and space, 
and within his earthly life man travels inexorably from 
physical birth to physical death, even as the larger 
pattern of history moves from the creation to the 
second coming. But man not only has a mortal body, he 
also has an immortal soul. Physical birth is followed 
by the spiritual rebirth of baptism. Ideally each 
Christian journeys through this life in a way that 
reflects his desire to partake of the promise of 
salvation renewed by the second Adam so that when he 
stands before his Maker at 'the day of doom1 [X (1} 158] 
he may be *replenyssed with the sights of the parfit 
knowynge of God' [X (I) 1079], so that he may, indeed, 
live. The way in which this may be achieved is in a 
progression which must take place during 'the pilgrimage 
of this mortal life' but which primarily involves a 
spiritual movement not a physical one: man on earth is
not only 'a resonable mortal beste1 (Boece, l.pr.6.61) 
he is an immortal wayfarer in exile from his true 
country which is heaven. The movement through time is 
parallelled by this movement through no 1 space-occupying 
time'1*’ of the growth of understanding of what it means 
to be God's creature and the acceptance of the responsi­
bility entailed by this knovledge. 17 The natural 
universe offers itself to man as a mirror in which he 
can see traces of its Maker. When his vision rests in 
the literal, it is not because there is no spiritual 
meaning to which the literal points but because of his 
selfset limitations. Unlike man who can only write in 
words God is a Maker who writes both in words and deeds." 
He has created the book of the universe and the book of 
history (as revealed in holy writ and in the patterning 
of all historical events) for man's delectation
instruction in virtue and ultimately for hit justification 
in history. Writing of God's book of the universe Hugh 
of St Victor describes the whole visible world as a book 
written by the finger of God:
Universus enim mundus iste sensibilis quasi quidam 
liber est scriptus digito Dei, hoc est virtute 
divina creatus, et singulae creaturae quasi 
figurae quaedam sunt non hvinano placito inventae 
sed divino arbitrio institutae ad manifestandam 
invisibilium Dei sapient!am. Quemadmodum autem 
si illiteratus quis apertum librum videat, 
figures aspicit, litteras nor cognoscit: - a
stultus et animalis homo qui non percipit ea 
quae Dei sunt (1. Cor. 2.) in visibilibus istis 
creaturis foris videt speciem sed intus non 
intelligit rationem. Qui autem spiritualis est 
ed omnia dijudicare potest, in eo quidem quod 
foris considerat pulchritudinem operis, intus 
concipit quam miranda sit sapientia Creatoris.
For this whole visible world is as a book 
written by the finger of God, that is, created 
by divine power, and individual creatures are as 
figures not devised by human will but instituted 
by divine authority to show forth the wisdom of 
the invisible things of God, But just as some 
illiterate man who sees an open book, looks at 
the figures, but does not recognise the letters; 
just so the foolish and natural man, who does not 
perceive the things of God, sees outwardly in 
these visible creatures the appearance but does 
not inwardly understand the reason. But he who 
is spiritual and can judge all things, while he 
considers outwardly the beauty of the work, 
inwardly conceives how marvellous is the wisdom 
of the Creator.19
St Bonaventura uses ^inilar imagery to express the 
concept:
Primum principium fecit mundum istum sensibilem 
ad declarandum seipsum, videlicet ut homo per 
ilium tanquam per speculum et vestigium, 
reduceretur in Deum artificem amandum et 
laudandum. Et secundum hoc duplex est liber, 
unus scilicet scriptus intus, qui est Dei 
aeterna ars et sapientia, et alius scriptus 
foris, scilicet mundus sensibilis.
The first source made this visible world to 
declare himself, namely, so that man, through 
it as by a mirror and by traces, might be 
brought to love and praise God the author.
And accordingly the book is twofold, one, that 
is, written within, which is the eternal art 
and wisdom of God, and the other written with­
out, that is, the visible world. 9
Similarly, man, in contemplating the book of history, 
must understand it in mure than one way, must comprehend, 
that is, the literal, and also understand its signifi­
cation :
Auctor Sacrae Scripturae est Deus, in cuius 
potestate est ut non solum voces ad signific- 
andum accommodet, quod etiam homo facere 
potest, sed etiam res xpsas. Et ideo cum in 
omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc 
habet proprium ista scientia, quod ipsae res 
significatae per voces, etiam significant 
aliquid. Ilia ergo prima significatio, qua 
voces significant res, pertinet ad primum 
sensum, gul est sensus historicus vel 
litteralis. Ilia vero significatio qua res 
significatae per voces, iterwi res alias 
significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis, qui 
super litteralem fundatur et eum aupponit.
The author of Holy Scripture is God, in whose 
power it is to signify His meaning, not by 
words only (as man also can do) but also by 
things themselves. So, whereas in every other 
science, things are signified by words, this 
science has the property that the things 
signified by the words have themselves also 
a signification. Therefore, that first 
signification whereby words signify things 
belongs to the first sense, the historical or 
literal. That signification whereby things 
signified by words have themselves also a 
signification is called the spiritual sense, 
whi^h is based on the literal and presupposes
It is this duality of mode and meaning which St Augustine 
describes in a comment on the account of the two sons of 
Abraham: 'where the Apostle speaks of the allegory he
finds it not in words but in the deed? for he pointed out 
that by the two sons of Abraham, the one by a slave-girl 
and the other by a free-woman — he was not speaking 
figuratively but of something that also took place - 
the two Testaments are to be understo o d . T h e  
Civitate Dei, whose influence upon medieval historical 
theory is fundamental, describes in detail the relation 
of the earthly city of this life to the heavenly city, 
and stresses the figural interpretation of history 
wnereby events do not only proclaim their own reality 
but also point beyond themselves toward other, future 
events which fulfil the promise only inherent in them.22 
The natural universe and the pattern of history are both 
designed to reflect in their being the Being of their 
Maker. Man's role is to read these . vrne books
well in order to benefit from them, = importance
of history lies not only in the harmu. its pattern,
or even in the evidence of its Author which may be 
discerned in it, but also in the lesson which it offers 
for whoever desires to take it. God's books are 
figural and exemplary and history’s educative value 
lies in their aspects of relationship, for through 
them past, present and future are conterminously 
contained in a whole created by God to affirm the 
promise of salvation available to all men.
History demonstrates the pattern of love unfolding, 
and it can — and should - be read as a spur to 
personal action. If other men were able to withstand 
temptation, so too may the reader. The moral with 
which the Friar glibly rounds off his scurrilous 
attack upon the Suirtmoner (who indeed is well able to 
repay the insult in kind) had real value for those 
who would heed it:
'•*»**»'jpttiiwM,*
Herketh this word! beth war, as in this cas; 
"The leoun sit in his awayt alway 
To sle the innocent, if that he may."
Disposeth ay youre hertes to withstonde
The feend, that yow woide make thral and bonde.
He may nat tempte yow over youre myght.
For Crist wol be youre champion and knyght.
{Ill <D) 1656-1662}
The possibility of successfully withstanding temptation 
is proclaimed throughout Christian history. In one man's 
experience lies the hope which sustains his successors. 
God did not only help those who lived before the present, 
He also helps those who live now and who will live in the 
future when we are in their past and our lives provide 
examples — good or bad — for them to contemplate and 
imitate or reject. In the letter to Can Grande,^ Dante 
exemplifies the fourfold interpretation of reality that 
is 'theologian's allegory1 by citing the description of 
the exodus from Egypt:
nam primus sensus est qui habetur per 11teram, 
alius est qui habetur per significata per 
literam. Et primus dicitur literalis, 
secundus vero allegoricus, sive moralis, sive 
anagogicus. Qui modus tractandi, ut melius 
pateat, potest considerari in his versibus:
’In exitu Israel de Aegypto, domus lacob de 
populo barbaro, facta est ludaea sanctificatio 
eius, Israel potestas eius'. Ham si ad 
literam solam inspiciamus, signixicatur nobis 
exitus filioruro Israel de Aegypto, tempore 
Moysi; si ad allegoriam, nobis significatur 
nostra redemptio facta per Christum; si ad 
moralem sensum, significatur nobis conversio 
animae de luctu et miseria peccati ad statum 
gratiae; si ad anagogicum, significatur 
exitus animae sanctae ab huius corruptionis 
servitute ad aeternae gloriae libertatem.
Et quamquam isti sensus mystic! variis 
appellentur nominibus, generaliter omnes did 
possunt allegorici, quum sint a literal! sive 
historiali diversi. Nam allegoria dici€ur ab 
alleon graece, quod in latinum dicitur 
alienum, sive diversum.
(Moore, pp.415-416)
for it is one sense which we get through the 
letter, and another which we get through the 
thing the letter signifies; and the first is 
called literal, but the second allegorical or 
mystic. And this mode of treatment, for its 
better manifestation, may be considered in 
this verse: 'When Israel came out of Egypt,
and the house of Jacob from a people of strange 
speech, Judaea became his sanctification,
Israel his power.' For if we inspect the letter 
alone the departure of the children of Israel 
from Egypt in the time of Moses is presented to 
us; if the r-llegory, our redemption wrought by 
Christ; if tie moral sense, the conversion of 
the soul from the grief and misery of sin to 
the state of grace is presented to us; if the 
anagogical, the departure of the holy soul from 
the slavery of this corruption to the liberty of 
eternal glory is presented to us. And although 
these mystic senses have each their special 
denominations, they may all in general be called 
allegorical, since they differ from the literal 
and historical; for allegory is derived from 
alleon, in Greek, which means the same as the 
Latin alienum or diversum.
(Latin Works, pp.347-346)
I have quoted this passage not to suggest that the 
Canterbury Tales was intended as a poem which demands 
fourfold explication,^-* but to convey a sense of the 
all-encompassing benevolence of the medieval concept 
of history. In it past present and future are united, 
and each individual's history is placed within the 
wholeness of all time: by his acts on earth his
eternal fate is resolved, and what he has chosen to 
make of his life helps illuminate the choices possible 
to others.^  Although it is my belief that it is the 
literal level of historical reality with which Chaucer's 
truth claim is concerned, both allegorical and figural 
weight lie beyond it as part of the authenticating 
device: to claim the historicity of the pilgrimage is
to claim its essential seriousness.^  For ir it 
actually happened then the events described are relevant 
to Chaucer's auditors and readers — his verbs of address 
to his audience imply both — in a way that r.o mere
fictional events, whether evincing their author's concern 
with moral issues or not, could be. What has actually 
happened is part of God's plan and may be read not only 
in its own right as part of the past but also for what it 
offers regarding present or future possibility. But this 
is not the only way in which the truth claim operates: 
it is the foundation upon which associated claims rest.
If the pilgrims whom Chaucer describes are to be regarded 
as actual people, living in fourteenth century England, 
like Chaucer himself of ‘ful devout corage,' or at any 
rate all evincing, for whatever multitude of reasons, 
a desire 'to goon on pilgrimage1 then they are the 
contemporaries of Chaucer's audience, their compatriots 
too, living like them in a Christian society in an age 
of grace, capable of attaining salvation. They are 
responsible for their actions, their wills are free and 
the grace to do well and receive eternal reward has been 
restored to them by Christ whose Passion is celebrated 
at the time of year at which they are pilgrimaging to 
Canterbury. Christian history stresses both the literal 
existence of its protagonists and their flgural quality, 
and since what the pilgrims do and say is freely chosen, 
it can act as an illuminating mirror for others.
But in fact of the pilgrims only Chaucer is part of 
God's creation;^ the remainder are not actual people. 
Their realism, if stressed to the exclusion of its own 
conventionality would be deceptive, since they are not 
God's creatures: they are the verbal creations of
Chaucer who is their maker. The naturalism of the 
account of their pilgrimage serves not only to convey 
a sense of the actual, it also defines its own limits. 
While it is not true that the pilgrimage to Canterbury 
actually took place, the manner in which Chaucer 
describes it suggests a very close relationship of the 
fiction to the truth of an actual pilgrimage.
Chaucer's account of the pilgrimage is not an history 
even though the events described are treated as though 
it were. For the Canterbury Tales is a poetic fiction, 
but it does bear an analogous relationship to truth: 
the narrative frame of the poem embodies a lie that is 
as rue as possible; true in the sense that an actual 
r. .ject, about which its audience would be perfectly 
knowledgeable, is treated in a manner which reflects 
its nature rationally not in the act of translation 
into words of past experience, which is the real 
histordan's task, but by an act of literary imitation. 
The poem affirms the dual truth of its fictionality 
and its capacity to mirror reality faithfully, as 
fiction can.
Frcm classical times until the fourteenth century a 
wide range of attitudes to the nature and value of 
poetic fiction was expressed. ^  If the tension in the 
'debate' over the relative values of philosophy and 
poetry in the middle ages was considerable, it was the 
philosophers and the theologians who tended to express 
their irritation (in the main the poets simply went on 
writing). However, there were men whose attitude to 
poetry's worth was less uneasy, who saw and stated its 
own specific potential for expressing reality.
St Augustine, writing in the fourth century, was 
highly influential; Macrobius analysis of the value 
of one type of fiction in his Commentary on the Somnium 
Scipionis, although it involves a fairly limited 
accepts.ice, was also influential. So too was Boethius's 
Consolation of philosophy which, with its alternating 
metra and prosae vindicated true poetry's place in a 
philosophical treatise even while it drew the internal 
distinction between poetry which aims at reflecting 
reality and poetry which denies it.^ 'Thise poetical 
muses' whom Lady Philosophy so summarily banishes from
Boethius's bedside are seducers of his reason; the roetra 
that offer lyric statements closely related to the 
arguments of their surrounding propae reflect a very 
different attitude to reality: their poetic beauty
enhances and does not deny their truth or the power of 
reason to operate upon them or any other object.
Peter Dronke, ir /abula, traces briefly the involvement 
of authors from the fourth century until the twelfth 
century with 'the defence and the use of the r&dlm of 
the imagination.'3® In the Genealogy of the Gods, 
begun some time 'between 1340 and 1350' (Osgood, p.13, 
n.2), Boccaccio provides perhaps the most comprehensive 
defence of poetry. He writes to defend his own work 
and to rout those who say that poets lie irresponsibly, 
systematically refuting the arguments of ancient 
philosophers, hostile theologians and modern deriders 
of his art. Despite its great range - for he 
summarises most of the arguments vindicating or 
condemning poetry that were advanced from Plato 
onwards - Boccaccio's defence of poetry is simply 
based: there is a distinction between 'good1 and 'bad'
poets, dependent upon the presence or absence of moral 
worth in their poems, consequently only incompetent or 
irresponsible critics would condemn all poets 
(Genealogy, 14.19, 14.20). In a chapter (14.3) firmly 
entitled 'Poetas non esse mendaces' (Poets are not 
liars), Boccaccio makes a clear distinction between a 
lie, whose intention is to deceive, and a poetic 
invention, which is a creation designed to incorporate 
or reflect truths. Boccaccio's justification of the 
vocation of poet is accomplished by resource to modern 
as well as ancient authors — he cites Dante and 
Petrarch as contemporary examples of moral poets, 
whose lives and works both reflect their concern with 
the good life (14.19, 14.22). He also points out that 
since poetry may well be a divinely inspired vocation,
as he feels it was for himself, it would be best for 
carpers against it to reassess their attitudes (15.10).
My concern in what follows is selective; in a brief 
discussion of a number of the attitudes to poetry's 
potential and Junction held by Plato, St Augustine, 
Macrobius, William of Conches and Dante, I hope to 
explore some of the implications of the true lie, 
generally and in specific relation to Chaucer's 
treatment of his subject matter in the narrative 
frame of the Canterbury Tales. When Plato determined 
that it was best to exclude the poets from his ideal 
republic, he offered as part of his justification that 
'it was reason that led us on. And lest [poetry] 
condemn us as rather harsh and rough, let us tell her 
that there is an ancient feud between philosophy and 
poetry. The pronouncement was to provide authority
for a long series of adverse judgments upon both poets 
and their fictions. Although the Republic was only 
translated into Latin in the sixteenth century its 
reputation preceded its ready accessibility to readers 
in the west, and parts at least of Plato's discussion 
were known by their citation in subsequent writers' 
works.32 But if Plato provided ammunition for the 
detractors of poetic worth, he was also cited in 
poetry's defence. The grounds for this were twofold: 
that he used myth himself, and that there are passages 
in his works where he explicitly endorses a role for 
fiction.33 Besides the Timaeus, the Meno and the 
Phaedo were available in Latin translation from 1156; 
Klibansky (p.27) notes that they were quoted (ca. 1300) 
by the Franciscan John of Wale® at Oxford.
In a discussion of the properties of myth in the Phaedo, 
Plato makes Socrates proclaim the healing value of the 
true lie, that is, the myth or art which though it is
literally untrue expresses a truth through its fiction.34 
It is shortly before the death of Socrates, and in 
declaring his belief in the immortality of the soul, 
the philosopher describes his concept of the nature of 
the afterlife. He concludes his account with this 
comment;
No sensible man would think it proper to rely 
on things of this kind being just as I have 
described; but that, since the soul is clearly 
immortal, this or something like this at any 
rate is what happens in regard to our souls 
and their habitations — that this is so seems 
to me proper and worthy of the risk of 
believing; for tne risk is noble. Such things 
he must sing like a healing charm to himse"’f, 
and that is why I have lingered so long over 
the story.
(Phaedo, 114D, Rouse, p.518)
The story is fiction, but it expresses fundamental 
human needs and beliefs, and in this lies its power 
to heal. Socrates continues by preparing for his 
death with a serenity which those around him cannot 
emulate. No more dramatic vindication of the positive 
power of 1 good1 poetry — poetry whose moral purpose is 
sound — could be offered.
It is not only in the Phaedo that Plato admits the 
possibility of morally sound poetry; in the Republic 
even as Plato banishes the poets, he qualifies his 
decision:
but let it be said plainly that if imitation 
and poetry made to please can give some good 
reason why she ought to be in a well-ordered 
city, we should be glad indeed to receive 
her back home since we are quite conscious 
of her enchantment for us . . .  . And per­
haps we may allow those other champions of 
hers who are not poets but poet-lovers to 
plead for her in prose, that she is not only 
delightful but helpful for constitutions and
, human life, and we will hear them with favour.
For I suppose it will be just so much gain for 
us if she is proved to be helpful also as well 
as delightful . . . .  We shall be glad, indeed, 
that she should be proved good and true in the 
highest degree, . . . but as long as she cannot 
make out her case, e will still listen to hv. , 
. . . .  knowing thav we must not take such 
poetry seriously . . .
(Republic, 10, 607C-608B, Rouse, p.408)
Plato establishes a distinction between two broad types 
of poetry — 'good' and 'baa'; it is because both are 
conceived as potent tools of persuasion that the type 
of poetry which Plato believes would influence people 
adversely is exiled,35 and that the type of poetry which 
P'.ato feels to be beneficial is affirmed as providing man 
with a 'healing charm'. In the introduction to his 
translation of Macrobius' Commentary on the Dream of 
Scipio W. H. Stahl characterises the work as 'one of 
the basic source books of the scholastic movement and 
of medieval science. Next to Chalcidius1 Commentary, 
it was the most important source of Platonism in the 
Latin West in the Middle Ages . . . .  The frequent 
references throughout the Middle Ages to Macrobius as 
an authority on Neoplatonism testify to his ability to 
make the system intelligible to his readers.'36 
Chaucer himself cites Macrobius in the Nun's Priest's 
Tale (B2 4313) , and the Book of the Duchess (284) , as 
well as in the Parliament of Fowls (111)? in the A 
Fragment of the Romaunt of the Rose, which is generally 
accepted as having been translated by Chaucer, 'an 
authour that hight Macrobes' (7) is instanced as the 
auctorite justifying paying heed to the messages implicit 
in dreams. From the account of the dream of Scipio in 
the Parliament of Fowls it is clear that Chaucer had 
actually read Macrobius' commentary by the time that 
he wrote tie poem, and was not merely referring to his 
name to add learned ballast to its weight.3^
It is as an authority on dream lore that Chaucer cites 
hacrobius, but the portion of the Commentary in which 
I am presently interested precedes the classification 
of different types of dreams. It includes the first 
two chapers of Book One in which Macrobius instances 
Plato's use of myth as a precedent justifying Cicero's
In Book One Chapter 1, Macrobius relates Cicero's use 
of a dream as the device whereby he includes 'an 
interesting description of the spheres and constellations' 
to Plato's inclusion at the end of his Republic (10,614B- 
621D) of the myth of Er, 'a man who apparently had died 
and was restored to life' and revealed what he had seen. 
Macrobius continues:
The reason for including such a fiction and dream 
in books dealing with governmental problems, and 
the justification for introducing a description 
of celestial circles, orbits, and spheres, the 
movements of planets, and the revolutions of the 
heavens into a discussion of the regulations 
governing commonwealths seemed to me to be worth 
investigating: and the reader, too, will perhaps
be curious. Otherwise we may be led to believe 
that men of surpassing wisdom, whose habit it was 
to regard the search for truth as nothing if not 
divine, have padded their treatises, nowhere else 
prolix, with something superfluous.
(Macrobius, 1.1.3, Stahl, p.81)
He argues that both Plato and Cicero realised that 
because 'a love of justice' could best be 'instilled 
in men's minds' by the use of fable which could 
demonstrate 'the immortality of souls,.' they were 
justified in introducing fiction into philosophical 
works. Had there been a consensus of opinion regarding 
the use of fiction in such a context, Macrobius' 
justification of Plato and Cicero would have been 
unnecessary. Macrobius continues with an account of 
the argument of those who insist 'that philosophers
should refrain from using fiction since no kind of fiction 
has a place with those who profess to tell the truth,' 
and counters it with the argument offered by the two 
authors each of whom 'justified his choice of characters 
as suited to the expression of his doctrines.' It is a 
justification which recalls Chaucer's own in his account 
of his motives in the General Prologue [I (A) 725-742]. 
Macrobius' final argument is that in order to judge 
rightly in this regard one must remember that 'philosophy 
does not discountenance all stories, nor does it accept 
all;' he points out that there are distinctions between 
different types of fables, and then proceeds to enumerate 
these. The fundamental distinction which he makes in 
classifying fable is based upon the intentions of their 
creators: 1 fables — the very word acknowledges their
falsity — serve two purposes: either merely to gratify
the ear or to encourage the reader to good works'
(1.2.7, Stahl p.84). Macrobius' stated concern is the 
justification of the specific type of fable which Cicero 
uses in the Somnium, and his method is reductive: he
operates by making serial distinctions whereby he can 
eliminate 'unphilosophzcal' types of fiction - types, 
that is, unconcerned with inculcating moral values.
In the process of exclusion, however, different types 
of fiction are defined and described In ways which 
suggest their potential as much as their limitations.
'The fables of Aesop' are characterised as unphilo- 
sophical, having 'both setting and plot . . . fictitious/' 
but Aesop himself is praised as being 'famous for his 
exquisite imagination.' His treatment of those 
categories of fable with which he tells us neither 
Plato nor Cicero was concerned is sufficiently compre­
hensive to suggest points beyond his immediate purpose.
1For-William of Conches, writing in the twelfth century, 
the implications of Macrobius1 categorization of types 
of fable proved far other than they had to their 
originator. Using Macrobius * categories as a basis upon 
which to construct his own more tolerant view of the range 
of fable that admits philosophically sound handling, 
William blandly glosses Macrobius' reductivism out of 
existence.Indeed, Dronke points out that William does 
far more than merely use traditional arguments to achieve 
'a greater latitude;' moving beyond the conventional 
arguments that fictions may either be useful since they 
provide training 'for more serious philosophical study, 
or again (that) the philosopher can use them as 
intequmenta,1 William
appeals to new principles. His emphasis is not, 
like that of the ancient allegorists of Homer, 
on drawing a veil over what is unseemly: for
him the seemliness of the slqnificatio genuinely 
eclipses and renders unimportant the unseemliness 
of the words. Even if the language or the 
narrative details of a fictive work seem objec­
tionable , the work can still be beautiful and 
honourable because of what it means. It is not 
the philosopher who makes ’an honest woman out 
of the wanton fabula: whatever her appearance
she can have a beauty and dignity that stems 
from her inherent nature, her meaning . . . .
This is a new way of approaching the justification 
of works that on the surface are 1 immoral;' it is 
an approach independent, at least in principle, 
of the issue about intequmenta. Though the 
implications of this approach are not developed 
here, the essential breakthrough has been made.
(Faaula, p.28)
The movement which William makes towards greater 
inclusiveness in the categories of acceptable fable 
is striking when contrasted to the earlier attitude 
expressed in Macrobius1 commentary.
4St Augustine, writing at approximately the same time as 
Macrobius,3® had already offered a number of statements 
of the power of fiction which suggest far-reaching 
possibilities for this art. I have already mentioned 
his commendation of Plato's stance in the Republic (see 
n.10), but even there it is clear that St Augustine, 
like Plato, is thinking of a specific type of poetry.
In two later passages in the City of God (11.18 and 
11.21), he praises God for the benevolence of His 
divine will in terms which express concepts of poetic
Neque enim Deus ullum, non dico angelorum, sed 
vel hominum crearet, quem malum futurum esse 
praescisset, nisi pariter nosset quibus eos 
bonorum usibus commodaret adque ita ordinem 
saeculorum tamquam pulcherrimvrai carmen etiam 
ex quibusda® quasi antithetis honestaret.
God would never have created a single angel — 
not even a single man - whose future wickedness 
He forsaw, unless, at the same time. He knew 
of the good which could come of this evil.
It was as though He meant the harmony of history, 
like the beauty of a poem, to be enriched by 
antithetical elements.
Nec auctor est excellentior Deo, nec ars 
efficacior Dei verbo, nec causa melior quam 
ut bonum crearetur a Deo bono. Sane etiam 
Plato causam condendi mxrndi iustissimam dicit, 
ut a bono Deo bona opera fierent; sive ista 
legerit, sive ab his qui legerant forte 
cognoverit; sive acerrimo ingenio invisibilia 
Dei per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta 
conspexerit, sive ab his qui ista conspexerant 
et ipse didicerit.
There is no Creator higher than God, no art 
more efficacious than the Word of God, no 
better reason why something good should be 
created than that the God who creates is good. 
Even Plato says that the best reason for 
creating the world is that good things should 
be made by a good God. It may be that he read 
this Scriptural passage or learned it from 
those who had, or, by his own keen insight, he 
clearly saw that 'the invisible things' of God 
are 'understood by the things that are made.'
. or perhaps he learned from others who had clearly 
seen this,
In both instances Augustine uses poetic or artistic 
analogues of divine creation? but by their very use he 
graces human artists with the dignity of imaging their 
Divine Exemplar, for their literary harmony reflects 
the innate and substantial harmony of the universe, and 
when they deliberately choose to reflect this, then 
they are not abdicating moral responsibility in writing 
fiction, rather they are assuming a special type of 
responsibility: the presentation to the imagination of
an accurate depiction of reality. God offers reality 
itself to us in His poem of the universe, and the good 
poet, aware of the nature of this reality, and of the 
fact that it is at least partially translatable into 
words (which can reflect tuough not directly parallel 
or become the reality itself), strives to convey an 
adequate sense of earthly reality in words, and employs 
'reasonable fictions' to this end.
It is this view which underlies the recommendation 
which St Augustine makes to Licentius in De ordine.40 
Licentius had greatly enjoyed composing poetry before 
St Augustine enabled him to perceive the fundamental 
concern of philosophy with the orderly understanding 
of the universe. Once he realised this, Licentius 
decided to forsake the lesser good of loving poetry 
for the greater delight of following 'a far different 
light' — that of philosophy — in his pursuit of truth.
But St Augustine explains that while his conversion to 
Christianity is of the utmost importance, to describe 
his poems as 1 these trifles of mine' (1.8.23) and to 
desire renunciation of the act of composition is foolish, 
for art, imaging God's art in this, is itself orderly, 
manifesting its order both in the discipline of writing 
and in the substance of what is created, in its
significance both for its creator and its auditors:
Si ordinem . . . curas, redeundum tibi est ad 
illos versus. Nam eruditio disciplinarum 
liberalium modesta sane atque succincta, et 
alacriores et perseverantiores et comptiores 
exhibit amatores amplectendae veritati, ut et 
ardentius appetant, et constantius inseguantur, 
et inhaereant postremo dulcius . . . quae 
vocatur, Licenti, beata vita . . . .  Vade ergo 
interim ad illas Musas. Verumtamen, scis quid 
te facere velim? June, sit, quod placet. Ubi 
se, inquam, Pyramus et ilia ejus supra seminecem, 
ut cantaturus es, interemerint, in dolore ipso, 
quo tuum carmen vehementius inflammari decet, 
habes commodissimam opportunitatem. Arripe 
illius foedae libidinis et incendioruzn venenatorum 
exsecrationem, quibus miseranda ilia contingunt: 
deinde totus attollere in laudem puri et sinceri 
amoris, quo animae dotatae disciplinis et virtute 
formosae copulantur intellectui per philosophiam, 
et non solum mortem fugiunt, verum etiam vita 
beatissima perfruuntur.
(1.8.24, PL 32 988-989)
'If you have a care for order . . . .  you must 
return to those verses, for instruction in the 
liberal arts, if only it is moderate and concise, 
produces devotees more alert and steadfast and 
better equipped for embracing truth, Licentius, 
so that they more ardently seek and more con­
sistently pursue and in the end more lovingly 
cling to that which is called the happy life 
. . . .  For the present, therefore, return to 
the Muses. And yet, do you know what I would 
have you do?' 'Ask whatever you like,' he 
replied. 'At that point where Pyramus destroyed 
himself, 'I said, 'and she slew herself over his 
half-dead body — as you were about to relate — 
there, in that every anguish where it is proper 
that your poem should reach its highest flight, 
you have a golden opportunity: satirize the
curse of that unclean lust and those burning 
passions by which those deporable things come 
to pass. Then soar aloft with all your power in 
praise of pure and genuine love - love wherein 
souls endowed with knowledge and adorned with 
virtue are, through philosophy, united to under­
standing, and whereby they not only escape death, 
but moreover enjoy a life most happy.'
(Fathers of the Church, 5, pp.261-262)
Later St Augustine draws a further distinction which 
places his own attitude to human creativity clearly: 
he distinguishes between 'delight of the sense' and 
'delight through the sense.' Just as God's universal 
harmony can lead those who see its reflection in reality 
to contemplate the benevolence of its and their Maker, 
so too can a good artistic creation first delight the 
senses and then move its viewers or auditors to a 
rational understanding of the place of sense delight:
aliud . . . sensus, aliud per sensum: nam sensum
mulcet p -Icher motus; per sensum autem animum 
solum pulchra in motu significatio. Hoc etiam 
in auribus facilius advert!tur: nam quidquid 
jucunde sonat, illud libet, atque ipsum auditum 
illicit; quod autem per eundem sonum bene 
significatur, nuntio quidera aurium, sed ad solam 
mentem refertur. Itaque cum audimus illos 
versus:
Quid tanturn Oceano properent se tingere soles 
Hiberni, vel quae tardis mora noctibus obstet;
(Virgil, Georgies, 2.480-481) 
alitsr metra laudamus, aliterque sententiam . . .
(2.11.34, PL 32 1011)
delight of the sense Is one thing, delight through 
the sense is something else. Graceful movement 
delights the sense, but the timely import of the 
movement delights the mind alone through the sense. 
This is more easily noticed in the case of hearing: 
whatever has a pleasing sound, that it is which 
pleases and entices the hearing itself. What is 
really signified by that sound, that is what is 
borne to the mind though by the messenger of our 
hearing. And so, when we hear these lines - 
Why do the suns in the winter rapidly sink in the 
ocean? What is tKe hindrance that holds back 
latecoming nights in the summer? — our praise of 
the metre is one thing, but our praise of the 
meaning is something else.
(pp. cit., pp. 312-313)
St Augustine continues by explaining the orderly nature 
of musical and poetic harmony:
Sic ab ea [i.e. ratio] poetae. geniti sunt: in
guibus cum vdderet non solum sonorum, sed etiam 
verborum rerumque magna momenta, plurimum eos 
honoravit/ eisgue tribuit quorum vellenfc ration- 
abilium mendaciorum potestatem. Et quoniam de 
prima ilia disciplina stirpem ducebant, judices 
in eos grammaticos esse permisit . . . .  
rationabili mendacio jam poetis favente rations 
(quaerendumne quid propagini similiter inesset?), 
Jovis et Memoriae filias Musas esse confictum 
est. Unde ista disciplina sensus intellectusgue 
particeps musicae nomen invenit.
(2.14.40-41, PL 32 1014)
Thus, poets were begotten of reason. And, when 
it saw in them great achievements, not in sound 
alone, but in words also and realities, it 
honoured them to the utmost, and gave them 
license for whatever reasonable fictions they 
might desire. And yet, because they took origin 
from the first of the liberal disciplines, it 
permitted grammarians to be their critics . . . . 
By a reasonable fiction it was fabled that the 
Muses were the daughters of Jupiter and Memory. 
Now, with reason bestowing its favour on the 
poets, need it be asked what the offspring 
likewise contained? Since this branch of 
learning partakes as well of sense as of the 
intellect, it received the name of music.
(op. cit., pp.317-318)
It is not merely that philosophy is a discipline worthy 
of greater devotion than poetry, it is also that they 
are different. When Licentius seeks to distinguish 
between love of philosophy and love of poetry, St 
Augustine demonstrates that each has its place in the 
orderly hierarchy of God's created world.
It is true that in his Retractions (1.3.2), St Augustine 
expresses his reservations at his earlier stance, 
remarking somewhat dryly that possibly he set too 
great store by the study of the liberal arts 'quas 
multi sancti multum nesciunt; quidam etiam, qui sciunt 
eas, sancti non sunt' (of which many saintly people do 
not know much; furthermore some who do know them are 
not saintly [PL 32 588]). However, this reflects more
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on his sense of the intractability of the unsaintly when 
exposed to the effects of the liberal arts than on the 
liberal arts themselves. These are not condemned ? 
their limitations as spurs to morality are merely 
observed.
By its nature a poetic depiction of reality cannot be 
totally true: its creator is not the Creator, tnd his
tools are words and images not realities. But it is 
possible for a poet to create a fiction which so closely 
imitates truth that it is both a reasonable fiction and 
as true a lie as possible. If he has this talent then 
i’c is worth his using it. In De musica, the only 
completed treatise extant of those St Augustine proposed 
to write on the liberal arts, there is a detailed (five 
book) discussion of technicalities relating to rhythm 
and metre, followed by a last book relating musical and 
poetic harmony to cosmological harmony. In the intro­
duction to this last book, St Augustine deprecates his 
devoting so much effort to his subject ’childishly,' 
a deprecation which nevertheless did not cause him 
either to jettison or retract his treatise, and he 
justifies his having spent so long on the work since 
in it he hopes to enlighten those 'qui litteris 
saecularibus dediti, magnis implicantur erroribus, et 
bona ingenia in nugis conterunt, nescientes quid ibi 
delectet' (who, given up to secular literature, are 
involved in great errors and waste their natural good 
qualities in trifles, not knowing what their charm is 
[6.1.1, PL 32 11633 ) . Reading De musica it is apparent 
that St Augustine is not denying the validity of 
composing song or poetry; he is rather intent upon 
proclaiming that beauty inheres in such creation as 
a trace of the true harmony which derives from God.^1
I wish to discuss one other passage in which St Augustine 
directly considers the nature of tne maker and his 
creation. It occurs in Soliloguia, 2.10.42 The titular 
noun is of St Augustine's coinage: he uses it to 
characterise the 'dialogue' between himself and his 
reason, in which the nature and relationship of God and 
the soul are explored. In the course of the work he 
fixed upon the resemblances and distinctions between 
what is true and what is false, and Reason points out 
a paradoxical anomaly to St Augustine: while a writer
of fiction may have no desire to deceive, and therefore 
not be intentionally false, the nature of his craft is 
such that by its very mimetic process, it must be false, 
and yet, despite its being only a representation of 
reality and not the thing itself, it can, and often 
does, reflect truth:
Itague ipsa opera hominum velut comoedias aut 
tragoedias, aut mimos, et id genus alia 
possumus operibus pictorum fictorumque con- 
jungere. Tam enim verus esse pictus homo non 
potest, quamvis in specien hominis tendat, 
quam ilia quae scripta sunt in libris 
comicorum. Neque enim falsa esse volunt, 
aut ullo appetitu suo falsa sunt; sed quadam 
necessitate, quantum fingentis arbitrium 
sequi potuerunt. At vero in scena Roscius 
voluntate falsa Hecuba erat, natura verus 
nomo; sed ilia voluntate etiam verus tragoedus, 
eo videlicet quo implebat, institutum: falsus
autem Priamus, eo quod Priamum assimilabat, 
sed ipse non erat. Ex quo jam nascitur 
quiddara mirabile, quod tamen ita se habere 
nemo ambigit. A. Quidnam id est? R. Quid 
putas, nisi haec omnia inde esse in quibusdam 
vera, unde in quibusdam falsa sunt, et ad 
suuro verum hoc solum els prodesse, quod ad 
aliud falsa sunt? Unde ad id quod esse aut 
volunt aut debent, nullo modo perveniunt, si 
falsa esse fugiunt. Quo pacto enim iste 
quern commemoravi, verus tragoedus asset, si 
nollet esse falsus Hector, falsa Andromache, 
falsus Hercules, et alia innumera? aut unde 
vera picture asset, si falsus equus non esset? 
unde in speculo vera hominis imago, si non
falsus homo? Quare, si quibusdam, ut verum aliquid 
sint, prodest ut sint aliquid falsum; cur tantopere 
falsitates formidamus, et pro magno bono appetimus 
veritatem?
Reason. So, we can group the works of men. Like 
comedies, tragedies, farces, and other things of 
that type with the works of painters and sculptors. 
A man in a painting cannot be as true, even though 
it tends toward the appearance of a man, as those 
things which are written in the works of the comic 
authors. Such things do not choose to be false 
nor are they false, through their own desire to be 
so, but they are compelled by a kind of necessity 
to conform as much as they are able to the artist's 
will. On the other hand, the actor Roscius was by 
choice a false Hecuba on tne stage, though, by 
nature, a true man; he was by choice a true 
tragedian in that he fulfilled his purpose, and 
a false Priam because he played the part of Priam 
though he was not Priam. From this fact arises 
something remarkable, which nevertheless nobody 
denies is a fact.
Augustine. Wnat is that?
Reason. What else do you think but that all These 
things are in some respect true precisely because 
they are in other respects false. To establish 
their truth, the only thing in their favour is that 
they are false in some other regard. Hence they 
never succeed in being what they want or ought to 
be, as long as tney refuse to be false. How could 
that man I just mentioned be a true tragedian, if 
he were unwilling to be a false Hector, a false 
Andromache, a false Hercules, and others without 
number? Or how would it be a true picture, if the 
horse in it were not false? How could it be a 
true image of a man in a mirror, if it were not a 
false man? If, therefore, in order to be some­
thing true it is to the advantage of some things 
that they be something false, why should we have 
such a dread of falsities and desire truth as if 
it were a great good?
Roscius acting Priam is true and false simultaneously: 
ne is 'a true tragedian' and 'a false Priam;1 without 
his acting Priam, and the playwright's having 
preserved Priam's historical memory in his play, and 
without countless similar acts of recording to aid the 
book of memory, there would no longer be any knowledge
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fdlsus homo? Quare, si quibusdam, ut verum aliguid 
sint, prodast ut sint aliquid falsum? cur tantopere 
falsitates formidamus, et pro magno bono appetimus 
veritatem?
Reason. So, we can group the works of men, iiice 
comedies, tragedies, farces, and other things of 
that type with the works of painters and sculptors. 
A man in a painting cannot be as true, even though 
it tends toward the appearance of a man, as taose 
things which are written in the works of the comic 
authors. Such things do not choose to be false 
nor are tney false, through their own desire to be 
so, but they are compelled by a kind of necessity 
to conform as much as they are able to the artist's 
will. On the other hand, the actor Roscius was by 
cnoice a false Hecuba on the stage, though, by 
nature, a true man; be was by choice a true 
tragedian in that he fulfilled his purpose, and 
a false Priam because he played the part of Priam 
though he was not Priam. From this fact arises 
something remarkable, which nevertheless nobody 
denies is a fact.
Augustine, wnat is that?
Reason. What else do you think but tnat all these 
things are in some respect true precisely because 
they are in other respects false. To establish 
their truth, the only thing in their favour is that 
they are false in some other regard. Hence they 
never succeed in being what they want or ought to 
be, as long as tney refuse to be false. How could 
that man I just mentioned be a true tragedian, if 
he were unwilling to be a false Hector, a false 
Andromache, a false Hercules, and others without 
number? Or how would it be a true picture, if the 
horse in it were not false? How could it be a 
true image of a man in a mirror, if it were not a 
false man? If, therefore, in order to be some­
thing true it is to the advantage of some things 
that they be something false, why should we have 
sc.l. a dread of falsities and desire truth as if 
it were a great good?
Roscius acting Priam is true and false simultaneously: 
nts is 'a true, tragedian1 and 'a false Priam?' without 
his acting Priam, and the playwright's having 
preserved Priam's historical memory in his play, and 
without countless similar acts of recording to aid the 
book of memory, there would no longer be any knowledge
of Priam. Actor, author, historian: the gap ramains
between the reality and its appearances, between the 
actual event anJ its record, but the integrity of 
intention in all three is shared; in each man's act 
Priam's life is recreated ."ir others to understand.
The type of fiction that Macrobius characterises as 
narratio fabulosa43 which 1 rests on a solid foundation 
of truth' (Commentary, 1.2.9) is still fabulous, 
fictive — but- < relation to truth is a sympathetic 
one, and one which closely parallels that of tne 
historian in moral intention if not always in the 
verisimilitude of its data.44
In choosing to authenticats his fiction by claiming 
its historicity, Chaucer stresses a specific type of 
relationship to reality, to truth; but any authenti­
cating device, by its very presence in a work which 
requires its functioning to aid its claim to truthful­
ness, ultimately works in two directions: Chaucer's
claim of historicity is also a token of hie poem's 
fiction,45 and like the act of Roscius' choosing to 
play Priam, it suggests the benevolent nature of his 
-.rue lie, its concern with a morally mimotic relation­
ship to reality.
Poetic allegory provides one means of writing poetry 
which does not only entertain but also instructs, 
which tHough it s fiction is nevertheless reasonable 
and can embody a 1 true lie.’46 It is a style which 
Chaucer himself utilised, particularly in the House of 
Fame and the Parliament of Fowls. But the relationship 
to truth of the fiction wnich is the narrative frame of 
the Canterbury Tales is not allegorical in this sense.47 
The narrative frame of the Canterbury Tales stresses 
its truth in a different way, by mirroring the 
manifold diversity of real life, not only in the
range of its subject matter but also in its multiple 
realism of style. in the Divine Comedy the 'bella 
menzogna' that Dante creates expresses itself as trues 
the journey which Dante ventures upon within the poem 
is not described as imaginary but as actual. Charles 
Singleton offers an interpretation of the implications 
of this which indirectly illuminates the realism of 
Chaucer's narrative frame too;
St Gregory, in the Proem to his Exposition of 
the Song of songs, says; ’Allegoria enim 
animae longe a Deo positae quasi guamdam 
machinam facit ut per 111am levetur ad Deum’ 
and the Letter to Can Grande declares that the 
end of the whoie Comedy is 'to remove those 
living in this life from the state of misery 
and lead them to the state of felicity.1 
A poet of rectitude is one who is interested 
in directing the will of men to God. But a 
disembodied Lady Philosophy is not a machina 
which can bear the weight of lifting man to 
God because, in her, man finds no part of his 
own weight. Lady Philosophy did not, does not, 
will not, exist in the flesn. As she is 
constructed in the Convivio, she comes to stand 
for Sapientia, for created Sapientia standing 
in analogy to uncreated Sapientia "Which is the 
Word. Even so, she is word without flesh.
And only the word made flesh can lift man to 
God. If the allegory of a Christian poet of 
rectitude is to support any weight, it will be 
grounded in the flesh, which means grounded in 
history — and will lift up from there. In 
short the trouble with Lady Philosophy was the 
trouble which Augustine found with the 
Platonists; 'But that the Word was made flesh 
and dwelt among us I did not read there.'
(Dante Studies One, p.93)
Although the Canterbury Tales is no divine comedy, 
it demonstrates a concern with reality similar to that 
evinced in Dante's Comedy. The world which is reflected 
in the Tales particularly, but not only, in the 
narrative framework is the real world in which time and 
space coexist to provide a frame for human action, and 
in which human action is seen as innately moral or
immoral. The nature of the narrative situation itself, 
the vividness and naturalism of the descriptions of the 
pilgrims in the General Prologue and the link passages, 
the colloquialism of their interchanges, the ease with 
which immediate exigencies override the prearranged 
scheme devised by the Host, these and similar details 
of plot and execution inform the historical authenticity 
of tne pilgrims' situation. Dante's poem is set beyond 
the normal confines of human experience, Chaucer's well 
within them, but both poems see reality as God's poem, 
whose harmony is not only beautiful but also true, and 
in both poems the existence of man as God's creature, 
created in His image and capable of -chieving eternal 
salvation by rightful action, is -
The complex interwoven nature of the structure of the 
Canterbury Tales has often been noted. What I am 
interested in discussing j.s a series of interrelation­
ships which communicate a sense of the poem's plenitude. 
Within the bounds of the narrative Chaucer's stated 
role is that of a faithful reporter of past events, 
beyond its restrictions he is the author of a poem 
in which fictitious events are actualised by a number 
of stylistic devices which both vivify them and suggest 
the nature of their vitality, for Chaucer's art in the 
Canterbury Tales is self-defining. It sets up 
expectations, confirms or denies them; it makes, 
unmakes and reforms our sense of the poem, and in the 
process increasingly enriches our understanding of 
what the poem is. If we were to take Chaucer's claim 
that this is history and he its scribe seriously, our 
attitude to his artistry would be of a particular sort, 
for the expectations set up by the claim are specific. 
When we see that the Canterbury Tales is fiction we 
do not simply have another attitude: we incorporate
into our concept of the poem whatever sense we have
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of .its squaring fiction and truth? it is Chaucer who has 
explicitly raised the issue of their relationship for 
his audience.
To label the most prominent of the stylistic devices 
utilized realism is legitimate if one Informs the 
protean quality of that term with fairly explicit 
meaning. The nature of what people value as real 
varies in different places and at different times, 
and also obviously, though to a lesser degree, amongst 
individuals sharing cultural constants which would 
tend to cause them to have in common a great number of 
attitudes to experience. The realism of the Canterbury 
Tales is multifaceted, but all its aspects are related 
to a single and steady perception of the firmness of 
Christian truth.48 The social and psychological realism 
of the frame, the lucidity of its boethian logic of 
cause and effect are aspects of a whole whose basic 
assumption is that the universe is the divinely created 
ar^na in which man freely chooses the nature of his 
life's moral quality and in so doing both determines 
his own eternal fate and illuminates the nature of 
choice for his fellowmen. The narrator’s liberal 
praise of the pilgrims, often as nonpareils sometimes 
only as excellent men and women of their estaat, 
conveys a sense of their (inflated) typicality: it is
as though they are being generously ranked upon a scale 
of their own conventional attributes, but the pilgrims 
are also each individuated so carefully that the range 
of their responses to one another and to tale-telling, 
the two chief touchstones of their characterization 
after the initial portraits, seem to possess the 
authority and inevitability of what is. The totality 
of responses in the frame offers a rich complex of 
highly individual and typical behaviour, social and 
anti-social, moral and immoral action; the individual
responses are authenticated by the consonance of the 
inner logic of the personality in question and the 
nature of his choice of tale,49 by similarities and 
contrast of the various characters whose tales form 
•the body of each group, or by the dramatic situation 
in which the characters find themselves. The relation­
ship between teller and tale is buttressed by the 
relationship between the tales in each group and indeed 
by the extended treatment throughout the poem of topics 
in which a multitude of differing attitudes is 
manifested.
2 BEGINNINGS: SPRING, PILGRIMAGE AND
.THE PERSONA'S LITERAL DILEMMA
The ways in which the poem is authenticated include two 
that are fundamental: first the use of a continous
narrative frame, and secondly the articulation as the 
poem progresses of an unfolding relationship between 
Chaucer, his poem and its earthly audience, and Chaucer, 
his poem and God. Reading the Canterbury Tales involves 
the reader as well as the pilgrims in a journey — one of 
understanding - whose Implication unfolds gradually, and 
the inner authenticating device - that of the narrative 
frame — is both established earliest and provides the 
basis upon which perception of the second depends.
At the most basic level the narrative frame of the 
Canterbury Tales contains the individual tales within 
its context; it provides a boundary to the poem, a sense 
of its finite form, both as a whole object - the poem 
itself — and as something distinguished from the 
surrounding reality which it reflects.^ While each 
completed tale has, clearly established, its own inner 
sequentiality, it is the narrative frame which 
communicates a sense of continuity most comprehensively. 
Beginning in the General Prologue the narrative frame 
functions throughout the poem. The device of the journey 
to Canterbury which provides its plot is sustained 
throughout the tales, and only disappears at the end 
of the Parson’s Tale (his telling the tale implies the 
pilgrimage's presence until its completion). Then, in 
the final lines entitled 'Heere taketh the makere of 
this book his leve1 the poem, as it were, shifts gear 
or, less anachronistically, changes its imitative level 
of reality: in their implication the opening lines of
the General Prologue extend far beyond the immediate 
situation which Chaucer goes on to describe, and they 
act as a link between the world of the Canterbury Tales
2 BEGINNINGS: SPRING, PILGRIMAGE AND
.THE PERSONA'S LITERAL DILEMMA
The ways in which the poem is authenticated include two 
that are fundamental: first the use of a continous
narrative frame, and secondly the articulation as the 
poem progresses of an unfolding relationship between 
Chaucer, his poem and its earthly audience, and Chaucer, 
his poem and God. Reading the Canterbury Tales involves 
the reader as well as the pilgrims in a journey - one of 
understanding — whose implication unfolds gradually, and 
the inner authenticating device — that of the narrative 
frame — is both established earliest and provides the 
basis upon which perception of the second depends.
At the most basic level the narrative frame of the 
Canterbury Tales contains the individual tales within 
its context? it provides a boundary to the poem, a sense 
of its finite form, both as a whole object ~ the poem 
itself — and as something distinguished from the 
surrounding reality which it reflects.^* While each 
completed tale has, clearly established, its own inner 
sequentiality, it is the narrative frame which 
communicates a sense of continuity most comprehensively. 
Beginning in the General Prologue the narrative frame 
functions throughout the poem. The device of the journey 
to Canterbury which provides its plot is sustained 
throughout the tales, and only disappears at the end 
of the Parson's Tale (his telling the tale implies the 
pilgrimage's presence until its completion). Then, in 
the final lines entitled 'Heere taketh the makere of 
this book his leve1 the poem, as it were, shifts gear 
or, less anachronistically, changes its imitative level 
of reality: in their implication the opening lines of
the General Prologue extend far beyond the immediate 
situation which Chaucer goes on to describe, and they 
act as a link between the world of the Canterbury Tales
and -the world of Chaucer's auditors or readers; in the 
last lines of the poem what is offered both develops 
from and extends beyond the immediate implications of 
the plot of the narrative frame. The pilgrimage may 
only have been presented as actual, but the author's 
existence is incontrovertible, and the catalogue of his 
works includes the title of only one poem, the Book of 
the Lion, which is not extant — hardly sufficient in 
itself to trigger off unease at the possible ambiguity 
of Chaucer's authorial stance in the retraction.
Whatever the force of the passage, whether it is merely 
a conventionally devout ending or a deeply felt 
retraction, its speaker is, in a sense which cannot be 
applied to the persona earlier, undoubtedly the creator 
of the Canterbury Tales. The 1eve-taking, by its own 
closer relation to actuality, moves its readers to 
contemplate the limits of the realism of the pilgrimage 
situation, and respond not only to the fiction but also 
to the fact of its fictiveness and hence of Chaucer's 
authorial responsibility.
At both the beginning and the ending of the Canterbury 
Tales links between the poem and the reality which it 
reflects symbolically are carefully and precisely 
established. Just as what is described in the first 
eighteen lines happens each spring, so too what 
Chaucer is stating at the end of his poem has an 
authenticity which his pilgrims do not literally share? 
the assessment of the nature of his offering in the 
Canterbury Tales is that of the poem's author, reflecting 
upon his position in relation to his Maker, a position 
determined in part by his innate nature and in part by 
his own use of his freedom of will. And we, reading it, 
exist in actuality too, and in the act of reading and 
responding to Chaucer's poem are exercising a real freedom 
of choice even as he did in writing it and considering
what he had written. These two passages, introducing and 
concluding the Canterbury Tales, provide focal points in 
the dialogue between author and readers or perhaps more 
aptly boundaries which demarcate the end of one sort of 
reality and the entry into another, but their implications 
are clearest once the inner figure in the narrative frame, 
that of the pilgrimage, has been explored. Viewing the 
act of reading the Canterbury Tales as going on a 
narrative journey51 - a type of itinerarium mentis not 
directly ad deurn but definitely towards an understanding 
of the presence and partial significance of His traces 
and shadows in the world — it is necessary to begin at 
the beginning with the description of spring.
The opening eighteen lines of the poem locate the action 
in time and space. They differ from the remainder of 
the General Prologue in which the persona'a presence is 
almost ubiquitous, implicitly impressing upon us a 
sense of the subjectivity of the account given.
Here the description is primarily of an objective 
reality, and the style of presentation achieves, 
through its conventionalism, a degree of impersonality 
that is highlighted by the easy naturalism of what 
succeeds it. The reality described communicates a 
sense of the teleological nature of the universe: 
the description of the renewal of spring, physically 
regenerative for plant and animal life, spiritually 
restorative to man, is one of phenomena which affect 
more people than the pilgrims assembled at the Tabard 
or within the covers of Chaucer's Book; the universality 
of the description provides a very broad context for 
what fo] lows and also tacitly unites all mankind within 
its scope. Chaucer's pilgrims, impelled by the 
spiritual yearning that moves men's thoughts to God, 
are authenticated by the catholic nature of their 
response/*3 The description itself embodies a coherent 
sense of the benevolent pattern of duration in the
world z spring implies the whole cycle of the seasons 
which, unfolding in time, points towards and provides 
an analogue to the eternal rest beyond tiiae,^ the cyclic 
renewal implies the continuity of life and spring, being 
not only the season of physical resurgence but also of 
spiritual renewal, is a fitting choice for this pilgrim­
age which, being fictive, has only symbolically true 
existence. Chauncey Mood points out that spring was not 
a particularly popular time for actual pilgrimages.55 
But that spring is a conceptually fitting time for 
pilgrimage is obvious: it is the season in which 'God
first maked man,* in which both the Annunciation of the 
Second Man and his Passion took place, and it is also 
the season in which Noah, prefiguring Christ, ensured 
the salvation of those who voyaged in the Ark built to 
God's design.
The use of conventional spring imagery in a passage 
of highly formal verse links Chaucer's depiction to 
its. literary forbears, recalling both classical and 
earlier medieval natureingange, even while the specific 
development of the narrative manifests its singularity.56 
The device of an introductory description of spring is 
a literary one, and admits equally any directing of 
the understanding; that it is used to draw attention 
to a relationship between time and space, the eternal 
and the infinite and the importance of this union for 
man is deliberate. By its movement, the description 
of time's process establishes an innate connection 
between universals and particulars. It is itself 
couched ir the historical present ('whan [the earth is 
renewed] . . . thanne longen folk to goon on pilgrimages'), 
a present which, used in conjunction with a preterite, 
expresses both the sense ->£ perpetual possibility — 
this is what people always feel in the spring, this is 
how nature responds at that time of year - and of
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completed action — when April has pierced the drought of 
March the plants can begin and do begin, and have again 
begun, this year, to flower.57
The use of the historical present universalizes the 
implications of the passage; so too does the manner in 
which space is described. The time described in the 
passage is whenever-spring-comes-in-a-christian-universe 
before it is 'in that seson . . .  as I lay . . . redy to 
wenden on my pilgrymage;' the place is wherever 'the 
tendre croppes' are renewed in April, in 1straunge 
strondes', in 'sondry londes1 as well as in all England: 
the lines evoke a sense of all places and all time 
before they become specifically located in the here
Bifil that in that seson on a day
In Southwerk. at the Tabard, as I lay . . .
[1 (A) 19-20]
The movement of the verse involves a narrowing of focus 
which does not deny the universals from which it began? 
it first expresses their validity by demonstrating them 
in action and then by the ordering of the verbal pattern 
suggests how what follows relates to what went before. 
Tne ideal nature of the universe is stressed in the 
formally executed opening lines? the special case of the 
individual pilgrimage which Chaucer is to describe is 
placed within its context, even as the earthly real may 
be seen in the context of the infinite ideal which it 
attempts to mirror and for which its creatures yearn.
The motive energy which causes the seasonal cycle 
derives from God, and directly or indirectly, freely 
or by kynde knowynge, His creatures respond.5® The 
introduction to the Canterbury Tales clearly establishes 
a sense of the universe's being God's creation. Its
idea-lism is in sharp contrast to the pragmatism of most 
of the pilgrims to whom the persona is about to introduce 
us, and its function is not dissimilar to that of 
Boethius1 pr v r in metrum nine of book three of the 
Consolation of Philosophy where lines such as these 
attest to the basis of belief upon which rests the 
exploration of earthly reality there;
0 qui perpetua znundum ratione gubernas 
Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo 
Ire lubes staMlisque manens das cuncta moueri.
. . . Tu namque serenum,
Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, 
Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
(Boethius, 3 m.9 1-3, 26-29)
0 thow Fadir, soowere and creatour of hevene 
and of erthes, that governest this world by 
perdurable resow..that comaundest the tymes 
to gon from syn that age hadde bygynnynge; 
thow that duellest thiselve ay stedefast and 
stable, and yevest alle othere thynges to 
ben meved . . . .  thou art cleernesse, thow 
art pesible reste to debonayre folk; thow 
thiself art bygynrvnge, berere, ledere, 
path and terms; to looks on the, that is 
our ende.
(Boece, 3 m.9 1-7, 46-49)
Chaucer's introduction, too, clarifies general issues 
which human action might be thought to have placed in 
doubt and which what follows in the poem often seems 
to ignore. ^  The introduction differs in authority 
from the often dubious value judgments which the persona 
makes shortly afterwards; it provides a type of 
objectivity whose Presence conveys a wider view than 
the shortsighted selfconfidence of most of the pilgrims 
admits. The utilization of the tale-telling device in 
itself involves placing a high premium on subjectivity 
throughout the poem: one of its major values lies in
its stress upon the preciousness of human freedom of
idea-lism is in sharp contrast to the pragmatism of most 
of the pilgrims to whom the persona is about to introduce 
us, and its function is not dissimilar to that of 
Boethius' prayer in metrum nine of book three of the 
Consolation of Philosophy where lines such as these 
attest to the basis of belief upon which rests the 
exploration of earthly reality there:
0 qui perpetua mundum rations gubernas 
Terrarum caelique sator qui tempus ab aeuo 
Ire lubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moueri
. . . Tu namque serenum,
Tu requies tranquilla piis, te cernere finis, 
Principium, uector, dux, semita, terminus idem.
(Boethius, 3 m.9 1-3, 26-29)
0 thow Fadir, soowere and creatour of hevene 
and of e’-'hes, that governest this world by 
perdurable resoun,that comaundest the tymes 
to gon from syn that age hadde bygynnynge; 
thow that duellest thiselve ay stedefast and 
stable, and yevest alle othere thynges to 
ben meved . . . .  thou art cleernesse, thow 
art pesible reste to debonayre folk; thow 
thiself art bygynnynge, berere, ledere, 
path and terme; to looke on the, that is 
our ende.
(Boece, 3 m.9 1-7, 46-49)
Chaucer's introduction, too, clarifies general issues 
which human action might be thought to have placed in 
doubt and which what follows in the poem often seems 
to ignore.^  The Introduction differs in authority 
from the often dubious value judgments which the persona 
makes shortly afterwards; it provides a type of 
objectivity whose presence conveys a wider view than 
the shortsighted selfconfidence of most of the pilgrims 
admits. The utilization of the tale-telling device in 
Itself involves placing a high premium on subjectivity 
throughout the poem: one of its major values lies in
its stress upon the preciousnens of human freedom of
choice; In a poem whose natural isra defends upon both moral 
and psycnclnciwil rt'P.lisr.i, this also involves an explora­
tion of ?. ruj t.itudc- of subject <ve freedoms, including the 
freedom to bo wilfully blind in embracing an apparently 
inexhaustible series of Ic-ssor rather than greater goods. 
In the boginning of the poem as again in its ending 
Chaucer oi f-.^ s description designed to offset the balance 
of wh.i intervenes by its own, truer orierxtatici.
The com -pt of pilgrimage introduced in these lines 
functic a analogously to the description of created 
nature in the spring. Its latent figural meaning is 
inherent in Chaucer's use of it and is made explicit in 
the Parson's Prologue and Tale and in Chaucer's leve- 
takinq, but the overriding impression of the pilgrims' 
journey to Canterbury is one in which a series of 
responses to immediate situations rather than any long 
term goal predominates. The ideal connotations of the 
pilgrimage communicate one level of the reality which 
Chaucer presents: the spiritual potential inherent in
man (reflected most strikingly amongst the characters 
in the idealized descriptions of the Knignt, the Clerk, 
the Parson and the Ploughman) and the nature of man's 
life on earth as a pilgrimage back to God. The range 
of responses elicited from most of the pilgrims is set 
in clear contradistinction to this, In the nexus of 
pilgrims' attitudes sublime indifference to moral issues 
coexists, with convincing naturalism, side by side with 
moral scrupulosity, easygoing lack of interest in 
personal salvation and utter contempt for others' 
concern with it. The concept of the ideal in human 
behavior.,., and the range of the ctual are contermir. -sly 
held within the same dramatic device.
The use of the pilgrimage topos provider the frame with 
a wide Christian context and a specific temporal and
spatial focus. The journey to Canterbury incorporates 
both physical and spiritual movement, Chaucer describes 
it as an actual event, mapping the pilgrims' advance 
from Southwark along the Canterbury Way; but it is a 
pilgrimage not merely a vacation that the 1compaignye 
of sondry folk1 embark upon and Chaucer also demonstrates 
the nature of the pilgrims1 spiritual attitudes to this 
journey. The movement through time and space to pay 
tribute to the saint exists in its own right; it also has 
figural meaning. It connotes the pilgrimage of life 
itself both compositely and individually: the history of
all mankind and of each man's journey through the world; 
it also symbolizes the inner movement of the affections, 
a journey neither from place to plae« nor from past to 
future, but at least potentially from the state of 
original sin to a state of g r a c e I n  St Augustine's 
terminology the pilgrimage is both res and siqna■
When in the prologue to his tale, the Parson says what 
ho will ’shews . . . the ney, in this viage,/ Of thilke 
parfit glorious pilgryraage/ That highte Jerusalem 
celestial1 ['/. (I) 49-SlJ . he draws together the Canterbury 
pilgrimage, the. concept of life as a pilgrimage and the 
ideal journey of the mine towards God in this life; for 
unless the pilgrims understand their nature and the 
nature of the larger journey upon which they have also 
embarked, their pilgrimage can only he to them a movement 
from place to place, its signification being of no more 
use to them than the radiance of the sun to a blind man.^ 
But although his sermon is overtly addressed to the 
pilgrims its truth transcends the limits of its narrative 
situation; it is not the Parson's nor any other of the 
pilgrims' voices which is heard at the end of his sermon 
on 'a ful noble wey and a ful convenable, which may nafc 
fayle to man ne to wonunan that thurgh synne hath mysgoon 
fro the rights wey of Jerusalem celestial (which wey is 
cleped Penitence)' [X (I) 79-80]. Ultimately Chaucer's
pilgrims are as little able to use the words which he gives 
to the Parson as a blind man to perceive the sunlight, for 
they, like the priest, are fictions: they reflect but do
not possess human reality. But the words are Chaucer’s 
and they speak directly to Chaucer's audience not only, as 
the fiction claims, as part of a report of things past but 
in the poet's present affirmation of an eternal truth.
The pilgrimage to Canterbury is only a fiction, the pil­
grims the figments of Chaucer's imagination, and the voice 
which closes the Canterbury Tales is the persona-poet's.
The journey inside the frame is complete, even though the 
poem is, in parts, unfinished; but poet and reader too 
have been on a journey of insight — through the poem and 
into a sense of its implications. I would like to leave 
discussion of the implications of the fictionality of the 
pilgrimage until later, merely remarking here that Chaucer 
does stress this aspect of its constituent makeup overtly 
at the end of the poem. No reader is likely to take 
entirely seriously Chaucer's cl.„im of the historicity of 
his account for long, but once made, the claim is present 
in the readers' or listeners' minds as a part of what is 
offered, and it is only explicitly counterbalanced at the 
end of the tales when the history claim is firmly rescinded 
and the fiction claim placed in its stead in Chaucer's 
acceptance of responsibility for his act of making in the 
Canterbury Tales. At the beginning of the poem the only 
acts for which Chaucer accepts responsibility are those 
associated with his role as pilgrim and reliable reporter: 
he attests the accuracy of what is to follow and discusses 
the ethical problems raised by reporting precisely the 
speech and actions of the entire company, not all of whom 
were moral exemplars.
While the persona mulls over the problem of 'spekynge 
ful brode1 if he is to incorporate a full account of 
the pilgrimage, we are made to accept without comment 
the actual presence of the 'ful nyne and twenty' 
pilgrims-, the dilemma presumes their substantiality.
The large, and varied group of pilgrims is first 
characterized by what each of its members shares: the
common desire to go on pilgrimage; it is only after this 
claim, which not only levels their intentions but also 
quite literally realizes the pilgrims, is made that 
Chaucer first suggests and then demonstrates the variety 
of individual responses to the common situation. And of 
course the immediate situation in which the pilgrims find 
themselves is really twofold, for not only do they share 
their objective, visiting the shrine of St Thomas, but 
they also share acquiescence to the leadership of the 
Host in the tale-telling game. 1Oure Lord Jhesu Crist
seith thus: "By the fruyt of hem shul ye knowen hem"'
[X (I) 116] ; the fruits of 4\e pilgrims are manifest 
both in words and deeds, their choice of tales and 
their actions along the way. The journeying together 
and the agreement to tell whatever tales of 1 sentence 
and solaas' they choose provide opportunities for diverse 
ramification. The pilgrims, grouped together by their 
common intentions, are particularized by their responses 
to their situation. The plurality of responses described 
in the Canterbury Tales is of wide range, mirroring in 
aOs diversity the spectrum of possibilities open to 
mankind even as in their number and variety of attitudes, 
vocations and status the pilgrims reflect the multiplicity 
of men. The pilgrimage topos must incorporate description 
of an event, the journey itself; for the event to occur 
there must also be an agent. One way of employing the 
topos is to follow the progress of a representative man 
as Bunyan does Christian1s in Pilgrim's Progress; another 
way is to include a group of pilgrims who joirtly
represent human potential and its realization. In the 
Divine Comedy Dante uses both the individual pilgrim, 
'himself,' and a group, all those who together demonstrate 
'status animarum post mortem?' in the Canterbury Tales 
Chaucer's persona, unlike Dante's, becomes one of the ‘ 
same group as the other characters, apparently differing 
from them only in that he is the one who has decided to 
recount their experiences.
In the Summa contra gentiles (2 .44-48}^ St Thomas 
discusses aspects of the relation of the many and the 
One. God is the One from whom all creation proceeds 
and with whom it strives to be reunited, and this is 
true of creation in its totality, of whole species and 
of individuals within each species. God has created an 
hierarchical universe and man's position within it is 
intermediate between the lesser animals, which like man 
possess bodies but which have no intellectual souls, 
and the angels which are pure intelligences. It is his 
possession of a free and rational soul which distinguishes 
man from lesser creatures for through it man can both 
know and love the true and the good and in so doing he 
most fully realizes his humanity. Within the human 
species there is further ordering. For since men are 
not God's equals no adequate likeness to God is found 
in them singly ? jointly and in relation to one another 
they can better reflect God's unity and simplicity 
'since a plurality of goods is better than a single 
finite good1 (2.45.5) .
Drawing upon traditional theology, 'the grete poets of 
Ytaille/ that highte Dant' [II (B2) 3650-51] also discusses 
the relationship of the many and the One and of universals 
and particulars in relation to the multiplicity of the 
human race in De monarchia:
Nunc autem videndum est, quid sit finis totius 
humanae civilitatis . . . .  Et ad evidentiam eius 
quod quaeritur, advertendum, quod quemadmodura est 
finis aliquis ad quem natura producit pollicem, et 
alius ab hoc . . .  ad quem totum hominem; sic 
alius est finis ad quem singularem hominem, alius 
ad quem ordinat donestiLcam communitytern, alius ad 
quem viciniftm, et alius ad quem civitatem, et 
alius ad quem regnum, et denique ultimus ad quem 
universaliter genus humanum Deus aeternus arte sua 
quae natura est, in esse producit . . . .  Est . . 
aliqua propria operatic hui. anae universitatis, ad 
quam ipsa universitas hominum in tanta multitudine 
ordinatur, ad quam quidem operationem nec homo 
unus ^omus una, nec una vicinia, nec una
c i r e g n u m  particulnre pertingere potest. 
Qua- .t ilia, manifestum fiet, si ultimum
de t totius humanitatis appareat . . . .
Patet . , quod ultimum de potentia ipsius
humanitatis, est potentia sive virtus intellectiva
Et quia poientia ista per unum hominem, seu per 
aliquam particularlum communitatum superius 
distinctarum, tota simul in actum reduci non 
potest; necesse est multitudinem esse in humano 
genere, per quam quidem tota potentia haec 
actuetur; sicut necesse est multitudinem rerum 
generabilium, ut potentia tota materiae primae 
semper sub actu sit; . . . .  Potentia etiam 
intellectiva, de qua loquor, non solum est ad 
formas universales, sive species, sed etiam per 
quandam extensionem ad particulares. Unde solet 
did, quod intellectus speculativus extensions 
fit practicus, cuius finis est agere atque 
facere. Quod dico propter agibilia, quae 
politics prudentia regulantur, et propter 
factibilia, quae regulantur arte; quae omnia 
speculation! anciilantur tanquam optimo, ad quod 
humanum genus prima bonitas in esse produxit.
(1.3, Moore, pp. 342-343)
So now we must consider what is the goal of human 
civilization as a whole . . . .  And to understand 
the point in question we must note that like as 
there is an end for which nature produces the 
thumb, and another vhan this . . . for which the 
whole man, so there is one end for which she 
produces the individual man, another for which 
the domestic group, another for which the district 
another for which the city-state, and another for 
which the kingdom; and lastly there is an ultimate 
goal for which the eternal God, by his art, which 
is nature, brings into being the human race in its 
universality. There is . . . some function proper
to humanity as a whole for which that same totality 
of men is ordained in so great multitude, to which 
function neither one man nor one family, nor one 
district nor one city-state, nor any Individual 
kingdom may attain. And what this function is 
will be obvious if the specific potentiality of 
mankind generally be made clear . . . .  It is 
plain . . . that the specific potentiality of 
humanity as such is a potentiality or capacity of 
intellect.
And since that same potentiality cannot all be 
reduced to actuality at the same time by one man, 
or by any of the limited associations distinguished 
above, there must needs be multiplicity in the 
human race, in order for the whole of this poten­
tiality to be actualized thereby. Like as there 
must be a multiplicity of things generable in 
order that the whole potentiality of first matter 
may always be in act; . . . .  Moreover, the 
intellectual faculty of which I am speaking deals 
not only with universal forms or species, but also, 
by a kind of extension, with particular ones.
Whence it is commonly said that the speculative 
intellect by extension becomes the practical 
intellect, the end of which is doing and making.
And I draw this distinction because there are 
things to be done which are regulated by political 
wisdom, and things to be made, which are regulated 
by art. But they are all-alike handmaids of 
speculation, as the supreme function for which 
the Prime Excellence brought the human race into
(Kicksteed, pp. 131-133)
The order of the universe is found not in individual 
parts but in its totality as Dante explains (De Mon., 1.6) 
and it proclaims itself to those who seek to perceive it.
In the Genealogy of the Gods (15.10, Romano, 2, pp. 775- 
776) Boccaccio offers an engaging defence of his own 
choice of vocation by asserting that nature our mother 
assures the preservation of mankind by creating people 
with different aptitudes since a multitude of occupations 
is necessary to ensure man's continuance. Man is a social 
creature: alone no one can survi/e; even the sublime 
theologian needs the farmer to provide him with rood, the
maacm and carpenter to give him shelter, the weaver and 
shoemaker to provide his clothes and shoes. It is as 
part of a group of people of diverse skills (including 
that of poetry-making) that man has his being and 
continuance. In regard to this justification it is 
interesting to reflect how representative Chaucer's 
vocational depiction within the social range from 
knight to landed peasant is in the narrative frame and 
also to remember that excepting the ghostly preestes 
thre each character's vocation is uniquely allocated 
which makes the depiction of rank and occupation as 
wide as possible within the scope of the given number 
of pilgrims.63
The group of Canterbury pilgrims together manifest a 
type of part of the universal order, a sense of the 
manifold nature of choice and the underlying realities 
upon which it is based and by which it may be understood. 
Chaucer's company of 'sondry folk' whose avocation of 
pilgrimage is an acceptance of spiritual responsibility 
in 'doing' and whose consent to the Host's secular 
leadership involves acceptance of responsibility in 
' making', together communicate a far fuller picture of 
humanity than any of them could possibly do alone, and 
in their corporate diversity they proclaim both the 
freedom man enjoys to choose a particular way for himself 
and the types and implications of the choices that people 
do make. In creating so diverse a cast of pilgrims 
within hie poem, Chaucer imitates in small the plenitude 
of the human race and in so doing places his poem in 
relation to God's poem of the world, and himself in 
relation to its Maker, his own act of Imitation being in 
this both full and true.64
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Freedom of will and choice, if it involved only the fre 
to choose .-.mongst random possibilities, would be a very*, 
limited instrument of human potency, but it is associat 
with the concept that man's natural desire is to enjoy/ 
as fully as he may, both in this life and the next, uni' 
with the good; it is the instrument whereby man, whose: 
reason enables him to distinguish between good and evil- 
may choose to embrace what is good and reject what is e 
In essence the freedom is a moral one, and those who pr 
not to perceive and act upon this delude themselves 
concerning its nature. Freedom to choose the moral pat 
of one's life is fundamental to man, who possesses both 
the knowledge and capacity to choose well; if he cares 
abuse this gift, which is the gift of his own rightful 
nature, he may: for where were the freedom or the goi^ d
if man were obliged to select a particular pattern? 
lives of all other worldly creatures are ordered by the 
kynde knowynge implanted within them; what they do is 
good, but it is not praiseworthy since it involves no 
choice. To man alone on earth is given the dignity of 
being able to choose the good, and men who prefer to 
deny their essential morality by blindly pursuing false 
goods, are both self-defeating (since ultimately they ^  
destroy themselves) and blameworthy. This is the reply 
which Lady Philosophy gives to Boethius when he asks wh 
alone of all earthly creatures men include amongst thei 
number those who choose to lead the life of shrewes. 
Boethius had been troubled by the apparent contradictio 
between the concept of a good universe created by a goo 
God and the abundance of wicked men in positions which 
enable them not only, apparently, to prosper’ but also t 
harm others, \ ■
The pilgrims in the narrative frame represent*- a wide "r 
of moral attitudes. If the frame is to mirror the actu 
world, of which it purports to be a record, .'it would be
highly implausible if all its members were uniformly 
virtuous. The freedom of will and of choice which the 
Canterbury pilgrims possess is depicted in a way which 
not only authenticates their individual freedoms but 
also places each man's choice within the context 
established by those of the other members of the group: 
each of the pilgrims acts freely, but each choice is not 
seen in isolation, its nature is increasingly sharply 
defined by its juxtaposition to similar acts of choice 
attesting the possibility of other responses.
Throughout the Canterbury Tales there is a series of 
interrelated activities whose implications amplify and 
resonate in relation to one another. The narrator, 
charting the journey, provides the temporal orientation 
of the account? the Host, inviting and accepting 
nomination by the others as their governour in this 
caas, orders — or attempts to order - the form and 
content of the tale-telling game. Each pilgrim who 
tells a tale orders the inner logic of its universe, 
and Chaucer, creating all the characters, devising their 
freedoms and necessities, offers his evocation of their 
reality in the poem to his readers, whose act of reading 
involves another act of organization in their mental 
reconstruction of the poem. Within the poem the diversity 
of reactions in what is really a very simple narrative 
situation and the interplay it affords contribute to the 
sense of abundant life in the frame.
The person whose actions provide a focal point at the 
beginning of the frame is the narrator whose decision 
to go on pilgrimage though influenced by the season is 
freely made as is his decision to tell of the way which 
he and his fellow pilgrims took; together they provide 
a broad paradigm of the types of choices — verbal and 
actual — which the other pilgrims also make. His
preparing to journey to Canterbury 'with ful devout corage' 
is parallelled by the seriousness with which he takes his 
role of chronicler of the events of the pilgrimage.
That his own judgments of the pilgrims in the General 
Prologue are unlikely does not belie his desire to report- 
what they did accurately. Chaucer does not sustain the 
narrator's idiosyncratic vision throughout the Canterbury 
Tales; although the narrator reports what happens his 
j idgments become ’ ss unlikely and less prevalent. In 
most of the narrative it is not simply that the narrator's 
judgment proves inadequate but that it is not apparent 55 
But here, at the beginning of the Canterbury Tales, it is 
his sense of purpose which predominates. The inclusion 
of the descriptive clause in which he .'.ntroSuces his 
fellow pilgrims to his audience is prefaced with the 
justification that it is 1accordaunt to resoun' and at 
its conclusion he comments with satisfaction upon the 
orderliness of his organization so far and explains in 
greater detail its rationale:
. . . whil I have tyme and space,
Er that I ferther in this tale pace.
Me thynketh it acordaunt to resoun 
To telle yow al the condicioun 
of ech of hem, so as it semed me,
And whiche they weren, and of what degree,
And eek in what array that they were inne . . .
Now have I tooId you soothly, in a clause, 
Th'estaat, th'array, the nombre, and eek the cause 
Why that assembled was this compaignye 
In Southwerk at this gentil hostelrys 
That highte the Tabard, faste by the Belle.
But now is tyme to yow for to telle 
How that we baren us that like nyght.
Whan we were in that hostelrie alyght;
And after wol I tellr of our viage 
And al the remenaunt of cure pilgrimage.
But first I pray yow, of youre curteisye.
That ye n'arette it nat my vileynye,
Thogh that I pleynly speke in this mateere,
To telle yow hir wordes and hir cheers,
Ne -hogh I speke hir wordes proprely.
For this ye knowen al so wel as I,
Whoso shal telle a talc- after a man,
He moot reherce as ny as evere he kan 
Everich a word, if it be in his charge,
Al speke he never so rudeliche and large.
Or ellis he moot telle his tale untrewe,
Or feyne thyng, or fynde wordes newe.
He may nat spare, althogh he were his brother; 
He moot as wel seye o word as another.
Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ.
And wel ye woofc no vileynye j.s, it.
Bek Plato seith, whoso that kan hym rede.
The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede.
Also I prey yow to foryeve it me,
Al have I nat set folk in M r  degree
Heere in this tale, as that they sholde stonde.
My wit is short, ye may wel understonde.
[I (A) 35-41, 715-746]
The persona tells us how he intends organizing his material. 
It is an history of events that he is recording for his 
audience and the chronological sequence of the original 
events of the pilgrimage will dictate the form of his 
account. The authenticity of his account is emphasized 
by its being presented as personal experience and by its 
reflecting temporal experience in its patterning.66 
To justify his inclusion of cherles tales the persona 
reminds his audience that 'the wordes moote be cosyn to 
the dede' but the concept also vindicates his choice of 
structure. Before embarking on his verbal journey through 
the events, however, the persona states his intention of 
including a preliminary description of the pilgrims.
The principle of organization of the General Prologue 
portraits differs from that of the remainder of the 
account which unfolds in a simple linear sequence. The 
portraits reflect a different type of order: that whereby
man can escape what would otherwise be the tyranny of 
time's one-way flux by using memory and understanding to 
inform perception. It is ’resonable* that he chooses to 
follow the original order of events for most of his 
account and to waive that order in one part of it, for 
the choice in each instance is based upon his attempt to
For this ye knowen al so wel as I,
Whoso shal telle a tale after a man,
He moot reherce as ny as evere he kan 
Everich a word, if it be in his charge,
Al speke he never so rudeliche and large.
Or ellis he moot telle his tale untrewe,
Or feyne thyng, or fynde wordes newe.
He may nat spare, althogh he were his brother; 
He moot as wel seye o word as another.
Crist spak hymself ful brode in hooly writ.
And wel ye woot no vileynye is it.
Bek Plato seith, whoso that kan hym rede.
The wordes moote be cosyn to the dede.
Also I prey yow to foryeve it me,
Al have I nat set folk in hir degree
Heere in this tale, as that they sholde stonde.
My wit is short, ye may wel understonde.
[I (A) 35-41, 715-746]
The persona tells us how he intends organizing his material. 
It is an history of events that he is recording for his 
audience and the chronological sequence of the original 
events of the pilgrimage will dictate the form of his 
account. The authenticity of his account is emphasized 
by its being presented as personal experience and by its 
reflecting temporal experience in its patterning.^
To justify his inclusion of cherles tales the persona 
reminds his audience that 'the wordes moote be cosyn to 
the dede' but the concept also vindicates his choice of 
structure. Before embarking on his verbal journey through 
ne events, however, the persona states his intention of 
including a preliminary description of the pilgrims.
The principle of organization of the General Prologue 
portraits differs from that of the remainder of the 
account which unfolds in a simple linear sequence. The 
portraits reflect a different type of orders that whereby 
man can escape what would otherwise be the tyranny of 
time’s one-way flux by using memory and understanding to 
inform perception. It is 'resonable1 that he chooses to 
follow the original order of events for most of his 
account and to waive that order in one part of it, for 
the choice in each instance ic based upon his attempt to
communicate his knowledge of the experience to his audience 
as best he can and whatever means he utilizes to that end 
are legitimate.
In the actual descriptions of the pilgrims the limitations 
of the persona's judgments are abundantly clears although 
what he says about them makes coherent sense, his own 
responses often seem breathtakingly inappropriate. The 
contradiction is irreconcilable within the logic of 'his1 
account, for if the judgments based upon the farts in 
the description are his, the descriptions have escaped 
his total control for they proclaim other and more than 
he sees; they point beyond the narrator's control to 
Chaucer's.
Earthly experience is time-and spacebound and while 
man is free to range in whatever spatial direction he 
chooses, his liberty in time is more circumscribed.
The longest temporal journey, that from birth to death, 
extends in a single direct Lon. All journeys in space 
occupy time, converting time present into time past and 
time future first into time present and then too into 
time past. But even while this is undeniable, man's 
other experience of time, in thought, bears analogy 
to God's conterminous knowledge of all time; of Him it 
can truly be said that there is no past or future only 
an omnipresent eternal day in which things past, present 
and future are contained; in man's memory past events 
remain present sharing coexistence with present experience 
and, once this has changed its status, with what was 
previously the future and has become present or past 
time.^
In relating his account the perscna speaks in a present 
which he shares with his audience whom he addresses 
directly in the second person. His 'now' occurs whenever 
persona and audience interact, the pilgrimage is in the
past as are the narrator's once present relationships 
with his fellow journeyers to Canterbury. But in memory 
mar can revisit the past and in the words which communi­
cate memory he can recreate it for others, transforming 
its temporal status and increasing its value by 
renewing its accessibility. The persona's choice of 
technique — linear narrative — is eminently reasonable 
given this aim, for imitating the chronological sequence 
he offers his audience an experience analogous to that 
which he and his fellow pilgrims originally had.
Primarily the persona's claims and concerns are not 
those of maker of fic*-.oa but of chronicler of events.®® 
It is not his own art that he is defending from adverse 
criticism but the rightful charge of the historian to 
tell the truth, to express what actually happened 
regardless of its nature.^  The defence of his 
intention of suiting 'the wordes . . .  to the dede' 
provides the preface to the body of his account in 
which he will recount cherles tales as well as storial 
thynge of gentilesse, moralitee and hoolynesse. His 
reasons for doing so do not stem from any form of 
vileyne, they are associated with his concern to 
r<.fleet as closely as words and not overnice morality 
wil± allow the actuality of the pilgrimage.
The argument which the persona offers in selfjustifica­
tion [I (A) 725-746] repays attention since it clarifies 
the distinction between his task and Chaucer's and in 
doing so raises issues about the nature of the poem 
which though unresolved here, once introduced, remain 
as part of our sense of it. Chaucer establishes three 
major foci in these lines. In the first, the persona 
addresses his audience, gratifyingly assuming their 
susceptibility to his reasoning, thus placing its 
members, together with himself, apart from those whose
vileyne has caused his predicament. In the second he 
elaborates his charge and the obligation to report 
accurately and in the third he explores the alternatives, 
either to falsify or to fictionalize, concluding that 
neither suits his purposes, nor is what he is doing 
immoral. The grounds on which the narrator appeals to 
his audience unite its members with him as right- 
thinking people. His appeal is to their understanding: 
cherles may speak rudeliche and large; his audience, 
like himself, knows tne duties of an accurate reporter. 
This assumption of shared attitudes widens the gap 
between the unsalacious intentions of the persona in 
relating that part of his account which might seem 
vileynous and the thoughtlessness of the churlish 
characters: his scruples in reporting their words and
actions implicitly contrast with their original dis­
regard of such niceties. Union with the audience, 
however, like so much else in the Canterbury Tales, 
involves sleight-of-word: it is an hypothetical
audience whose total consensus Chaucer can rely upon.
An actual audience's reactions might well be less 
uniform. In what follows the address to that omnibus 
'ye' that implicitly endorses so many of the persona's 
attitudes, Chaucer allows a more detailed development 
of the rationale of the persona's stance. Character­
istically, the language in which it is couched admits 
ambiguity.
When the persona hopes that his audience understands 
that although he speaks 'pleynly in this mateere' his 
motives are not suspect, he lays claim to reporting 
fully as well as clearly. A further meaning of plainly, 
whose earliest use is attributed by the OED to Chaucer 
(adv. 1.5), is 'without concealment, disguise or 
reserve; openly, candidly, frankly.1 The implication 
that the persona's narration is guileless reinforces
the benevolence of his candour and also points to one of 
its virtues: an unreserved report of actual events,
being unadulterated, is likely to repay scrutiny. 
'Speaking plainly,' the persona must needs 'speke hir 
wordes proprely,' that is, relate them truly, literally, 
and accurately (OED adv. 2)? he will also needs communi­
cate a sense of their intrinsic nature (OED adv. 1) - 
both senses whose meanings reinf rce the persona's 
good intentions while implying that those who would 
cavil at his narration because of what it includes 
would themselves be guilty of the impropriety o± 
preferring the covert falsity of omission to the truth 
of a completely accurate account. 'Telling a tale after 
a man' involves a very different activity either from 
relating a story oneself or creating a tale in which 
others tell tales: what is stressed regarding the
persona's claim of activity is his involvement as a 
participant-auditor in the past and a narrator of the 
past activities in the present. The tale need not only 
refer to the generic man's 'pilgrimage story1 but may 
also refer to whatever he said to the others or whatever 
was told about him. And this is the persona's task: to 
‘reherce as ny as evere he kan/ Evericb a word,' which 
is his charge, that is, the responsibility or office 
entrusted to him (OED sb. 11.12). If charge adds a 
distinct aura of reliability, to rehersen is a somewhat 
chameleonlike term. Its prime sense ir. the passage 
seems clear: it means to repeat, to recount that which
has previously been said or heard (OBD v. l.b.) It also 
reinforces the concept of orderliness emerging through 
the persona's speech, stressing the accuracy of the 
account; one of its meanings is 'to recount in order'
(OED v. 3) The first meaning listed in the OED, however, 
points to a different set of connotations, those 
associated not with 'a strict regard for truth' but with 
artistry and oratory: 'to recite or repeat aloud in a
forinal manner;' telling tales was obviously an ambiguous 
concept so also is rehersyng.
The ambiguity which begins to emerge in the passage 
increases in the reflection on possible alternatives 
where the terms which Chaucer uses compound their 
meanings. If it is possible to tell the truth it is 
necessary to tell as much of it as is known — anything 
i-ss would involve falsifying or fictionalizing. The 
lanvuage which Chaucer uses places these alternatives 
in juxtaposition: 'or ellis . . . telle his tale
untrewe' in the context seems primarily to mean falsify 
his account either by emission or commission, but it may 
also mean make an opposed choice, that of telling some­
thing fictitious; in which case the focus admits shift 
from the abuse of the literal to the possession through 
creation of one’s own fiction. Again 'feyne thyng, or 
fynde wordes newe' expresses the dualism of deception 
and artistic invention: ultimately feign derives from
the Latin fingere and the meanings of fashioning either 
fictitiously or deceptively were both current in the 
fourteenth century (OED v. II;11.2). Also current were 
the senses 'to assert or maintain fictitiously; tv 
allege, make out, pretend' (OED v. II.5) with their 
stress upon the attitude rather than the craft involved 
which is even more apparent in the sense 'to put a false 
appearance on; to disguise, d'.ss-^ mble, conceal.'
(OED v. II.6), and 'to pass of for something else'
(OED v. II.10. c.) Were the persona 'to feyne thyng' 
he would not only invent it he would also offer false 
coinage, passing off as history what was mere illusion 
(see also senses II.3.b. and 4). Fynde has similar 
connotation, implying simultaneously 'to contrive, 
devise, invent, discover' (OED v. 11.15). Whether the 
persona were to direct his efforts to the discovery of 
less indelicate language or to its invention or even
sinjply to the creation in words of different situations, 
he would still be faced with the same essential dilemma: 
how well would this serve truth? The last instance, of 
re-forming anew in part, would - because of his general 
desire to chronicle events not sophisticate them in any 
way — involve a violation of his principles; in the first 
and second instances he would admit to a different type 
of distorting inaccuracy. Whether he were to substitute 
acceptable words for those he fears unacceptable or coin 
new ones, he would still be recounting the same 
Incidents and concepts which though no longer nakedly 
apparent would not have changed in essence — they would 
merely be wearing their new linguistic dress. What he, 
and indeed his maker too, is faced with is the problem 
of becoming aware and desiring to make others aware 
that even the less attractive aspects of reality demand 
confrontation for the simple reason that they exist.
By the use of these words we are given a type of bifocal 
vision: in the foreground we see the persona's dilemma
and respond to his argument that since the value of his 
account lies in its verisimilitude he must use language 
suited to its realities or fail entirely; in a wider 
perspective the proximity of fiction to deception is 
conveyed and because it is its nearness rather than its 
total congruity that is suggested boundaries between 
them are set. Cust as the persona stresses the 
importance of motive in the justification of his own 
inclusion of ongentil tales - his motives being quite 
unlike those of the Miller or Reeve since he is neither 
impulsive nor divisive in intention, his reasons being 
carefully formulated and thought through — so Chaucer 
admits the impli'- ' -1 that fiction can be meretricious 
and implies, 1 :ure of the persona's concerns,
and the langw .ich he couches them that his own
fiction, being .icerned with its reflection of
moral reality, is certainly not of a type without value.
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By the use of these words we are given a type of bifocal 
vision: in the foreground we see the persona's dilemma
and respond to his argument that since the value of his 
account lies in its verisimilitude he must use language 
suited to its realities or fail entirely? in a wider 
perspective the proximity of fiction to deception is 
conveyed and u cause it is its nearness rather than its 
total congruicy that is suggested boundaries between 
them are set. Just as the persona stresses the 
importance of ir vtive in the justification of his own 
inclusion of orgentil tales - his motives being quite 
unlike those of v.he Miller or Reeve since he is neither 
impulsive nor divisive in intention, his reasons being 
carefully formulated and thought through — so Chaucer 
admits the implication that fiction can be meretricious 
and implies, by the nature of the persona's concerns, 
and the language in which he couches them that his own 
fiction, being so concerned with its reflection of 
moral reality, is certainly not of a type without value.
The persona’s arguments predominate since his predicament 
is in the foreground but behind it lies the analogous 
dilemma of his maker. The narrator's conclusion that 
he cannot choose to subvert the meaning of his experiences 
either by censoring them or replacing them with others, 
whose accounts would be less problematic, points through 
all its ironies to the seriousness of Chaucer's approach. 
Truth to the author of the Canterbury Tales is not always 
to be found in the literal but it is no less sought by 
the poet than by his earnestly literal-minded other self.
The relationship between text and audience set up by the 
narrator's preoccupations involves the poem's readers 
immediately and actively in assessing what type of work 
they are reading and in what its value lies. The persona's 
speaking directly to his audience in the present which 
they share and in which he appeals to them to understand 
his motives in choosing the particular way of reporting 
that he intends using, implies the readers' critical 
presence, his selfjustification suggests, if not the 
practical impossibility of narrator-audience dialogue, 
at least its ideality, and indeed in a situation of oral 
delivery the sense of dialogue would be strengthened: 
interchange between rarrator and audience might occur 
and its possibility •ould be inbuilt in the situation 
of public reading w'.ether or not it did. In silent 
reading of the poer • i e invitation to assessment remains, 
internalized but s- i• essentially a challenge to think 
about the issues rc-M.c-d to reporting well. To sub­
stantiate the soun- - 3 of his intentions, the persona 
cites the example :>£ Christ (whose merits are beyond 
reproach, and who din-elf 1spak ful brode in hooly writ') 
and the authority of Plato's explication of the 
cousinage of words and deeds in the Timaeus. Plato, 
explaining the analogous relation of the model and its 
copy at the beginning of the Timaeus, says that in so
fa? as the copy of a truth is an accurate image of its 
model it too will tend towards being absolutely true, 
for 'an account is of the same order as the thing it 
expounds - an account of what is abiding and stable 
and discoverable by reason will itself be abiding and 
unchangeable in so far as it is possible for an account 
to be incontrovertible and irrefutable1 (29 B}
The persona's credentials could hardly be more 
impeccable. His concern with the accuracy of his 
account bespeaks his concern with its truth. He 
defines the way in which his copy is to imitate its 
model. He will describe the pilgrims and their tales 
as punctiliously as he is able and will do so in a way 
that parallells in his verbal depiction the original 
flux of unfolding events. He will not reshape the 
events or their sequence, refine the language used by 
any of the pilgrims nor alter in report any aspect of 
their behaviour. Their autonomy must be honoured even 
where the narrator — or audience — might prefer what 
happened to have been different.
The narrator reaches out to his audience and back to 
the pilgrims: his sense of responsibility to the past
is counterbalanced by his desire to have his motives 
understood in the present. He is serious to the point 
of earnestness about his task and the discrepancy 
between the high theory justifying his technique and 
standards and the extreme ingenuousness of his informing 
voice again points beyond his control towards the poet's. 
We may not be able to define precisely how ironically 
Chaucer is treating his persona - it is in the nature 
of irony to evade schematic categorization — but it is 
clear that the persona's voice does not inform the whole 
nor does he provide a sufficient model to account for 
the richness of the Canterbury Tales. His plan is 
unicursal, the poem is not.72 The persona introduces 
the poem — and the theme of freedom and responsibility —
but h. does not create it. His freedom stands between us 
and the pilgrims': we see it first, and it is by his 
active choice that we see theirs at all. It also stands 
between us and Chaucer. For his control, absolute within 
the fiction of his report, proclaims itself in other terr-s 
than those of the poem and is at odds with them. Chaucer 
gives his persona the fictitious task of telling the 
truth, his own task is creating fiction; the apparent 
dissonance between these two sets up resonances that 
amplify throughout the Canterbury Tales.
The interrelation between truth and fiction in the 
Canterbury Tales> the areas of blurring distinction, 
are made possible by the poem's self-refractiveness, and 
they (like the emphasis on choice) invite an active 
response from the poem's readers, a continuous testing of 
the nature of what is offered. The concern with truth 
which the persona evinces in the passages in which he 
discusses his intentims is not entirely dissimilar from 
that of the Parson in his prologue. Both men make 
categorical stands which ars undercut by their situation, 
whose logic — and reality — is well beyond their control. 
Neither wishes to offer less than he considers truly 
valuable and each realises this aim: the persona in his
account, the Parson in his sermon on penitence. Between 
them is the account of the pilgrimage and of the pilgrims' 
fictions, each the fruits of its own maker, all of 
Chaucer's making. And both the persona affirming the 
historicity of his narrative and the Parson showing the 
way which 'may nat fayle* are themselves literary 
characters whose prime literal reality is verbal not 
actual. Chaucer does not conceal this from us, rather 
he directs our attention to it. Not to do so would be to 
deny his own responsibility in making, doing so proclaims 
the creativity of the true lie i.i which fiction serves tne 
interest of the poet's concept of truth.
3 COMPOUNDING COMPLEXITY: LANGUAGE, 
-LITERATURE AND THE PILGRIMS
Thanne seide I thus: "I delite me," quod I, "nat
oonly in the eendes or in the somroe of resouns 
that thou hast concluded and proved, but thilke 
woordes that thou usest deliten me moche more." 
" . . .  thise thinges ne schew-idest thou naught 
with noone resouns ytaken fro withouten, but by 
proeves in cercles and homliche knowen, the 
whiche proeves drawen to hemself beer feyth and 
here accord everich of hem of othir." Th-inne 
seide sche thus: ". . . . yif I have styred
resouns that ne ben nat taken from withouten the 
compas of the thing of which we treten, but 
resouns that ben bystowyd withinne that compas, 
ther nys nat why that thou schuldest merveillen, 
sith thow has iernyd by the sentence of Plato 
that nedes the wordis moot be cosynes to the 
th.iges of whiche thei speken."
(Boece, 3 pr. 12, 119-123, 180-185, 200-207)
Chaucer's acts of choice are implicit throughout the 
Canterbury Tales; those of his creatures are revealed 
in a diversity of attitudes and situations 7^ The action 
of the narrative frame may be viewed in relation to four 
sets of activities, Chaucer's in writing the poem, the 
persona's in recording past events, the Host's in 
proposing and implementing the tale-telling game and 
the pilgrims' in responding to the Host and to one 
another. In writing the Canterbury Tales Chaucer 
creates freely, inventing character and incident at 
will; his liberation in his art is in part analogous 
to God's total freedom in creation. The persona's 
freedom is far more restricted in range and so in 
implication. He propounds his initial choice of 
accuracy or decorum, and once he has made this choice 
its nature dictates the form of his account. His task 
is far more limited than the poet's since the persona 
recording events cannot change them and theoretically 
Chaucer can include what he will, although practically 
he too is partly constrained - for example, by 
exigencies of style or of his plan. Nevertheless, the
persona's act of choice remains free and in this it 
parallells the poet's for both persona and poet freely 
choose not only their initial stances but also their 
continuance in then. The freedom which Chaucer 
elaborates in the persona's situation is primarily 
the universal human freedom — that of choice itself; 
it is also the particular freedom to decide whether or 
not to use his perception and judgi t to marshall 
experience into as truthful a verbal order as he may.
It is the basic choice which has significance in the 
narration: Chaucer does not return to the problems of
reporting after the Knight-Miller link nor do the 
persona's problems change to provide a developing 
strand throughout the poem. The Host’s ordinance, 
however, does remain throughout as an elaborated 
thematic strand. The Host's proposal provides a 
device whereby the narrative can plausibly incorporate 
a series of inner narrative units whose impact is 
increased substantially by their placing in the 
complex context provided by teller, situation, thematic, 
structural and generic relation. It also enables the 
inclusion as part of its own sustained development of 
a series of incidents highlighting differences as well 
as correspondences of response amongst the pilgrims.
It provides a parallel between the activity within the 
poem and Chaucer's making. In a poem about a pilgrimage 
the tale-telling game is eminently suited to linking 
issues of literary and moral value, since in it language, 
reality and the 'craft [that] countrefeteth kynde' are 
seen to be poised in synthesis
The pilgrims may tell whatever tales they choose but 
their tales are to be judged, and the Host's criteria 
of judgment are articulated solely in terms of content: 
the pilgrim he adjudges teller of the 'tales of best 
sentence and ; st solaas' will win a supper paid for 
by the others on their return to the Tabard. What
precisely the Host intends is left ambiguous. Sentence 
provides little room for uncertainty but solaas is not 
a simple t e r m . Solaas is commonly used in romances 
where it connotes the solace of love, variously inter­
preted; it also has extraliterary connotations.
Chaucer uses it in the Miller's Tale to characterize 
an area of Nicholas’s expertise that is hardly boethian 
in its ascesis or chivalric in its idealisms 'of deerne 
love he koude and of solas’ [I (A) 3200]; but there its 
meaning parodically counterbalances the romanticism of 
Palamon's and Arcite's concept of love service and is 
found beyond the norm of such connotations as * comfort, 
consolation; alleviation of sorrow, distress, or 
discomfort1 (OED sb. 1) and 'pleasure, enjoyment, 
delight; entertainment, recreation, amusement’
(OED sb. 2) or 'that which gives comfort or consolation, 
brings pleasure or enjoyment, etc.' (OED sb. 3).
Whether solaas is coupled with or in opposition to 
sentence is equivocal and in the same way that 1 divers 
folk diversely seyde1 in reaction to the Miller's Tale, 
so too the pilgrims' responses to the Host’s terms 
vary considerably.
In the frame as it stands the Host’s proposal is not 
fully adhered to and while it is possible that Chaucer 
intended at some stage to allocate four tales to each 
pilgrim it is clear from the Parson1s Prologue that 
certainly at the time that Chaucer wrote it he had no 
intention of describing a second set of rekenynges at 
the Tabard. When the Host sees the scales of Libra in 
the sky and says 1almoost fulfild is al myn ordinaunce' 
it is the heavenly city which the Parson reminds the 
pilgrims is their ultimate goal which predominates.
A 'thropes ende1 is hardly a precise topographic 
description of their location; wherever it is, the 
type of ending that the Host’s plan suggested does not
occur. Like the discrepancies between persona and poet7® 
those between the Host's organizational plan and Chaucer's 
point beyond the naturalistic narrative web to the 
illusion that it is reality itself but before the 
Parson1s Prologue the Host's ordinaunce has a different 
dominant function: it provides a mapping of the events
of the frame which authenticates them and renders them 
broadly predictable. His exercising control in the game, 
like the persona’s concern that truth be in the field, 
helps vivify what is described since its necessity 
presupposes the existence of the pilgrims and the 
variety of their responses. The Host's plan also 
enables ramification of the exploration of types of 
choices.
The persona's are the ii 't individual attitudes 
presented in the Cant*. ales, and they are
emphasized as much by ttf—  i. position as by his authority 
as 'reportour as in this cas.' The persona's present 
task,"77 reporting the pilgrimage, is largely linguistic 
although his concept of language's province is laudably 
broad. The Host's task is different — he must administer 
the successful functioning of the game, which although it 
includes defining the literary bounds within which the 
tales must remain, is a task pre-eminently demanding 
skilful group leadership. As befits a successful inn­
keeper, the Host is fully aware of the social niceties 
of his role - his language varies considerably depending 
upon the status of the person whom he is addressing:7® 
from the relatively understated respectfulness of his 
addressing the Knight as 'my mayster and my lord1 — 
effusion would hardly go down well there — through the 
convoluted courtesy of
, "My lady Prioresse, by youre levs,
So that I wiste I sholde yow nat grave,
I woIda demen that ye tellen sholde 
A tale next, if so were that ye wolde.
Now wol ye vouche sauf, my,lady deere?"
I(B ) 1637-1641]
whose element of self-parody is heightened by the 
pleased brevity of response of the lady in questions 
'"gladly," quod she, and seyde as ye shal heere' to 
the role reversal of
He gan to speke as lordly as a kyng.
He seide, "What amounteth al this wit?
What shul we speke alday of hooly writ?
The devel made a reve for to preche.
Or of a soutere a shipman or a leche.
Sey forth thy tale, and tarie nat the tyme 
Lo Depeford i and it is half-wey pryme.
[I (A) 3900-3906]
Harry Bailly's ability to gauge whom he is dealing 
with is indisputable.
Arguing sequential developments in the Canterbury Tales 
must be moderated by a sense of the problems attendant 
upon the unfinished nature of the poem, manuscript 
variation and internal inconsistencies. But the 
beginning and ending of the poem are complete and since 
they were indisputably arranged in this sequence the 
General Prologue and the first three tales of the A Group 
admit discussion of aspects of their linear unfolding 
as does the relation of the Manciple's Tale to the 
Parson's Tale and the leye-taking. Within the individual 
groups of tales and in these groups which are linked 
together exploration of concept or development of theme 
often utilizes the forward movement of the narrative 
both to climax pointy and modify conclusions. That 
climax implies some form, however temporary or limited, 
of stasis in the poetic argument is clear; modification
impl-ies another: it depends upon the existence of a
series of at least two concepts or views in which the 
introduction of the second and any subsequent members 
invites the reassessment of what went before in the 
context of a new perspective which limits the degree of 
the original's total acceptability. It is a powerful 
tool in the service of relativism since it not only makes 
us pause when confronted by apparent contradiction or 
clear need for reviewing but engenders in the poem's 
readers a tendency towards comparative assessment, a 
tendency enhanced once the entire poem (or such of it 
as we have) has been read, by the correspondences which 
become visible only when hindsight and conterminous 
sight are possible.
With the introduction of the Host as a dominant figure, 
our attention is redirected: the persona's dilemmas
have hinged upon the relation of words and realities, 
the ambivalent presentation of the pilgrims has pointed 
towards the relation of subjective viewer and object 
viewed, but both of these centres of interest have been 
described in relation to the writing and the evaluation 
of report. The Host's governance moves us into closer 
relation with the pilgrims themselves since it is they 
(including the persona) who have accepted his plan and 
who implement it throughout the Canterbury Tales. The 
tale-telling game still involves issues of perception 
and language but it provides a different and far more 
extensively treated area for their development. A 
report is usually a report79 but tales of 'sentence 
and solas' are almost as various in conception and 
style of execution as the pilgrims who tell them.
Chaucer utilizes the pilgrimage topos as one means of 
communicating a sense of plenitude in his poem; the 
Host's game that 'shal coste noghte' offers another.
Like the pilgrimage which is both literal and figural.
the game communicates its own actuality and points towards 
wider implication. The ways in which a man chooses to 
play a game are likely to reflect some of his attitudes 
to action generally 80 and a game requiring free play 
subject to the exigencies of a finite span and a pre­
ordained set; of rules, provides a satisfying symbol of 
more general human activity. The pilgrims all consent to 
the Host's plan but the ways in which they interpret it 
and react, to it vary considerably.
The Host's control is not dict.atorially assumed. He 
proceeds in a most democratic manner to have himself 
elected to the position of authority which he wants. 
Initially he asks the pilgrims' permission before 
revealing his proposal to them, and after he has 
received it he explains carefully the procedure which 
he envisages, then asks whether they will consent to 
his control. The pilgrims' agreement is unanimously 
and cordially celebrated:
This thyng was graunted, and oure othes swore 
With ful glad herte, and preyden hym also 
That he wolde vouche sauf for to do so,
And that he wolde been oure governour.
And of oure tales juge and reportour.
And sette a soper at a certeyn pris,
And we wol reuled been at his devys 
In heigh and lough; and thus by oon assent 
We been acorded to his juggement.
And therupon the wyn was fet anon;
We dronken, and to reste wente echon,
Withouten any lenger taryynge.
[I (A) 810-821]
The proposition is clearly explained and the pilgrims' 
free consent to the Host's conditions is emphasized.
It is not only the Host's control which is stressed but 
also the pilgrims* acquiescence - the plan is rational, 
their behaviour, the passage implies, as much by the 
judicious formality of its language as by its prose
sense, will also be. Any doubts about this triggered off 
by the Host's faint reservation that possibly even-song 
(after the pleasures of the Host's strong wyn) and morwe- 
sonq may not accord are swiftly dispelled by the Knight's 
response to beginning the game. Besides broadly describing 
the type of tale he wanted, the Host had provided for 
threats to his authority. The Knight's response is that 
of a man of whom the compiler of a feast of tales need 
have no fears.
The lines at the end of the General Prologue which provide 
the introduction to his tale corroborate the sense of his 
worth communicated earlier in the Knight's portrait:
Were it by aventure, or sort, or cas.
The sothe is this, the cut fil to the Knyght, 
Of which ful blithe and glad was every wyght, 
And telle he moste his tale, as was resoun.
By fc -ewe'-’ ^nd by composicioun.
As ye han herd; what nedeth wordes mo?
And whan this goode man saugh that it was so.
As he that wys was and obedient
To kepe his foreward by his free assent,
He seyde, "Syn I shal bigynne the game,
What, welcome be the cut, a Goddes name!
Now lat us ryde, and herkneth what I seye." 
And with that word we ryden forth oure weye. 
And he bigan with right a myrie cheere 
His tale anon, and seyde as ye may heere.
[I (A) 844-658]
The manner in which his worthiness is stressed repays 
attention. The passage is one in which both the Host's 
desires and the persona's attitudes are clearly 
articulated. The Host has just summarized the terms of 
their agreement, stressing their consent to his own 
leadership. And yet, although he claims the role of 
judge and ordainer of action, the initial choice of 
taleteller is only Indirectly his ? he chooses the system 
of choice but he has no control over the person chosen:
'We;. ..o by axenture, or sort, or cas,/ The sothe is this,
the cuv f11 to the Knyght,/ Of which ful blithe and glad 
was every wyght.1 It is true that the Host has just 
explained that they will draw lots to decide who will 
tell the first tale, but since he chooses the Monk to be 
the second taleteller directly after the Knight's tale 
is completed, it is clear that realism need not be the 
only reason that Chaucer introduces the game in tnis way. 
There is more than one realistic way of furthering the 
game. The cut's falling to the Knight is not arbitrary: 
it may appear mere chance or luck, in fact it is part of 
a providential pattern whether this be visible or not.
The Host governs the game, but divine providence governs 
the ordering of the draw. Or would in an actual situation. 
Here Chaucer is the providential agent whose sort ensures 
that the Knight is the first taleteller. Our — and the 
pilgrims' — expectations of virtuous matter from this 
'parfit gentil knyght' are borne out both by the tale he 
tells and by the manner in which he prefaces his story 
which expresses his own sense of responsibility, one which 
deepens the implications of the Host's strictures reminding 
the pilgrims of their contract and its terms [I (A) 828- 
834]. The Host only spoke of human obligations, the Knight 
welcomes the cut in God's name. The persona's sense of 
the Knight's worthiness is clearly communicated in his 
narration. Every one was glad when the cut fell to the 
Knight and he was obliged to tell his tale then 'as was 
resoun,/ By foreward and by composicioun,/ As ye han herd; 
what nedeth wordes mo?' [I (A) 847-849]. With the Knight 
there is no need for 'wordes mo,' a fact stressed by the 
repetitive pattern of lines 850-858, which assert and 
reassert consonancy. To any right thinking man it is 
apparent that the Knight, having given his word must tell 
his tale — 'what nedeth wordes mo?' To the Knight himself 
it is also clear that if the cut must be welcomed in God's 
name since he has given it free assent, his tale must be
worth listening to or his welcome be only a sham. The 
persona, too, offering the tale to his auditors endorses 
its value as an object worthy of attention. The Host's 
game has begun wcill, the microcosmic society is functioning 
amiably and the Knight's Tale so richly fulfils anyone's 
expectations of a virtuous tale that the Miller's reaction 
inevitably comes as a rude and deflating shock: with it
the blissful first age of the pilgrimage is over.
In the poem stress upon man's freedom in action is counter­
balanced by a parallel stress upon his limitations: if the
freedom is Godlike man's knowledge is not and his use of 
both may or may not be good. The perpetual qua]ification 
of stances in the poem reminds us of the limits of man's 
understanding as well as its aspirations. When the Miller 
interrupts the Host's invitation to the Monk to tell the 
second tale, announcing his intention of 'quiting' the 
Knight's tale, his action disrupts the urbane surface of 
organization not implausibly (since there is no objective 
reason for expecting all to go according to plan simply 
because all the pilgrims agreed to the plan the previous 
night) but irrevocably. One effect is the forwarding of 
the narrative, another is that the contrast which the 
Miller's attitudes afford causes us not only to look back 
to the Knight's response again but also illuminates the 
manner in which Chaucer has synthesized earnest in game 
so far. The Miller's rejection of the rules invites their 
reviewing, and in the repetition the act of insight itself 
is renewed: what is communicated during an earliest
reading of the Host's proposal is not identical to what 
is communicated after the Knight's Tale and during the 
Miller's Prologue. Our sense of the potentialities of 
the action described expands in response to the situation 
engendered by the Miller.
Man is a social creature. His individual choices are 
uniquely his, as is his resultant fata, but he exists, 
in this world and the next, in social contexts. It is a 
blissful company which rejoices 'everich of otheres joye' 
in heaven and in it 'every soule [is] replenyssed with the 
sighte of the parfit knowynge of God' [X (I) 1077, 1079]. 
To know himself, as he journeys along the 'weye 
espirituel' that Leads to Jerusalem celestial, each 
man must look in se, circa se and supra se, for it is 
only by knowing what God is, what his fellowmen are and 
what relation with them demands, and what his own inner 
nature is that man can have some sense of the order of 
the universe and his own place in it.81 In describing 
the pilgrimage to Canterbury, Chaucer begins with the 
persona's expressing his desire to go on pilgrimage and 
his introducing himself into the company of 'sondry folk' 
all journeying to the shrine of St Thomas. The Host's 
governance of the ale-telling game binds them in another 
order. The Knight's affirmation of his obligation to 
honour his word, the type of tale he chooses to tell 
(which itself extols, as well as explores with the 
objectifying dist. of his faith, a particular type 
of order, that when death reigned, between Adam and 
Moses), as well as the response of the other pilgrims 
to his tale make clear that the Knight fully understands 
the nature of responsible fellowship which membership of 
the pilgrimage company and the game-players implies.
In the General Prologue portrait the Knight was described 
as a type of virtuous man and his character is confirmed 
by the consonance of understanding, ideals and behaviour 
which he exhibits.
'By the fruyt of hem shul ye knowen hero1 [X (I) 116]: the 
Knight's are the first fruits of the Canterbury Tales and 
they derive from a man whose own goodness is felt through­
out his tale in the harmony and order of his vision and
his tale’s form. In De vulgar! eloguentia, Dante speaks of 
the subjects fitting for treatment in vernacular poetry: 
'armorum probitas, arooris accensio, et directio voluntatis1 
(prc ess in arms, the fire of love and the direction of the 
will, 2.2. 75-771. Citing poets who have written on these 
in the vernacular Dante observes: 'arzna vero nullum Latium
adhuc invenio poetasse.' (But I do not find any Italian 
who has written on arms, 2.2. 95-96). Vittore Branca in 
'The Myth of th* Hero in Boccaccio' (Concepts of the Hero, 
p. 270) says of the Teseida that it was ‘a reply to a 
complaint expressed by Dante in his De vulgar! elocruentla. 
Boccaccio replied by asserting that he was the "prime a 
can tare <3i Marts nel volgar lazio" (the first to sing of 
Mars in the vulgai tongue of Latium).' The stanza from 
which Branca quotes also recalls Dante's other possible 
subjects;
Poi che le Muse nude cominciaro 
nel cospetto degli uomini ad andare, 
gi& fur di quell! i qua! I'esercitaro 
con bello stilo in onesto parlare, 
e altri in amoroso 1’operaro; 
ma tu, o 3 ibro, primo a lor cantare 
di Marte fa! gli affanni sostenuti, 
nel volgar lazio piu mai non veduti.
Since the Muses began to walk unclothed 
before men's eyes, there have been those who 
employed them with graceful style in virtuous 
discourse, while others used them for the 
language of love. But you, my book, are the 
first to bid them sing in the vernacular of 
Latium what has never been seen thus before: 
the toils endured for Mars. B-
(12.84)82
Boccaccio includes each and lays claim to primacy in 
singing of war. The Knight's Tale intricates all three 
topics without comment. Boccaccio ends his poem with a 
summary of its deserving (12.85-86). The Knight, for 
this reticence is his as well as Chaucer's, makes no 
equivalent comment upon his achievement. Rather the 
reverses early in his tale he explains why he is
condensing his source in a characteristically Chaucerian 
modesty disclaimer. It is partly because he is no great 
poet: 'wayke been the oxen in my plough./ The remenant
of the tale is long ynough1 and partly that if he takes 
overlong to tell his tale it may prevent another's 
telling: 'I wol nat letten eek noon of this route;/
Lat every felawe telle his tale aboute,/ And lat se now 
who shal the soper wynne' [I (A) 887-892]. It is the 
matter rather than the artistry necessary to communicate 
it which most nearly engages the Knight's interest.
Unlike the Man of Law who expounds his concern with 
aspects of style and literary reputation, the Knight 
simply tells his tale, permitting his words to proclaim 
their meaning without intermediary explication.
The Knight1s Tale is a much condensed translation into 
another mode of the Teseida. Whole sequences in the 
original are omitted and overall length has been reduced 
to approximately one seventh of the Italian poem.
Emphasis is differently placed in the two poems, the 
Teseida is far lighter in predominant tone than the 
Knight1s Tele and it lacks the English poem's holistic 
preoccupation with order. In it the affairs of Palemone 
and Arcita are given far greater stress than those of 
their counterparts in the Knight's Tale. Although the 
love triangle of Palamon, Arcita and Emelye provides the 
narrative core of the Knight1s Tale it is itself contained 
within the ambit of Duke Theseus' governance, a controlling 
force within the poem which is analogous in operation to 
the Knight's organization of the entirety of his tale.
The changes in Theseus' role are particularly interesting 
since they effect a far nearer correspondence between his 
protagonist and the pilgrim than would have existed had 
Chaucer's act of translation been more faithful to the 
spirit of his original. Teseo is far less just a figure
than -Theseus: he is described as being inflamed by Mars
before leaving to fight against the Amazons, as having 
'nel cor quella saetta/ la gual Cupido suole aver pin 
cara' (1. 131) when he sees Ipolita. After his marriage 
to her, he remains in Scythia 'in lieta vita e dolce1 for 
over a year before he receives a vision reminding him of 
his obligation to return to Athens (2. 1-7). Chaucer 
summarises the events extended throughout Boccaccio's 
first book, in twentyfour lines [I (A) 859-883} in a 
passage centering upon Theseus1 virtuous prowess. His 
social roles are described as a series of sources of 
order: he is 'a noble due,1 a great 'lord and governour,'
a famous 'conguerour,' and the husband — not merely 
vanquisher — of Ypolita. His behaviour throughout the 
poem manifests his goodness and its effect upon the 
society which he rules forms a major strand in the tale.
Neither Chaucer nor the Knight ascribes the tale to 
Boccaccio; its sources are ancient — 'olde stories' — 
and in recounting the tale the Knight explores the 
nature of a society in which faith in the true God was 
unknown, in an age before Christ came in justification, 
the nature of the divine and its interaction with the 
human could not clearly be understood; but perceived or 
not, all history, .’hose end is man's salvation, is part 
of God's teleological plan and pagan history merits 
scrutiny since the Christian may find much of value in 
it.83 Since the view of history which he was influential 
in propounding saw all that occurs in time as part of the 
book of universal history written by God Himself, what 
St Augustine says of the ancient philosophers — 
particularly the Platonists - in De doctrina Christian^4 
may be applied to all records of pagan knowledge which 
can further understanding:
Philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera 
et fidei nostrae accommodata dixerunt, maxime 
Platonic!, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab 
eis etiam tanquam iniustis possessoribus in usum 
nostrum vindicanda. Sicut enim Aegyptii non 
solum idola habebant et onera gravia, quae populus 
Israel detestaretur et fugeret, sed etiam vasa 
atque ornamenta de auro et argento, et vestem, 
quae ille populus exiens de Aegypto, sibi potius 
tanquam ad usum meliorem clanculo vindicavit; 
non aactori.ta.te propria, sed praecepto Dei, ipsis 
Aegyptiis nescienter commodantibus ea, guibus non 
bene utebantur: sic doctrinae omnes Gentilium
non solum simulata et superstitiosa figmenta 
gravesque sarcinas supervacanei labcris habent, 
quae unusquisque nostrum, duce Christo, de 
societate Gentilium exiens, debet abominari 
atque devitare; sed etiam liberales disciplines 
usui veritatis aptiores, et quaedam morum prae- 
cepta utilissima continent, deque ipso uno Deo 
colendo nonnulla vera inveniuntur apud eos, 
quod eorum tanquam aurum et argentum, quod non 
ipsi instituerunt, sed de quibusdam quasi 
metallis divinae providentiae, quae ubique infusa 
est, eruerunt . . . .  debet ab eis auferre 
christianus ad usum iustum praedicandi Evangelii. 
Vestem quoque illorum, id est, hominum quidem 
institute, sed tamen accommodata humanae 
societati qua in hac vita carere non possumus, 
accipere atque habere licuerit in usum conver- 
tenda Christianurn.
Nam quid aliud fecerunt multi boni fideles 
nostri? Nonne aspicimus quanto auro et argento 
et veste suffarcinatus exierit de Aegypto 
Cyprianus doctor suavissimus et martyr 
beatissimus? quanto Lactantius? quanto 
Victorinus, Optatus, Hilarius, ut de vivis 
taceam? quanto inmraerabiles Graeci? . . . 
sed dederunt aurum, et argentum, et vestem suam 
exeunti populo Dei de Aegypto, nescientes 
quemadmodum ilia quae dabant, in Christi 
obsequium cederent. Illud enim in Exodo factum, 
sine dubio figuratum est, ut hoc praesignaret • • •
(De doctrina Christiana, 2.40.
60-61, B.A.C., 168, pp. 186-188)
If those who are c&_led philosophers, especially 
the Platonists, have said things which are indeed 
true and are well accommodated to our faith, they 
should not be feared; rather, what they have said 
should be taken from them as from unjust possessors 
and converted to our use. Just as the Egyptians
.had not only idols and grave burdens which the 
people of Israel detested and avoided, so also 
they had vases and ornaments of gold and silver 
and clothing which the Israelites took with them 
secretly when they fled, as if to put them to a 
better use. They did not do this on their own 
authority but at God's commandment, while the 
Egyptians unwittingly supplied them with things 
which they themselves did not use well. In the 
same way all the teachings of the pagans contain 
not only simulated and superstitious imaginings 
and grave burdens of unnecessary labor, which each 
one of us leaving the society of pagans under the 
leadership of Christ ought to abominate and avoid, 
but also liberal disciplines more suited to the 
uses of truth, and most useful precepts concerning 
morals. Even some truths concerning the worship 
of one God are discovered among them. These are, 
as it were, their gold and silver, which they did 
not institute themselves but dug up from certain 
mines of divine Providence, which is everywhere 
infused . . . .  the Christian . . . should take 
this treasure with him for the just use of 
teaching the gospel. And their clothing, which 
is made up of those human institutions which are 
accommodated to human society and necessary to 
the conduct of life, should be seized and held to 
be converted to Christian uses.
For what else have many of our good and faithful 
done? May we not see with how much gold and 
silver and clothing bundled up the most sweet 
teacher and most blessed martyr Cyprian fled 
from Egypt? Or how much Lactantius took with 
him? Or how much Victorinus, optatus, Hilary 
carried with them, not to speak of those still 
living? Or how much innumerable Greeks have 
taken? . . . But they gave their gold, silver, 
and clothing to the people of God fleeing from 
Egypt not knowing that they yielded those things 
which they gave 'unto the obedience of Christ.'
(Robertson, pp. 75-76)
The Knight's tale looks backward to pagan times but it 
is described with the insight of a Christian's vision.®5 
Underlying the empathy of its dramatic explication of 
the greatness of reason is a clear sense of the limitation 
of human scope which reason without faith implies.86 
The ending enforces this with its explicit distinction
not only between levelr. of reality but also between 
potential fates:
And God, that al this wyde world hath wroght,
Sende hym his love that hath it deere aboght;
For now is Palamon in alle wele,
Lyvynge in blisse, in richesse, and in heele.
And Emelye hym loveth so tendrely,
And h& hire serveth al so gentilly.
That nevere was ther no word hem bitwene 
Of jalousie or any oother teene.
Thus endeth Palamon and Emelye;
And God save al this faire compaignye! Amen.
[I (A) 3099-3108]; my italics)
By the end of the tale Arcita is dead; he and Palamon 
have both suffered greatly for their love, and although 
the marriage of Palamon and Emelye is celebrated 'with 
alle blisse and melodye,' it is hardly '0 parfit joye, 
lastynge everemo.1 In the sight of eternity their lives 
are short indeed. And here, so soon after the Host's 
halting them at the 'wateryng of Seint Thomas,' the 
pilgrimage and its figural meaning give force to the 
Knight's ending his account with a prayer to God 'that 
al this wyde world hath wroght,' for the salvation of 
the company. Palamon and Emelye's passing through what 
Egeus, who knew 'thys worldes transmutacion,1 perceived 
as 'a thurghfare ful of wo' has long since ended; the 
Knight's pilgrim audience is on a journey which has no 
finite spiritual termination and each is free to make 
of it what he — or she — wills.
Palamon and Arcita themselves circumscribe their freedoms 
by choosing so limited an object of their desire for 
fulfilment.®"7 While 'Emelye the shene1 is undoubtedly 
beautiful she is hardly an absolute, and yet Palamon 
and Arcita serve her as steadfastly as though she were 
a godhead herself. If their love is treated with 
dispassion in the Knight's Tale, Theseus' attempts to
embody his boethian principles in an age without grace 
are treated with respect and ultimately, compassion. 
Theseus does govern as best he may and his best is 
heroically conceived, but it is still a human value: 
it is despite his gods that Theseus achieves the orderly 
equilibrium that he may. The gap between himself and 
the Knight is not so much one of character, for they are 
both excellent men, but of opportunity. Like Dante's 
beloved Virgil who, for all his goodness will never see 
God face to face, Theseus remains isolated from the 
Knight not only in time present but also in the promise 
of time to come.
Although far less richly complicated than the King Lear 
universe,®® the world of the Knight's Tale resembles 
that of Shakespeare's play in its concomitant present­
ation of a wide range of concepts of reality. Those 
expressed by Theseus, Egeus, and Palazaan. and Arcita 
form important parts of the poem's meaning. While 
Palamon and Arcita's love of Emelye provides the poem 
with its central narrative situation, there is a series 
of interacting situations concentric with it: the
innermost circle of the lovers is contained within that 
of the governance of Athens by Duke Theseus, which in 
turn is also subject to the will of the gods. Together 
these are ordered by the Knight who tells the tale and 
the final control, beyond the limits of the fiction of 
teller and tale, is Chaucer's. The hierarchical nature 
of the spreading of control provides a correlative to 
the coherence of Chaucer's own view of the reality he 
so consummately evokes and explores within the tale.
Like the persona before him, the Knight's concern is 
with the truth to be mined in history, and with the 
nature of free will — both in act and in object.®®
When, he has completed it, all the pilgrims feel that the 
Knight1s Tale is 'worthy for to drawen to memorie,1 
wherein lie records of the greatness of man The gentils 
particularly feel this, says Chaucer, in a typically throw­
away line which realigns our perspective and prepares us 
for the far from adultatory response of the Miller, 'me 
Host's pleasure at the way the game has begun is expressed 
not only in his explicit approbation of the Knight's tale 
but also in his desire to further the ordering impulse of 
that tale in a fitting manner. The Monk, nearest class 
equal of the Knight, provides an obvious religious 
counterpart of the miles christianus; it is he who is 
invited to tell the second tale in quittance. The pilgrims 
are all indebted to the Knight and the Monk has been 
selected to make some return to him in his own tale:
'now telleth ye, sir Monk, if that ye konne/ Somwhat to 
quite with the Knyghtes tale' [I (A) 3118-3119] . How 
suitable the Host's choice of the Monk as the person who 
will give in return is we will only learn later in the 
G r o up fo r the Miller, interpreting 'quite' in a more 
aggressive sense, intrudes his desire to retaliate and 
rid them of the Knight's Tale.^ Clearly the Miller is 
not prompted by the ordering impulses inherent in the 
Knight's Tale and in his determination to have his will 
whatever the Host wants, there is a very different balance 
in attitudes established from the one which the Host was 
attempting to achieve.
The Knight's Tale is eminently reasonable; it is an 
exploration of the extent and meaning of order in a 
society operating in an age which did not know the Word 
made flesh. 'Dronkenesse1 pronounces the Parson is a 
■horrible sepulture of mannes resoun? and . . . whan a 
man is dronken, he hath lost his resoun' [X (I) 822].
The Miller's reason seems less entombed than descended 
below the belt, for his tale certainly exhibits
consistency within its own logical frame, but it is 
obvious that he is singularly unimpressed by the Host's 
argument that he should restrain himself in the interests 
of the company's working 'thriftily.' The company is 
only of secondary importance to the Miller; his own 
desires are primary, and the Host, recognising his 
obduracy with an exasperated 'Tel on, a devel wey!/
Thou art a fool; thy wit is overcome' [I (A) 3134-3135], 
accepts the inevitable. The Miller's need tc tell his 
tale immediately is not so imperative that it does not 
admit his offering an introductory sophism in support 
of his own irresponsibility, whereby he can deny culp­
ability and embark on the pleasures of propagating 
whatever he chooses in his tale secure in the knowledge 
that he has already declared his moral bankruptcy and 
should not thus be taxed further in virtue.
Central to the Knight's Tale and the manner of its 
narration is its teller's concept of volition: he
chooses the tale he tells deliberately; his motives for 
telling it require no explicit justification since it is 
clearly a 'moral tale vertuous,' a tale whose morality 
is intrinsic to its meaning. The Miller, quite reasonably 
in the event, feels differently from the Knight: he
needs to offer an explanation of what he intends telling 
since without it he might draw fire from the other 
pilgrims or at least from those who most enjoyed the 
Knight's Tale. The Miller's insistence that his tale 
is largely the product of the ale of Southwark (a somewhat 
more homely source of inspiration than poets usually 
praise), to whom any blame should accrue, liberates him 
from all responsibility for its contents and thus it 
appears gives him carte blanche to say precisely what 
he chooses. Charles Muscatine has written an account of 
the Miller’s Tale which must still, more than twenty 
years later, provide the starting point for its discussion9.3
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In it he describes the manner in which 'the pragmatic 
prosaically solid imagery of fabliau is here built into 
an unbroken, unbreakable wall of accepted fact.'
The surface naturalism of the Miller's Tale is most 
striking. Morton Bloomfield, in 'The Miller's Tale - 
An UnBoethian interpretation,194 elucidates a central 
issue relating to it: while the world of the Miller's
Tale has all the appearance of authentic physicality, 
it is a-loglcal, faulty in its underlying premises and 
therefore incapable of tending closely towards 
existence:
John comes crashing into _ne story at the end to 
bring matters to a close. The narrative is knit 
up, and the anecdote is properly ended. But the 
morality of it all is most unsatisfactory and 
must seem even more so when we regard its narrative 
context a story of an irrational, unjust world set 
between two stories of a just and ordered world.
In fact what we have here is a very unBoethian 
universe, a world which seems rational but is not 
really so. We are far away from a world which 
seems irrational but is really rational. It is 
no doubt with good reason that we are twice 
warned in the prologue and tale (I, 3163-3164 and 
I, 3454) of the dangers of attempting to probe 
Goddes pryvetee, God's secrets. We had better 
not, for we are apt to be made unhappy.
(206-207)
In the letter to Can Grande introducing his poem Dante 
quotes Aristotle's dictum 1 as a thing is related to 
reality so is it related to truth.' It is likely that 
neither Dante nor the concept would interest the Miller 
overmuch? his interest in speculative thought as 
reflected in his own attitudes in the Knight-Miller 
link and in those of his protagonist, hende Nicholas, 
seems limited to its short-term usefulness. Both the 
Miller and his 'clerke of Oxenford' operate by what 
Bruno Bettelheim has termed 1 the pleasure principle' 
rather than 'the reality principle,1 giving predominance 
to immediate over long-term satisfaction.^
The Miller cannot countenance the idea of waiting for 'som 
bettre man1 to tell his tale while he sobers up; hende 
Nicholas's fantastical plan to recreate Noah's flood 
verbally in the imagination of John the carpenter in 
order to enjoy the favours of his wife Alisoun, requires 
a great deal of effort and is hardly a plan to secure a 
domestic adulterous relationship for a lengthy period, 
in the event, Nicholas is unlikely to feel particularly 
amorous for a while, but he was hardly planning for that 
result. The Knight, like one of Donne's travellers 
permitted to have gone to new worlds, may have chosen 
his field of exploration in his tale, the Miller's Tale 
is to tell itself. If there is a culpable antecedent 
agent, and it is as difficult to imagine there not being 
an agent responsible for a tale's existence as it would 
be for Chaucer - or Boethius - to imagine a universe 
without a Creator, it is not the Miller but the ale of 
Southwark. Given that it is the ale speaking, it is 
perfectly reasonable (see [X (I) 836]) that the legend 
and life of a carpenter and his wife should offer itself 
as a counterpart to the Knight's pagan tale not as a 
religious poem but as a lecherous lay.
The events of the Knight's Tale occur before the 
Incarnation and the poem's characters are implicitly 
distanced from the pilgrims by the very different 
potential inherent in their situations. When the Miller 
speaks, another type of distance becomes apparent - 
that engendered by the diversity of choices free-willed 
Christians may make. The Miller, claiming that he can 
tell that he is drunk from his manner of speech and 
telling his audience that the ale not himself is speaking, 
has very different attitudes to tale-telling from the 
Knight's. A clear link between the Knight and his tale 
was the parallellism of moral attitudes of the Knight 
organizing the world of his tale and Theseus ordering
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and life of a carpenter and his wife should offer itself 
as a counterpart to the Knight's pagan tale not as a 
religious poem but as a lecherous lay.
The events of the Knight's Tale occur before the 
Incarnation and the poem's characters are implicitly 
distanced from the pilgrims by the very different 
potential inherent in their situations. When the Miller 
speaks, another type of distance becomes apparent — 
that engendered by the diversity of choices free-willed 
Christians may make. The Miller, claiming that he can 
tell that he is drunk from his manner of speech and 
telling his audience that the ale not himself is speaking, 
has very different attitudes to tale-telling from the 
Knight's. A clear link between the Knight and his tale 
was the parallellism of moral attitudes of the Knight 
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Athens and such of the world as impinged upon it. In the 
Miller's Tale there is a similar link, that between the 
Miller, determined to tell his taJe come what may and 
attempting to avoid criticism by humorously denying his 
role as taleteller entirely, and Nicholas creating a 
pattern of 'history' that could not possibly be true.
The real author of the history which Nicholas reinvents 
is Gcd and His book of history unlike Nicholas's admits 
of no repetitions. John who congratulates himself on 
avoiding the contagion of a little too much learning 
('Ye, blessed be alwey a lewed man/ That noght but 
oonly his bileve kanl1 [I (A) 3455-3456]) could b*>ve 
saved himself from the trials which follow had he applied 
the tenets of his bileve slightly more stringently:
God promised Noah that there would be no second flood 
and while Homer and Nicholas may nod, God is infallible. 
Had John lived in a universe such as that created by 
the Knight in his tale comfort rather than Nicholas might 
have been at hand. The Knight's compassion is reflected 
in the action of Egeus in consoling Theseus after the 
death of Arcita [I (A) 2842-2849} and of Theseus in 
urging Palamon and Emelye to accept that no further 
purpose is served by their continuing to mourn his death 
and their not marrying [I (A) 2897ff.J. In the Miller's 
Tale world no seriously meant advice is forthcoming from 
any of the characters: Nicholas's advice to John is
part of his elaborate ruse bearing neither resemblance 
to reality nor relation to John's needs; the main 
characters work upon rather than with one another, and 
the Miller himself attempts to appear a maker absconditus. 
The Miller1s Tale reflects a different type of perception 
from that informing the Knight's Tale and we are overtly 
prepared for this in the Miller's Prologue where the 
implications of the tale-telling game are also extended.
While no response could be more worthy than the Knight’s, 
his is undoubtedly not the only type possible and the 
episode at the head of the Miller's Tale provides a 
graphic example of an extreme type of polar opposition. 
The 'Knight’s acceptance of the cut was cordial and his 
acceptance of the Host’s right to impose its ordering 
unqualified; as his tale he chose to recount a philo­
sophical romance set in pagan times and told in high 
style. It reflects the principles of a boethian universe 
and places its accoun- of the strife between Athens and 
Thebes in terms consistent with an Augustinian view of 
history. Although fictionalized in its details, its 
basic elements are treated as literally true: Theseus
did rule in Athe.is and the events are described as 
historical. In so far as it is fiction the Knight's 
Tale is illustrative fiction illuminating the nature of 
human choice by the presentation of its own specific 
choices within an ordered and ordering context. The 
Knight says little about his use of words but in his 
tale language serves to contain and communicate a sense 
of reality. Implicit in the tale is the belief in 
literature's capacity to reflect reality and the Knight's 
Tale offers much earnest within its game.^
Displacing the order which the Host sought to impose, 
the Miller announces his subject matter and his drunken­
ness before beginning his 'legend.' His fabliau is set 
in Christian time: he introduces the tale in terms that
parodically recall t" Annunciation and the Immaculate 
Conception ^  and recounts a situation occurring in the 
house of John the carpenter in contemporary Oxford which 
by no stretch of any but a fevered imagination could 
offer itself as a postfiguration of the events leading 
to the birth of Christ (prefiguration being impossible 
because of the temporal setting as well as the content). 
In fact the Miller's Tale, unlike the Knight's Tale in
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which the period provides an important basis of under­
standing, is a-historical, its circumstantiality serving 
primarily short-term logical ends; this circumscription 
of meaning is echoed within the tale by Nicholas's 
account of the impending flood whereby the figural 
connotations of the actual flood are crammed into the 
confines of the Miller's physical parody of spiritual 
events. The Miller's Tale is only fiction, and the 
Miller, after all, is drunk? taking it overseriously, 
the Miller implies in his apology II (A) 3137-3140], 
would be reacting inappropriately.
When the Miller first speaks it is in ’Pilac^.'s voys* 
and like Pilate, figure of a false judge, the Miller 
washes his hands of responsibility — in this case 
responsibility for his tale. In the process he denies 
his freedom of will: he is compelled by his circum­
stances to tell the tale, he claims. The tale is 
fiction, and the Miller may imply that it is therefore 
not serious, its words (spoken or misspoken, said or 
missaid) unimportant, mere non-realities, but it appears 
that the Reeve holds another view for he is clearly 
unimpressed by this argument coupled as it is with the 
Miller's stated intention of describing the humiliation 
of a carpenter (whose craft the Reeve shares). The 
Miller has implicitly distinguished between earnest and 
game: his tale is game, let it not be treated as
earnest. To the Reeve the issue is not quite so clear 
cut. For him it appears words, or at least the words 
in which the Miller has described his subject matter, 
relate to realities and their potency is not vitiated 
by the presence of alcohol. Perhaps he does not subscribe 
to the Miller's theory that his tale is produced by near- 
spontaneous generation; certainly when he responds to 
the Miller's Tale in his own tale its butt is not ale 
but a miller.
The distinction the Miller draws between earnest and game 
attempts prescription of his tale and is parallelled 
within the tale by Nicholas's equally purposefully limited 
attitude to realities and his own expression of them.
Both the Miller and his protagonist use words as screens 
rather than mirrors. Nicholas conjures up the panorama 
of the second Noah's flood for John who together with 
himself and Alisoun alone will be saved: salvation of
this sort is neither necessary nor forthcoming; the only 
flood which deserves credence in the tale is appointed 
to occur 'ther as the carpenter is wont to lye' and John 
is conspicuously absent when it occurs. The logic of 
the Miller's reply to the Reeve is similarly opaque.
In his earlier stance the Miller denied responsibility 
for his tale, now ;n- accepts it implying that the Reeve 
has no cause for ar.gor because:
1. Only he who has no wife is not, or may be sure 
tL.it he is not, a cuckold.
2. But nevertheless he is not implying that the 
Reeve is a cuckold (one wonders what category 
of married men the Miller has in mind for the 
Reeve).
3. There are one thousand good wives (no definition 
of the meaning of * good' made explicit, though 
the implication is clearly 'chaste') to every 
bad — which the Reeve himself must know unless 
he’s mad.
4. In addition, the Reeve has no cause for anger at 
the Miller's tale since the Miller himself has 
a wife (whether one of the one thousand to one 
good wives or universal cuckold-makers is 
unstated, but presumably the former is implied).
5. The Miller would never imagine himself a cuckold; 
he prefers to believe that he is not one.
6.. A husband should not be Inquisitive of either 
Goddes privetee or his wife's 'so he may fynde 
Goddes foyson there' (precisely what it is, where 
and in what manner it subsists is left ambiguous).
By the end of this we have come a long way from the 
Reeve's original objection to the Miller1s Tale, and 
the Reeve's reply (if any) is not recorded. He is 
probably as dazed by the Miller's argument as the rest 
of u-v. The persona's tone echoes the resignation of 
the Host earlier: 'what sholde I more seyn' he asks,
t-'.iat indeed.
Since his first claim that his tale subsists in itself 
seems to have found no favour 'this dronke Millere1 
offers the Reeve the opposite extreme possibility: 
reality is in the eye of the beholder: if the Reeve
chooses to see himself in the role of cuckold in the 
Miller's Tale that is no affair of the Miller's.®®
The Reeve and the Miller and their exchange are, however, 
all part of the persona's concern and in the final lines 
of the Miller1s Prologue it is his voice which reasserts 
itself. Unlike the Miller, the persona is clear about 
the nature of his own intentions and their morality - 
he wishes to preserve accuracy above decorum as is 
fitting in an historical account. It is easy to argue 
the intention's aptness in regard to a tale as virtuous 
as the Knight's which is selfvindicating but the 
inclusion of the Miller's and the Reeve's tales might 
give rise to objections on the grounds of their subject 
matter. The persona's justification is a model of 
lucidity after the Miller's exercise in logic. Under­
lying his explanation is a traditional argument: it is
used in the Roman de la Rose to justify Raison's use of 
the word 'coillons' (and by implication, the poem's 
subject matter), it is used by St Augustine in De 
clvitate Dei (14.23) in a discussion of human sexuality.®®
In giving man freedom of will God has granted him the 
ability to choose between good and evil and this act of 
choice and its gift are intrinsically good. Not all the 
particular acts chosen are good, but even those which in 
themselves are immoral provide valuable object lessons 
for whoever will learn from them the differences between 
good and evil so that they may more easily embrace virtue 
and avoid immorality. The persona's concern with language 
here is quite distinct from either the Miller's or the 
Reeve's: it is a concern that the balance of his account
should reflect the balance of the original, for unless 
it were to do so, it would offer a distorting mirror of 
the events it purports to reflect. The function of his 
account defines the persona's task but it does not 
necessarily define the audience's response: the persona
has chosen to write his account; each individual in 
Chaucer's audience must choose his own path through 
the Canterbury Tales. If anyone finds the Miller's or 
the Reeve's tales unacceptable (and the persona has 
offered ample warning to alert those who might) he is 
at liberty to 'turne over the leaf and cheese another 
tale.' None of the tales is forced upon its readers; 
the choice is theirs. But as the persona found it 
necessary to relate all the tales 'be they bettre or 
werse' since to do otherwise would be to find wanting 
what God in his omniscience saw fit to permit mankind, 
go the reader who censors for himself the persona's 
account casts doubt upon the benevolence of the universe 
which it reflects. But this too is only a qualified 
truth for the Canterbury Tales only claims to be an 
history and the events that the persona describes as 
having happened are in fact fictitious. Yet the fiction 
is a true lie closely modelled upon the realities it 
mirrors and the reasons which would make people avoid 
the bawdy tales are short-sighted whether the tales be 
part of an historical account or not. When Chaucer's
persona ends his address to the audience, what he says — 
'avyseth yow, and put me out of blame?/ And eek men shal 
nat maken earnest of game.' II (A) 3185-3186] - holds 
true for both historian and poet; the intentions are 
sound; they are reflected in what he writes, and 
therefore may be communicated to whoever reads the 
Canterbury Tales, and, typical Chaucerian warning, one 
should not anyhow be overserious, making difficulties 
where nothing but delight and instruction coexist.
Of the A Group tales the Knight's Tale views life and 
death more soberly - and judiciously ~ than either the 
Miller's or the Reeve's tales although in the prologue 
to his tale the Reeve himself takes a sombre and one­
sided look at the aging process. Of the three only the 
Knight1s Tale is set in an age before Christ redeemed 
mankind from the stain of Adam's sin; in each- aspects 
"F its historical setting inform its subject matter.
The Miller's Tale contains a complicated plan for the 
plausible annunciation of a second flood. The salvation 
achieved for Noah and his family, themselves to regen­
erate mankind, has in the Miller's Tale been stripped1 
of all its resonating connotation. Where the dangers 
of the flood which Nicholas declares imminent are of 
actual importance only to the four protagonists, the 
macrocosm has dwindled in physical and moral scope.
The Miller is not concerned t.o extend implication in 
his tale: his concern with the literal is end-stopped
at a concern with the immediate and the accidental.
What Alisoun, Nicholas, John and Absolon do is what he 
describes, and the tension between the detailed circum­
stantiality of the account and the figural meaning
implicit in it yet overtly ignored is considerable.
The journey of Noah in the ark prefiguring the incarn­
ation of Christ and his redemption of mankind lies 
behind hende Nicholas's busynesse and speaks through
the surface moral silence of the tale. The characters 
of the Miller's Tale live in an age of grace but their 
preoccupations, like those of their creator, are with 
the law of the flesh.
For all his sermonynq the Reeve supports his tale with 
an equally ungracious argument; living under the 
historical dispensation of the new man and the new law 
of love he prefaces his tale with a series of reflections 
upon time's erosion of man's bodily provresse which treats 
the physical deterioration as though it were of absolute 
importance: 'with olde folk, save dotage, is naittoore 1'
Self-righteously recalling the Sermon on the Mount 
il (A) 3919-3920] he uses his text to 'justify' the old 
law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. If 
there be justice in the Reeve's rational 'quiting' of 
the Miller's tale of an irrational universe and in the 
events of the Reeve1s Tale itself, it is the justice 
of the old law not the new: justice without mercy and
without grace. Of the three tales it is the first, 
which treats a pagan universe without denigrating or 
sentimentalizing it, which provides the broadest sense 
of the Christian view of history. In their different 
ways the Miller1s Tale and the Reeve's Tale both deny 
aspects of their being: the Miller’s Tale by ignoring
the affirmative implications of the events of the flood, 
the Reeve1s Tale by its parodic denial of the renewal 
through love which the Sermon on the Mount proclaims
Discussing theories of metaphor in the middle ages, 
Margaret P. Nims101 explores the effect of context 
upon single words in poetry:
• The single word, to recall Geoffrey of Vinsauf's 
terms, sonat or verberat, but it may also re­
sound, re-verberate with some of its unactualized 
semantic potential. The context may stabilize 
its meaning completely and totally exclude the 
unused residue of its potential, but it will not 
always do so. However disturbing this may be to 
philosopher or scientist, it is, as Gervais of 
Melkley specifically states, a subject of rejoic­
ing to poets, who delight in exploiting the 
ghostly presences evoked by audial and semantic 
resonances. (p. 216)
Multiple contexts may provide sources of multiplicity 
of connotation and metaphors are not only single words 
but may also be clusters of images. Chaucer employs a 
technique in the Canterbury Tales whereby this verbal 
resonance — Sister Niros cites 'Chaucer's famous line 
"Pitee renneth soone in gentil herte,"' as a typical 
illustration — is parallelled bv that achieved in the 
far larger semantic units of tale, group and the whole
In the Canterbury Tales Chaucer compounds contexts.
The relation of teller and tale provides one basis for 
interrelation whereby each constituent is enriched: 
a part of the teller's character is revealed in his 
choice of tale and in the nature of its execution, the 
tales gain added depth from being yoked to specific 
tellers. Sir Thopas without Chaucer, the Pardoner's 
tale of the three rioters without its pilgrim teller, 
or the Monk's de casibus tragedies without the Monk 
are extreme cases that point the loss that would be 
experienced without such a relation, but even in far 
less pilgrim-dependent tales such as the Nun's Priest's 
a significant dimension of meaning would disappear were 
the tale separated from its teller. Placing within a 
specific group contributes to the total effect: the
Knight's Tale is hardly diminished by the Miller's or 
Reeve's tales, but the sense of the coexistence of such
1diverse attitudes as the three tales exhibit contributes 
effectively both to the Canterbury Tales close-up focus 
on the issues raised by these tales and to the wider 
perspective of the poem's sum in which such diversity of 
attitude abounds, directing attention to the poem's 
plenitude as well as to its parts and their inter­
relations. In the I Group the Parson, telling the 
last tale, fittingly reminds the pilgrims - and Chaucer's 
audience - of a fundamental reality: 'oure sweete Lord
God of hevene, that no man wole perisse, but wole that 
we comen alle to the knoweleche of hym, and to the 
blissful lif that is perdurable* [X (I) 75]. Man is 
God's creature and God desires his salvation through 
love of Him. This is the rock upon which the Canterbury 
Tales is established but although everywhere providing 
the foundation it is not the only reality which men avow 
in the poem or in the actual fourteenth century world 
which it reflects. The Parson, scornfully rejecting 
the idea of telling a verse tale, preaches his sermon 
within the poem - a fiction speaking the truth to other 
fictions. This too communicates effect of context: 
the sermon which he preaches has an impeccable extra- 
literary theological ancestry102 but Chaucer saw fit to 
place it within not without his poem.
The reading of the Canteroury Tales involves the poem's 
readers or auditors in continual acts of accommodation. 
Perspectives widen or change radically, characters 
whose stances are highly individuated are placed within 
common contexts by the contrasts and comparisons of 
situation, personality, attitude and action which Chaucer 
engineers. Man's perception of time, itself necessarily 
conditioned by the age in which a man lives, provides a 
major developing substructure to the narrative of the 
A Group tales. The Knight's Augustinian view of history 
and his unstated conviction that this can be profitably
conveyed in his tale gives way to the a-historical parody 
of reality of the Miller's Tale and the fabliau incorpor­
ation of the Reeve's limited perception of the nature and 
function of earthly justice. Each tale is enriched by 
its context and the context of each widens as the next 
is read. The relation of time to history and to justice 
which links the first three tales of the A Group gives 
way in the B"*" Group (whose position after the A Group 
has overwhelming manuscript authority) to another series 
of relations involving time which though not central to 
the presentation of the first tales once raised invites 
their review. For the Man of Law's concern with time 
is linked both to the idea of fame and to the knowledge 
of art's capacity to defy or transcend tiiue and once the 
Man of Law has raised the issue of time and literature 
we see that none of the A Group pilgrims saw their tasks 
as related to literature and the possible reputations 
that they might gain. Their concerns however various 
were all with the immediate tale-telling situation.
It is the Man of Law who is the first to explore the 
possibility of literary recognition.
The B1 Group consists of the Man of Law's headlink, 
tale and epilogue. The headlink in which the Man of 
Law makes his literary pronouncements, comprises a 
narrative introduction ('The wordes of the Hoost to 
the compaignye1) and a prologue linked prosodically to 
the tale. These two parts are unlikely to have been 
written at the same time and lack narrative and prosodic 
continuity. The epilogue, while it is undoubtedly 
authentic, only appears in about thirty-four of the 
fifty-seven extant manuscripts examined by Manly and 
Kickert and does not appear in those following the 
Ellesmere order. The Group has attracted much 
critical attention due in part to its undoubtedly 
problematic character.103 One difficulty, the juxta­
position of the Man of Law's assertion that he will tell
a tale 'in yrose' with the actuality of his choice — the 
tale and its prologue are written in rhyme royal stanzas 
has prompted discussion of the degree of Chaucer’s 
revision of the fragment, of other possible contenders 
for the position of Man of Law's Tale and of the meaning 
of 'in prose.' The tale itself has been subject to much 
scrutiny. Its sources,, genre and themes have been 
discussed and the possibility that part at least of its 
presentation is ironic has been examined. in what 
follows I shall not provide another overview of the 
fragment or direct myself specifically to these issues.
I shall discuss the observations on time, law and 
literature in the introduction, the remarks on poverty, 
riches and merchants in the prologue to the tale and 
shall also explore a possible link between all these 
and the narrative stance in the Man of Law's Tale 
although it is clear that any interpretation of the 
fragment rests rather uneasily upon its accepted 
problems of inner logic.
When we first read the B* Group we can see that it 
points back to the General Prologue, but its relation 
to the Group in which the persona tells his two 
tales and to the leve-takynge in which the 'makere of 
this book' takes his leave necessarily eludes us.
The relation is there waiting to be discovered but at 
that point we cannot perceive it because we are within 
the linear time flow of the narrative very much as the 
pilgrims to Canterbury are within their time continuum, 
that of the journey itself. They cannot draw inferences 
about the Man of Law from the persona's speech as they 
have not yet heard it, we cannot because we have not 
yet read it. The two experiences are different but 
both occur within unicursally experienced time. When 
we have read the entire Canterbury Tales our situation 
is different again. What was still future experience
in our first reading of the B1 Group has become through 
the agency of memory, part of a co-present reality in 
which the linear progression of time past, present and 
future is now only one way of perceiving the whole.
We see the poem in its totality as well as in its 
narrative unfolding and connections that were not 
accessible to us earlier are now apparent.
Medieval enquiry into the nature of time and its relation 
to eternity is closely associated with moral concern 
about the nature of knowledge. For if man is to know 
God as well as to love Him and must achieve at least 
that part of this knowledge which enables salvation in 
time then the nature of knowledge and of experience in 
time becomes very important. Chaucer's poem is an 
imitation of reality, a work of art which attempts to 
appear a history of actual events. But as it progresses 
it also demonstrates its own nature as fiction.
Ini-t ^ ally we may take the narrator's truth claim 
seriously: he makes it and nothing prevents us.
After a while it is not possible to do so: the evidence.
unfolding in tims throughout our reading of the Tales, 
does not permit such a stance Because its implications 
are far-reaching the Man of Law's headlink is one of the 
places in the Canterbury Tales where our knowledge and 
hence our response necessarily differ during a first and 
second reading for what we understand of the same action 
changes radically during a reading of the B2 Group, in 
which the distance between persona and poet is stressed, 
and after we have completed our first reading of the 
entire Canterbury Tales.
The headlink is broadly divided into three thematic 
units. The first is the Host's disquisition on time, 
moving from a general statement of time's nature to an 
application of its lesson to the pilgrims and his request 
to the Man of Law to use the time profitably by telling
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them"a good tale. The second is the Man of Law's reply 
to the Host in which he acquiesces to the Host's request 
but laments that because of Chaucer's prodigious literary 
output he is left with only one tale which he can tell, 
a tale which he learnt from a merchant who is now dead.
The third unit is the Man of Law's denigration of 
poverty, praise of riches and particular praise of rich 
merchants.
Even during a first reading of the headlink when our 
knowledge is analogous in its limitations to that of 
the pilgrims who first heard the Man of Law speak it 
is clear that there is a diminution in scope of subject 
matter through the three parts. The Host's speech is 
unusually capacious in implication even for Chaucer; 
it expresses a complex of attitudes to time and to man's 
responsroility to use his time virtuously, and relates 
both of these to the specific task in hand — tale-telling. 
The Man of Law's response offers no comparable breadth; 
he would like to tell a tale that would enhance his 
reputation but feels frustrated in his attempt by 
Chaucer's prolific output. He does introduce the 
subject of literature, and once introduced it has its 
own autonomy, begging questions that thz Man of Law has 
not necessarily raised, but his discussion of literature 
is limited and self-centred. To the Man of Law 
literature is a means of establishing or maintaining 
a reputation. His objection to Chaucer's ample output 
is that it prevents his receiving credit for originality: 
'What sholde I tellen hem syn they been tolde,' I(B^ )
561. Chaucer has already told the tales and there is no 
purpose in the Man of Law's rehashing them.105 The Man 
of Law points out that Chaucer has told them in poor 
verse, a fact which he clearly sees solely as Chaucer's 
concern. Certainly it does not prompt him to re insider 
the validity of his premise that once told all is said.
The prologue to the Man of Law's Tale, with its far from 
impartial treatment of wealth and poverty, links fairly 
tenuously to the subject matter of the tale although its 
relation to the Man of Law's own character as depicted 
in the General Prologue and headlink is c l e a r W e  move 
in the headlink from the discussion of time through one 
of literature to one of poverty and riches before the 
Man cf Law’s Tale begins, the issues narrowing down to 
a specific focus chosen by the Man of law.
But if this is so within the terms of the truth claim of 
rhe narrative frame, ultimately the choice of topics is 
not the Host's or the Man of Law's but Chaucer’s.
There is an underlying logic of parts in the local 
presentation which explication of background ideas in 
the Man of Law's headlink clarifies. Once we have read 
further, there are also a number of areas in the Canter­
bury Tales that enable us to return to the B1 Group and 
renew our perception of it. Amongst these are the 
Group in which the persona tells the tales of Sir Thopas 
and Melibee, and the leve-takynge of 'the makere of this 
book' as well as the Clerk's Prologue and Tale where 
similar issues are r-.ised but treated differently and 
more satisfactorily. There are structural pointers 
established within the Canterbury Tales to the importance 
of the issues of language, literature and morality which 
they incorporate. The questions raised by the Man of 
Law's headlink and tale are not adequately resolved in 
situ and so they remain, urging our reflection as we 
move on or rather urging that they remain present in 
our minds even as other issues, with which they are placed 
in dialogue, are developed. The physically discrete 
narrative links are themsrIves interrelated by their 
c ntent. The partial tension between form a. content 
(for the implications of the content spills beyond its 
local or immediate container) points towards the larger
form.of the whole poem, thus suggesting a mode of reader 
response which both focuses upon the link and sees the 
link as a part of a whole series.
When the Man of Law launches into his disparaging review 
of Chaucer's literary output the fact of his assessment 
implies that he and the poet inhabit the same real space. 
A man offering his views of actual poetry is clearly 
also rerl himself. Or so we assume initially for Chaucer' 
poems are certainly real and how else may the Man of Law 
know them but by inhabiting the same world as they do? 
That the persona and Man of Law do share one reality is 
certain — they went on pilgrimage together - but the 
narrative does not imply that the persona and poet are 
identical.107 Disjunction between persona and poet is 
made particularly clear in the joke in which the 
persona, like the Man of Law, but unlike the poet, knows 
only one rhymed tale and, once the Host has rejected that, 
must turn to prose to honour his obligation to tell a 
tale. Here too, in the B1 headlink, distance between 
persona and poet is clear. One of the devices used to 
vivify dramatic situations and plausibly engender 
sequenuu^ of tales in the Canterbury Tales is personal 
confrontation. It operates in the A Group Miller-Reeve 
rivalry and again in the outbreak of hoscilities between 
Friar and Summoner in the D Group. Within the confines 
of the narrative situation there is no similar dialogue 
involving Chaucer and the Man o£ Law. When the poet does 
speak in his own person, in the leye-'takynge, the pilgrim 
frame has vanished and Chaucer's auditors are his actual 
fellow men and God. Ultimately the Man of Law can only 
behave as if he were a living person: his freedom of
speech is ita>elf the product of his maker, the poet 
Chaucer. What then is achieved by the Man of Law's 
reference to Chaucer? To those who may feel that the 
joke concerning Chaucer here as in the B2 Group is
being unduly laboured and that its humour is its sole 
point I would suggest that jokes, like all other verbal 
units, are formal structures which admit examination of 
their parts and mechanics. If this denies their apparent 
spontaneity it may nevertheless lead to insight into 
their functioning and purpose. At the simplest level 
the Man of Law's allusion to Chaucer authenticates the 
realism of the narrative frame, even if only briefly.
But the reference also has significance in its own right 
as a judgment which, like any act of evaluation, invites 
rational scrutiny.
That Chaucer's verse is poor is an assessment that his 
auditors or readers need scarcely take on trust. Even 
if they do not know the prologue to the Legend of Good 
Women from which most of the Man of Law's examples 
come or any of Chaucer's earlier verse, the Man of Law's 
detraction is itself cast in Chaucer's far from inexpert 
verse. The injudicious judgment is tested against the 
hearer's or reader's own present experience which includes 
that of hearing and seeing the poet reading to him or 
knowing the authorship of the Canterbury Tales.
The Man of Law's assessment of Chaucer's inexpertise 
leads us in two directions. Within the truth claim of 
the narrative frame it leads to the envy implied and so 
to the questions why does Chaucer attribute envy of his 
craft to the lawyer amongst the Canterbury pilgrims and 
why does he yoke together the figures of poet and lawyer? 
Beyond the truth claim it leads to the point of the 
inbuilt illogicality of the character's unwittingly 
berating his creator for inadequate poetic performance 
In order to explore these more fully it is necessary to 
look at the related topoi in the Man of Law's headlink: 
the reference to time, its use and abuse, the allusions 
to literature, poverty and wealth.
The Host's introductory lines conflate a series of 
traditional medieval and contemporary renaissance 
ideas about time. In the traditional medieval concept 
time may first be defined by its relation to what it is 
not — eternity. *** Where eternity is endless, all- 
encompossing, perfectly stable, time is a successive 
procession of moments in unicursal flux. But time is 
not only a physical phenomenon, it is also a moral 
reality which man inhabits and which he must use to 
his own good ends. For every individual his time is 
doubly precious: first because of the goodness of the
divinely created universe which man occupies during his 
life on earth and secondly because time is the medium 
in which man may shape his acts so that he may experience 
the endless good of eternity. Time is the medium in 
which man exerts his freedom of will. This aspect of 
time's being recurs continually in the Host’s speech 
and provides its climax when the Host asks the Man of 
Law to tell them a tale and free them from the dangers 
of too intimate an association with idleness: ‘Lat us
nat roowlen thus in ydelnesse1 I(B1) 32] is the preface 
to his request for ? tale from the Man of Law.
The antithesis between moral bisynesse and idleness 
implied here is recalled later in the Second Nun's 
interpretacio nominis Cecille where St Cecilia is praised 
for her lastynge bisynesse and her union of faith and 
works isee VIII (G) 85-1193. There is however another 
kind of bisynesse which is far more materialist in its 
impetus. It is this type of bisynesse for which the 
Man of Law praises riche marchauntz in his Prologue 
[(B1) 122-132) and by which he was categorized in the 
General Prologue. Wordly bisynesse, concern to amass 
treasure here on earth, involves a misapprehension of 
man's need to use his time in-the world. It is selfish 
in orientation and short term in its rewards. It negates
the community of mankind and the source and end of all 
good in God. What riche marchauntz achieve is material 
largesse, their wisdom is that of this world. Similar 
concerns and worldly wisdom operate in the General 
Prologue portrait of the Man of Law. He is we are told 
in great demand: 'Nowher so bisy a man as he ther nas/
And yet he semed bisier than he was' [I (A) 321-322].
He is so effective in engineering land transfers that 
even leasehold land becomes 1 fee symple to hym in 
effect.1 In Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire Jill 
Mann discusses 1 the omission of the victim' in the 
General Prologue. In the Man of Law's portrait it 
functions specifically in that the people duped in his 
land negotiations are not even mentioned; it functions 
generally in that his practice would obviously include 
no equivalents of the 1povre parrishens' whose welfare 
so concerns the Parson. No mention is made of his 
relation to the poor who could hardly provide him with 
' fees and robes . . . many oon' {I (A) 317]. The 
references to his legal practice imply that his clients 
are men of material substance.
The earliest part of the Host's discussion of time 
[ (B1) 1-14] uses a varied set of expressions drawing 
upon observation of nature, the seasonal and daily cycle, 
calculation of the position of the sun during the arti­
ficial day (that is, during the hours when the sun is 
above the horizon) and clock time. In The Renaissance 
Discovery of Time Ricardo Quinones observes that the 
desire for an accurate mechanical measurement of time 
which resulted in the fourteenth century flourishing of 
clock-making in 'the urban commercial centers' of Italy, 
Germany, France and England was closely related to the 
rise of commercial interests in these countries 
Although fourteenth century clocks did not possess 
minute hands division into hourly units demonstrated a
more pressing sense of time's fleeting quality than the 
leisurely divisions into canonical hours in the earlier 
medieval period. In a society increasingly preoccupied 
with mercantile concerns the immediate worldly importance 
of the moment was repeatedly stressed. Whether for the 
heaping up of material wealth or earthly renown the 
desire to seize the time became pressing.
Yet although he expresses tf t time of day in clock terms, 
the Host's concern is with the moral not the economic 
impli• e of time and his disquiet is expressed in
lan<. t from vertuous i:.atere of both lerned and
lews- proverbial wisdom, poetic and philosophy
statement. J Behind the Host’s speech lies an age-old 
tradition of moral concern with the way man uses his 
time. Tima is seen as a precious possession ensuring 
man's salvation if only it is well used, a force which 
helps man. But time is also seen as potentially 
destructive, as man's antagonist, a privy thief who 
steals his life away, a destroyer who devastates him 
all too soon if he does not seize, the tima and make it 
his own through his own bjsynesse. Even here there is 
still choice for man may use his time for ends that 
point towards eternity (even as time itself does) or 
for those purely mortal. At the boundary of time and 
eternity is earthly fame to which the Man of Law directs 
himself in his review of Chaucer's output and his express­
ion of his own fears I(B1) 46-92]. It is not the Host but 
the Man of Law whose understanding of time is firmly 
materialist even as his concern with literature is 
earthbound. The Man of Law's praise of riches balancing 
his denigration of poverty places him in relation to 
worldly blsynesse. His understanding of the usefulness 
of time would be termed immoral by St Augustine or the 
Clerk's sweet rhetorician, Petrarch, whose own pre­
occupation with time led him to write even more profusely
than Chaucer.114 The Man of Law's praise of rich merch­
ants' use of their time would hardly have endeared him 
to Pope Innocent III whose De miseria condicionis 
humane is, as is now well known, the source of the 
Man of Law's description of poverty.11  ^ In the second 
book of De miseria there is an extensive analysis of 
the poverty of material wealth and a lengthy description 
of the miseries attendant upon riches which Chaucer does 
not include in the B1 Group but which inevitably provides 
a gloss upon the Man of Law's own attitudes to poverty 
and riches.11^
The Man of Law's attitude to poverty and riches is 
related to his attitude to tale-telling. The tale- 
telling contract to which the Host refers in turning 
to the lawyer involves only a limited obligation: he
is asked to tell a tale that is not idle. The Clerk, 
in similar circumstances, defines the limit of the 
contract lest it conflict with the exercise of right 
reasons
"•Hooste,1 quod ne, 'I am under youre yerde;
Ye han of us as now the governance.
And therefore wol I do yow obeisance.
As fer as resoun axeth, hardily.1
[IV (E) 22-25]
The .Man of Law, unlike the Clerk, accepts the obligation 
simply but transforms the significance of the task.
For him telling a tale relates not only to the enjoyment 
of his present time but also to his enduring reputation 
as a literary figure. The deflection from his own 
present task to Chaucer's past achievements sets up a 
tension totally uncalled for by the Host's request.
What does dictate it is the Man of Law's measuring 
himself by different standards from the Host's. To 
Chaucer the court poet has come some fame and the 
success of his poetry detracts in some way from the
Man. of Law. What emerges in the Man of Law's remarks 
about Chaucer's poetry is not objective judiciousness 
but his envy of Chaucer's fame, Chaucer’s achievement 
is irrelevant in the Host's terms but the Man of Law's 
materialism extends to immaterial things and his own 
need to compare himself to Chaucer climaxes his account 
of Chaucer's achievement. Here, in the world of tales, 
claims the Man of Law, he has been left almost empty- 
handed by Chaucer's pre-empting all the thrifty love 
tales. Chaucer has told so many, and in poor verse at 
that, that the Man of Law is hard put to it to find a 
tal-s worth telling. His condemnation of Chaucer's 
craft in the context of his own search for a tale 
would imply that he could tell those that Chaucer has 
told better. But no one save himself stops him from 
telling a tale that Chaucer has told elsewhere. It 
is his own concept of tales as private possessions 
that makes him move to another genre. The Lawyer, 
to whom 'al was fee symple . . .  in effect' [I (A) 319] 
sees himself outwitted by a tale-propertied Chaucer 
who has staked prior claims to great tracts of a 
common heritage of t a l e s . ' W h a t  sholde I tellen 
hem, syn they been tolde?' [(B1) 56] asks the Man of 
Law. If Chaucer has told more love tales than Ovid 
himself, as the Man of Law claims, in the tale of 
Constance the Man of Law has chosen a subject whose 
Christian piety cannot but eclipse Chaucer's tales 
of cupidinous love. If he may not be ranked with the 
Muses, he must at least be sure that he cannot be 
classed with the Pierides. But things are not known 
according to their proper nature, as Lady Philosophy 
explained to Boethius, rather are they known according 
to the nature of their beholder, and the morality of 
a tale (even a tale of incest such as those moral 
Gower tells in the far from licentious Confessio 
Amantis) inheres not in its subject matter as the Man
of Law implies but in the use to which that subject 
matter is put. Here again contrast is provided by the 
Clerk's relation to his tale. He attributes his tale 
explicitly to Petrarch, whom he praises most generously 
before embarking upon his version. He explains too that 
this will differ in parts from his source: for one 
thing he intends omitting Petrarch's long prohemye as 
impertinent to his own matter though it was pertinent 
to Petrarch's. That the Clerk understands the relation 
of teller and tale in a way that is entirely different 
from that of the Man of Law is clear. So too is the 
difference of emphasis: the Clerk rejoices in
Petrarch's well-deserved fame, the Man of Law begrudges 
Chaucer his right to any fame.
Love of wealth is traditionally associated with awyers 
who, in Boccaccio's words, are ’marked, almost to a 
man, with one taint, the love of money.’11® The remarks 
of the Man of Law in his prologue clearly place him 
within this tradition. His interest in literature, 
although it has no place in traditional descriptions, 
does have an analogue in Boccaccio's Genealogy of the 
Gods. In book fourteen Boccaccio lists a series of 
objectors to poetry and amongst them he places lawyers 
who, he says, 'condemn poets themselves, together with 
their works and their poverty' (14.4) . Against the 
lawyers' criticism of poetry as a worthless art, which 
leaves its practitioners penniless, Boccaccio argues 
that poetry is a speculative not applied science and 
unlike law, whose aim for most of its practitioners 
is the aggregation of money but like theology and 
philosophy, it is concerned with eternal things not 
things that perish. Lawyers, Boccaccio continues, 
are skilled merely in memory while poets are div^.iely 
inspired, and while lawyers amass money and avoid 
poverty, poets deliberately avoid earthly riches
living simply and tranquilly but achieving reknown 
through their verse. Real poverty, Boccaccio observes, 
is poverty of the imagin > ion and this is a kind that 
lawyers not poets possess. He concludes his analysis 
with a comparison of poets and lawyers:
Preterea homines virtutibus ornari non palliis. 
Queso igitur hos morum humanorum frenatores 
egregios, poetas in pace sinant? nil enim eis 
cum poetis comune est, quo eorun possit 
occupari ius. Poete in secessu carmina sua 
canunt, juriste turbelis inmixti et fre- 
quentia fori apud rostra litigia clamant; 
illi gloriam et inclitam famam, aurum isti 
desiderant? illos taciturnitas atque ruris 
solitudo delectat, hos pretorium, tribunalia, 
et litigant!um strepitus? lllorum pax arnica 
est, horum questiones et litigium. Et si 
precibus meis acguiescere nolint, acguiescant 
saltern autoritati Solonis, amplissimi legum 
latoris, qui, decem perfectis tabulis, 
secessit, omissis legibus, in poesim, alter 
profecto futurus, si longior vita fuisset, 
Omerus.
(Romano, pp. 693-694)
Besides, virtue, not robes, is man's natural 
ornament. I therefore beseech these egregious 
tamers of human nature, to leave poets in 
peace. For properly and essentially they have 
no business with poets — nor poets with them. 
Poets sing their songs in retirement; lawyers 
wrangle noisily in the courts amid the crowd 
and bustle of the market. Poets long for 
glory and high fame; lawyers for gold. Poets 
delight in the stillness and solitude of the 
country; lawyers in office buildings, courts, 
and the clamour of litigants. Poets are 
friends of peace; lawyers of cases and trials. 
But if they will not listen to my plea, let 
them at any rate give ear to the authority of 
Solon, himself a most learned lawyer, who.
When he had finished his tables, forsook the 
law for poetry, and who would have proved 
another Homer, if he had lived.
(Osgood, p. 32)
This opposition of lawyers and poets may well have 
suggested the basis of Chaucer's narrative here for 
the attitudes of his lawyer are closely parallelled 
by Boccaccio's anti-poetic jurists. Whether Chaucer 
was directly influenced by Boccaccio's account or not 
he could have reached similar conclusions, working on 
a traditional stereotype of a money-loving lawyer 
whose concern for the things of the spirit is largely 
conventional. The superficiality of his Man of Law's 
arguments either suggests his intellectual dishonesty 
or underlines his inexpertise in the speculative arts. 
Either would suggest a falling off from an ideal of 
law in which positive law, enacted and interpreted by 
lawyers, and natural law, implanted in the hearts of 
all men, together derive their strength and harmony 
from divine law whose orderly pattern they should 
reflect. The Man of Law's interest in law in the 
General Prologue had nothing to do with this ideal; 
his interest in poetry is similarly short-sighted. 
Personal fame rather than exercise of virtue interests 
him and rivalry rather than pleasure stirs him at the 
thought of Chaucer's contribution to English poetry. 
Where the cult of the self is paramount, the order 
inherent in whole patterns, artistic, natural or divine, 
is ignored.
The Man of Law does tell a tale of a virtuous woman 
but he tells it in a way that wearisomely intrudes a 
sense of his presence throughout. He congratulates 
his heroine on her good fortune, laments her ill 
fortune so indefafcigably that the listener or reader 
alternates between realizing that the Man of Law 
leaves no room for any response distinct from his own 
and the awareness that the tale is hardly about what 
the Man of Law keeps emphasizing in his . iterpolations: 
the blessings of good fortune, the hardship of bad
fortune. The tale though not the teller {if his inter­
jections are a guide} explores the nature of 
constancy of faith in adversity. It is a virtuous 
tale and the Host is right to commend its thriftiness 
at the end, but the Man of Law’s thrift is not 
spiritual as his heroine's is, it is the thrift of 
the worldly wise lawyers playing at poet and trading
Most of the pilgrims' tales have written sources yet 
only two of the pilgrims, the Man of Law and the 
Clerk, preface their tales with comment on literary 
precursors. The Man of Law's attitude to twice-told 
tales differs from that of the poet whom he berates.
The tale which he tells provides a case in point. 
Chaucer's translation of the story of Constance is 
approximately parallelled in time by a translation in 
his friend John Gower's Confessio amantis. Neither 
version is diminished by the other’s existence.
Each poet put to specific use the common material he 
found in Trivet's anglo-norman account. In this 
Chaucer and Gower show themselves to be typically 
eclectic and incorporative of the literary wealth of 
their culture. The Clerk, who attributes his tale 
to Petrarch, shares the same cultural stance as 
Chaucer and Gower: he too draws upon the wealth of
the past, renewing it in his homage and his recreation.
To the less lettered amongst Chaucer's audience the 
Clerk's english version may easily be the only version 
of 'Petrarch's tale' they may ever know; to those who 
have read the latin, divergencies as well as equivalences 
would be clear and would provide part of the interest 
in Chaucer's retelling. Such readers would know that 
many versions of the tale were extant and that 
Petrarch’s was itself a translation from Boccaccio's 
Italian.119
Multiple reworkings of a tale are commonplace in the 
middle ages. The Man of Law is unusual in his desire 
not to retell what has been told before — what has been 
well-told merits retelling, what has been ill-told may 
be restored anew. The Man of Law's objection to retell­
ing tales is associated explicitly with Chaucer and 
only through him with a written tradition. The tale 
taught the Man of Law by a merchant is acceptable — 
presumably not only because of its commercial pedigree 
but. also because it has not been written down and to 
the Man of Law the pilgrims' tale-telling contest 
(oral and therefore ephemeral to him if not to the 
poet and the readers of his Book of the Tales of 
Canterbury) has become dwarfed by another literary 
contest, that of the Pierides and the Muses, In Ovid's 
account is recorded what Caliope and the Pierides sang; 
their tales have become part of an ever-present written 
tradition.120 Chaucer too has written his tales of 
love — 'mo than Ovide made of mencioun' I (B1) 54] — 
and whoever reads his works sees his authorship.
For the Man of Law to compete with the indefatigable 
Chaucer - and his headlink sets up a competitive 
stance — a tale from an oral source, a source untapped 
by Chaucer is apt.
Yet ultimately as we all know the Man of Law's escape 
from Chaucer's domain is no more possible than 
Chaucer's or any living man's from God's. There is 
no escape for the lawyer since Chaucer has created 
him and his tale? all his choices occur within 
Chaucer's determined artistic universe. In real 
terms whatever tale the Man of Law chose would also 
be told by Chaucer, but within the narrative frame's 
truth claim the Man of Law does divorce himself 
successfully from the poet. The tension between 
the success achieved within the narrative frame and
the. inevitable failure beyond its bounds points towards 
the fictionality of the Canterbury Tales for it is only 
in terms of the fictional universe that the Man of Law 
has any autonomy while Chaucer has autonomy in the 
actual world in which he really lives and in which he 
creates his mirror of human existence. The Man of 
Law's castigation of Chaucer turns our attention to 
the poet, maker of the Canterbury Tales as well as the 
earlier leve poetry. Through questions of literary 
choice, issues about the nature of being and of the 
relation of artifice and reality are raised though 
not fully explored within the fragment.
The Clerk1s Prologue raises and resolves local issues 
which invite comparison to those of the literary 
passage. Chaucer’s persona in the frame sections 
is a poet absconditus but here his Clerk says much 
that the poet endorses in his own writing methods and 
attitudes. In the headlink to the Clerk's Tale the 
balance between the present tale-teller and the poet 
whom he mentions is different from that established 
in the Man of Law's headlink. Asked by the Host to 
tell 'som myrie tale' the Clerk replies that he will 
tell a tale which he learnt in Padua from Petrarch,
'a worthy clerk,/ As preved by his wordes and his 
werk' [IV (E) 27-28].
The Man of Law's concern with fame is inappropriate 
to his situation. His qualms at the possibility of 
being compared to the Pierides rather than the Muses 
are gratuitous: the allusion and the preoccupation
with fame underlying it express self-interest and self- 
evaluation only. The Clerk touches upon fame too but 
his interest is related to his mentor's reputation not 
his own. Petrarch achieved fame as a worthy man and 
the writer who 'enlumyned al Ytaille of poetrie'
[IV (B) 33]. His awareness of time's inexorable passage, 
the pressing need for man to express his individualism 
creatively and to achieve an earthly glory which is both 
the flower of his creativity and a fitting crown of his 
virtue is expressed throughout his work. In his poetic 
concept moral and aesthetic are interwoven; the poet 
must shape both his life and his art as models for his 
own and all time. The good life and good works endure 
where frail mortality inevitably withers like grass. 
Petrarch, says the Clerk, is now dead yet his faith in 
his glory was well-founded for what he sought and 
achieved was not the foolish fame of the Pierides but 
the glory accorded to the man of good works whose name 
lives on in his creations and their rightful reputation. 
The Clerk not only learns from Petrarch and through 
him may offer his insight to others he also helps 
ensure and enlarge the scope of Petrarch's lasting 
reputation by translating the older man's latin into 
english. Paradoxically, too, by the Clerk's acknowledging 
Petrarch's eloquence and virtue (twin poles of his 
fame) in his praise of the poet and choice of his tale, 
the Clerk's own creativity is enriched for he not only 
takes from but also remakes Petrarch's tale. The 
Clerk's tale is and is not Petrarch's tale, even as 
Petrarch's was and was not solely his own.
The self-absorption of the Man of Law’s individualism 
is counterbalanced by the reflective generosity of the 
Clerk's humanism. Both men lay some claims to learning 
but their attitudes to knowledge and the quality of 
their learning differ fundamentally. The Clerk's 
unostentatious celebration of the stream of literary 
generation and his sense that poetry may illuminate 
reality and reflect philosophical truth are expressed 
in a tribute to a man whose influence on the development 
of fourteenth century humanism was seminal.121
Not .1 but he merits your consideration declares the 
Clerk in his tale. Not he but I is the message of 
the Man of Law.
In the A Group the predominant concern is with history, 
past and present. In the B1 Group the focus of the 
narrative frame shifts to literature itself and this 
preoccupation is sustained in the Group which Alan 
Gaylord has termed 'the Literature Group.’122 This is 
no misnomer: the number of tales in this group and
their generic range are greater than in any other.
The group is crowned by the Nun1s Priest1s Tale, itself 
a compact compendious and gloriously humorous synthesis 
of styles, subjects and themes presented elsewhere in 
the Canterbury Tales. Al its centre the group contains 
the two tales of the persona.
In the B1 Group the Man of Law decries the poet Chaucer; 
in the B2 Group the persona tells his two tales and we 
are given the opportunity of judging the relation of 
poet and persona. What congruencies or discrepancies 
between Chaucer’s personality and that of his 
persona (who, in a most unreporterlike manner, has his 
eyes fixed modestly upon the ground when the Host 
addresses him) would be self-evident to a contemporary 
audience contemplating the poet and listening to his 
words we cannot know, but we are given the opportunity 
of assessing how closely persona and poet are united 
by their literary abilities. Rather tenuously it 
would appear. In contrast to the poet of whom the 
Man of Law complained, the persona knows only one 
rhymed tale and it is a masterly reductio ad absurdam 
of poetry's ability to illuminate human reality by 
verbal dramatization.123 In a soporific rocking 
rhythm the persona, himself *a popet in an arm 
t'embrace' [(B2) 8913, describes Sir Thopas, a hero
entitled only by the genre of his surrounding tale to 
the adjective romantic. Both woodenly mechanistic and 
insubstantial he is a parody of a shadow: his origins
lie only indirectly in the aristocratic french chivalric 
romances, directly amongst the heroes of their english 
bourgeois redactions.124 Underlying the sprightly 
turgidity of the narrative is the sophisticated achieve­
ment of the poet, but neither the Host who interrupts 
his seemingly endless flow nor any other of the pilgrims 
suggests appreciation of the literary sophistication of 
the parody. That is offered to Chaucer's actual not 
hypothetical audience.
If there were ever an opportunity for overt self-advertise­
ment in the Canterbury Tales the B2 Group offers it.
But the persona, unlike the Man of Law, has no aesthetic 
problems in selecting his tale since he only knows one 
rhymed tale. This is the public mask with which Chaucer 
furnishes himself in the Canterbury Tales. Why? Alan 
Gaylord observes that the joke would be heightened for 
an audience who heard and saw Chaucer read his poem to 
them, but for an audience of readers too the distance 
between persona and poet would be clear. For while the 
Man of Law's criticism of Chaucer would still remain, 
the quality of Chaucer's verse throughout the Canterbury 
Tales as well as in his earlier w. rks belies both the 
lawyer's claim and the literal truth of the persona's 
statement — if the persona is adjudged an alter ego of 
Chaucer’s. It is simply untrue to say that Chaucer 
knows only rhymed tale: every tale freely chosen by
the pilgrims in the Canterbury Tales is Chaucer's and 
was ultimately freely chosen by himself. While the 
persona is the first person narrator, he is distinct 
from Chaucer in literary prowess at least. But his 
claim in the General Prologue was not that of a poet 
but of an historian and his first tale would suggest
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that poetry is certainly not his strong point. If Sir 
Thopas is hardly an ideal tale, the second tale which 
Chaucer allocates to his persona, while its morality 
is impeccable, is hardly a striking example of surpassing 
eloquence. The prose tale of Melibee and his wife Dame 
Patience is full of sound matter expressed with a rather 
graceless earnestness heightened by the coexistence 
within the Canterbury Tales of tales such as the Knight's, 
Clerk's, and the Nun's Priest's. It is possible to tell 
a moral t-ale in a variety of ways that are resounding 
literary js well as ethical successes. Chaucer does not 
choose to have his persona exemplify this truth. While 
the pilgrims are satisfied with Melibee1s virtuous 
matter, the roles of persona and poet are hardly fully 
identified in it. If it is true that Chaucer invests 
an aspect of himself in the persona, it is also true 
that this investment is partial, and that even looking 
for his investment in the sum of the pilgrims and their 
contributions is hazardous. We shall only finally be 
in a position to assess Chaucer's presence in the 
Canterbury Tales when we add to all these the words 
of the maker of this book which close the poem. Once 
again the logical thrust of the narrative is forward: 
as readers we are not yet at rest. Donald Howard has 
suggested that the Melibee could be accorded the same 
careful attention tr.— Chaucer's readers as the 
Parson1s Tale has reluctantly won, arguing that it 
presents a secular moral equivalent to the Parson's 
Tale.125 The Nun's Priest's Tale, which is the summa 
amongst the verse tales, uniting within its jest and 
earnest almost all the major issues raised throughout 
the Canterbury Tales.126 has suffered no similar dearth 
of attention, confirming the medieval moralists'sense 
of the siren-seductiveness of excellent poetry. The 
great diversity of genre in the tales of the B2 Group 
is internalized in the Nun's Priest's Tale, in any
discussion of Chaucer's exploration of the true lie in 
the Canterbury Tales the Nun's Priest1s Tale has an 
important place since its superb achievement is to use 
language to create a world which reflects and denies 
realities simultaneously, which explores human truths 
yet places them in contexts which occur in no real place 
save on the poet's page and in the imagination of poet 
and readers. It is its own argument for and against 
fictive truth, for like the ironla upon which its style 
depends it simultaneously confirms and denies whatever 
it offers. Anyone seeking to expound the evils of 
fiction would as readily find argument in the Nun's 
Priest's Tale as someone seeking to justify true 
fiction. For in its poetic excellence it vivifies 
the word's power: to reflect the Word in its words
and to create antiworlds of words, worlds that never 
were nor could be.
One instance of this is found in the treatment of the 
fable's central event, Chantecleer's capture by and 
escape from the colfox. It is described partly as a 
natural encounter between animal predator and prey in 
which Chantecleer's original instinct is to flee [(B^ ) 
4469-73] . It is also described in terms that recall 
Adam's fall in Paradise and Christ's redressing of 
that fall on the tree of the cross. Just before 
the encounter of the rooster and the fox is the dream 
debate which Chantecleer terminates with his firm 
'Now let us speke of myrthe, and stynte al this'
[(82) 4347]. He continues:
rtelote, so have I blis, 
ig God hath sent me large grace;
I se the beautee of youre face,
..so scarlet reed aboute youre yen.
It maxeth al my drede for to dyen;
For al so siker as In principio,
Mulier est hominis confusio, —
. Madame, the sentence of this Latyn is,
1Womman is mannes joye and al his blis.1 
For whan I feels a-nyght your softe syde,
Al be it that I may nat on yow ryde.
For that cure perche is maad so narwe, alias
I am so ful of joye and of solas,
That I diffye bothe sweven and dreem.
And with that word he fley doun fro the beem,
For it was day . . .  -
[ (B ) 4348-43633
On that 'accursed . . . morwe1 reason, variously per­
ceived and wielded by the two debaters, gives way to 
sensuality and Chantecleer flies down from the beams — 
an action perfectly reasonable in a cock if not in 
the debater upon free will and divine providence.
In the midst of the sonorous description of his 
descent is embedded Chantecleer’s credot
For al so siker as In principio,
Mulier est hominis confusio, —
Madame, the sentence of this Latyn is,
'Womman is mannes joye and al his blis.1
The mistranslation has been seen as evidence of Chante­
cleer 's poor scholarship, of his oneupmanship, or of 
:.ne Nun's Priest's or Chaucer's joke at Chantecleer‘s 
^ »1 ’nse. But whether Chantecleer believes that he 
nas translated the latin accurately for Pertolote or 
not, he is offering his creed: his actions make clear 
thai he does believe in both statements and both are 
true for him. That both are relative truths is clear 
to us - far clearer than the relativity of a great 
number of otf.zr truths. It is easier to be objective 
about another's assumptions than one's own as both 
Chantecleer and Pertetote demonstrate in the discussion 
on dreams. While the absurdity here is clear, similar 
absurdities in our own lives escape us even as just 
before the Nun's Priest began his tale, they escaped 
the affronted Monk when he was interrupted in his almost
endless narration. Chaucer's humour highlights problems 
of language that are also problems of human nature and 
choice.
Also webbed in Chaucer's language in these lines is the 
absolute truth upon which the Christian faith rests:
In principio erat Verbum, Et Verbum erat apud 
Deum, et Deus erat Verbum . . . .  Et Verbum 
caro factum est, et habitavit in nobis: et
vidimus gloriam eius, gloriam quasi unigeniti 
a Patre plenum gratiae et veritatis.
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word 
was with God, and the Word was God . . . .
And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among 
us, (and we saw his glory, the glory as it 
were of the only begotten of the Father,) full 
of grace and truth.
(John, 1.1.14)
The fall of Adam happened in the beginning of history, 
but before that, not only in time but in reality, in 
principio erat Verbum. In this tale above all others 
Chaucer shows the complexity of the relation of human 
word to the Word, human language to reality and human 
reality to divine. It is typical of Chaucer that he 
should do this in a tale which consistently deflates 
its own pretensions. While Ch&ntecleer's fall may 
gladden the f.'K, dismay the poor widow and horrify 
Pertelote, if ffects no more than these directly, but 
Adair's felix .-ulpa brought the Word made flesh to dwell 
among us.
The Nun's Pz * ' a Tale explores man's potential as a 
verbal fabr.v: < or and interpreter, it suggests some of 
the scope anr Imitation of verbal creation and focuses 
upon the distortions verbal mirrors may possess. The 
tale raises and explores major issues but does not resolve 
them: no true resolution is possible since the issues are
fundamental to human life of whose complexities man has no
single rational map What the poem at large and the 
Nun’s Priest's 'ale in particular do is invite delib­
eration. The tc;les that explore love and marriage, free 
will and divine providence or material and spiritual 
welfare could never exhaust or definitively circumscribe 
their topics. Paradoxically tightly organised treatment 
moving to literary resolution of carefully defined aspects 
of the issues would leave us with a sense of less rather 
than more, for fundamental issues of human existence defy 
simple explanation. Each individual and each generation 
must explore them again, which Chaucer knows. Such 
freedom is parallelled within the Canterbury Tales by 
Chaucer's use of the pilgrim tale tellers each of whom, 
within the tale's universe, freely chooses his tale's 
nature and range.
The roles which Chaucer assumes and calls to our attention 
in the Canterbury Tales are multifaceted. Of these 
reporter of events and poet have already been discussed 
at some length. Ti vy inhere subjectively in the dualism 
of Chaucer's task of describing the Canterbury pilgrimage 
and making the Book of the Canterbury Tales and are 
reflected objectively, outside the persona and poet, in 
the realities of the Knight's augustinian view of history 
and the many .^vert comments upon poetic practice and acts 
of poetic miking in the poem. Also associated directly 
with Chaucer are the roles of believer and user of language. 
His belief is in the doctrine of the incarnation - that 
the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us — and in the 
promise of salvation wrought by that event in history.
His use of language in verse and prose reflects that 
belief whether it explores the language of those who 
share it or those who deny it. Chaucer lived in a 
politically as well as spiritually powerful Christian 
society and few amongst its members who did not believe 
in the ever-living God expressed their scepticism 
publically. Such use of language was perilous indeed.
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There are many pilgrims in Chaucer's narrative whose faith 
is hardly of paramount importance to them and of these two, 
the Pardonerr and the Manciple, tell tales where attention 
is focused not only on belief of one kind or another but 
also on the relation of language and belief.^®
The moral of the Manciple’s Tale is that language itself 
is dangerous: true or false, criticisr. may redound upon
the critic so it is wiser to keep silent. To this and to 
the Pardoner's proclamation of the power of the hypo­
critical word the Parson's Tale affords an antidote.
For the Parson stands at the end of the Canterbury Tales 
as the true priest, constant in his faith in God, his 
love of his fellow men and the wisdom and goodness of what 
he preaches. Where the Manciple is expedient and time­
serving in all things, the Parson serves God and his 
fellow men in word and deed. Where the Pardoner boasts 
of his ability to use language to coin material wealth 
for himself, the Parson offers the genuine coinage of 
spiritual regeneration making the use to which the 
Pardoner has put his verbal talent look petty and tawdry.130
The Pardoner's headlink and tale raise interesting questions 
about the nature and function of language. In the Roman de 
Rose Reason tells the Lover, in a dialogue to which I 
shall return shortly, that God gave her the right to name 
all created beings 'proprement e comunement. According 
to Genesis Adam was given this task in Paradise. The gift 
of language is a precious one, helping man to order his 
universe faithfully and rationally and enabling him to 
communicate his insights to others. Speech says St 
Augustine is for teaching and learning; it consists of 
series of articulated words expressive of the inner words 
housed in the souls of men which are themselves reflections 
of the divine Word by whose agency heaven and. earth came 
into being.
Like all the pilgrims' tales the Pardoner's Tale is a 
verbal act, but unlike the other pilgrims the Pardoner 
offers what he says as typical of his regular verbal 
practice for his work is 'a labour of words' and this 
pleases him far more than manual labour would. The 
Pardoner's distaste for manual labour is linked with his 
disclaimer of the apostles as behavioural exemplars.
At some cost to others his powers of speech redeem the 
Pardoner from the fate of the apostles:
What, trowe ye, that whiles I may preche. 
And wynne gold and silver for I teche,
That I wol lyve in poverte ..rlfully?
Nay, nay, I thoghte it nevere, trewely1 
For I wol preche and begge in sondry landes? 
I wol nat do no labour with myne handes,
Ne make baskettes, and lyve therby,
By cause I wol nat beggen ydelly.
I wol noon of the apostles countrefete;
I wol have moneie, wolle, chese and whete, 
A1 were it yeven of the povereste page.
Or of the povereste wydwe in a village,
A1 sholde hir childrensterve for famyne.
[VI (C) 439-451]
Because he is able to preach eloquently the Pardoner 
need do no other work. Indeed his rhetorical ability 
does more than save him from the life of a labourer, 
it enables him to collect large quantities of money 
for himself in every village he visits.134
If we look at what St Augustine says about eloquence 
in De doctrina Christiana we find that he treats it in 
relation to another attribute, wisdom. Ideally, he says, 
'the defender of truth1 should combine wisdom and 
eloquence. However good the content of his discourse 
a man whose style is poor will be hampered in communi­
cating his message. But this is a far lesser evil than 
its opposite, where eloquence is united with folly:
,Qui vero affluit insipienti eloquentia, tanto magis 
cavendus est, quanto magis ab eo in iis quae audire 
inutile est, delectatur auditor, et eum quoniam 
diserte dicere a ud i et ia m vere dicere exlstimat. 
Haec autem sententia nec illos fugit, qui artem 
rhetoricam docendam putarunt: fassi sunt enim
sapientiam sine eloquentia parum ptodesse civitat- 
ibus; eloquentiam vero sine sapientia nimium obesse 
plerumque, prodesse nunquam.
(Da doctrina Christiana, 4.5.7, B.A.C.,168, p. 268)
But he who is foo1 - ~»h and abounds in eloquence is 
the more to be avv led the more he delights his 
auditor with those things to which it is useless 
to listen so that he thinks that because he hears 
a thing said eloquently it is true. This lesson, 
moreover, did not escape those who thought to teach 
the art of rhetoric. They granted that "wisdom 
without eloquence is of small benefit to states; 
but eloquence without wisdom is often extremely 
injurious and profits no one."
(Robertson, p. 121)
'fhe pardoner's folly is of a particular sort: it is that
of the. wordly wise. He is not intellectually foolish: 
his speech is excellently designed to realize the goal 
which he has set himself and what he says, although it 
is not said in truth, is not that is a true reflector 
of the Pardoner's belief, is nevertheless often true in 
itself.1^ 5 The moral logic of the Pardoner's tale of 
the thre riotoures is rigorous. It functions as a bleak 
reminder of the divisive destructiveness of the cupidity 
which provides the Pardoner with his text and is, as he 
points out, central to his own life. But the moral scope 
of his tale of spiritual death includes the person of the 
Pardoner too. He himself observes before he begins the
But shortly myn entente I wol devyse:
I preche of no thyng but for coveityse. 
Therefore my theme is yet, and evere was, 
Radix malorum est Cupiditas.
Thus kan I preche agayn that same vice 
Which that I use, and that is avarice.
But though myself be gtlty in that synne, 
Yet kan I maken oother folk to twynne 
From avarice, and score to repente.
But that is nat my principal entente;
I preche nothyng but for coveitise.
[VI (Cl 423-4331
Here Chaucer gives us insight into the manner in which 
the Pardoner operates not only as a confidence man but 
also as a man endowed with freedom of will. Outwardly 
he knows the doctrine which, should be part of his inner­
most being, whose inner knowledge could ensure his 
salvation. Yet his knowledge is sterile, mere mouthing, 
since he does not chose to internalize it and act upon 
it? knowing a truth he benefits only o t h e r s T h e  
Pardoner compliments himself upon his ability to make 
others abandon the vice which he embraces. It is yet 
another instance of his self-acclaimed unusual ability. 
Yet the pertinent discernment is not his but that of his 
listeners.
This anomalous situation is one which St Augustine treats 
in De maqistro (13.41-42) where he cites the instance of 
an epicurean philosopher who believes in the mortality of 
the soul expounding the doctrine of immortality in which 
he does not believe:
Quamobrem in iis etiam guae mente cernuntur, 
frustra cernentis loquelas audit quisquis ea 
cernere non potest, nisi guia talia guamdiu 
ignorantur utile est crederet quisquis autem 
cernere potest, intus est discipulus veritatis, 
foris judex loquentis, vel potius ipsius 
locutionis. Nam plerumque scit ilia guae dicta 
sunt, eo ipso nesciente guae dixit; veluti si 
guisguam Epicureis credens et mortalem animam 
putans, eas rationes quae de immortalitate ejus 
a prudentioribus tractatae sunt, eloguatur, illo 
audiente gui spiritualia contueri potest? judicat 
iste eum vera dicere; at ille qui dicit, utrum 
vera dicat ignorat, imo etiam falsissima existimat: 
num igitur putandus est ea docere guae nescit? 
Atgui iisdem verbis utitur, guibus uti etiam sciens 
posset.
Quare jam ne hoc guidem relinquitur verbis, ut 
his saltern loquentis animus indicetur; si quidem 
incertum est utrunt ea quae loquitur, sciat.
Adde memtientes atque fallentes, per quos facile 
intelligas non modo non aperiri, verura etiam 
occultari animum verbis.
(PL 32 1218)
It further follows that where realities dis­
cerned by the mind are concerned, it is of no 
avail for one who does not perceive them to 
hear the words of one who does, except when it 
is useful to believe them so long as he lacks 
knowledge of them. But anyone who is able to 
perceive them is an inward disciple of the 
truth and an outward judge of the speaker, or 
better, a judge of what he is saying. For he 
very often understands what was said even when 
the speaker himself does not. Let us suppose, 
for example, that someone who takes the word of 
thp :-uroans and judges that the soul is 
me ', hould expound arguments which have
be «... ced by the wiser philosophers in
fax -ts immortality. If someone capable
of Sj. _cual discernment happens to hear him,
he will judge that what this man says is true, 
whereas the speaker does not know whether such 
arguments are true; in fact, he even thinks 
they are completely false. Are we, then, to 
think of him as teaching what he does not know? 
Yet he uses the same words which could also be 
used by one who understood them.
Hence, not even the role of expressing what 
the speaker has in mind is any longer left to 
words, since it is not certain that he knows 
what he is saying. There are, in addition, 
those who lie and deceive, so that you can 
readily see from them how words not only do 
not reval their thoughts, but even conceal
(Fathers of the Church, 59, p. 56)
To the Pardoner the truths that he preaches have the 
same value as the frauds in which he deals, for he 
judges them in accordance with his objective, the 
satisfying of his coveteise, and in terms of this his 
tales and his relices are both effective instruments. 
The Pardoner's language does communicate truths but 
his intentions to do so are not because of any belief
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in the value of those truths as spiritual realities but 
because they provide him with the best available means of 
satisfying his cupidity. Ignorant people, confused by 
his verbal legerdemain into believing that they may use 
his relics to increase their material good or frightened 
into recognition of their own possible damnation by his 
preaching, are easily persuaded to offer to his relics.
But the audiences of lewed peple whom the Pardoner 
regularly dupes are not his present audience on pil­
grimage and Chaucer's actual audience of auditors or 
readers is even further removed from the simple credulity 
of the villagers whom the Pardoner customarily bemuses. 
What is being offered to these two audiences, the pilgrims 
and Chaucer's readers in this tale and how does the 
complexity of linguistic use in the Pardoner's Prologue 
and Tale help illuminate the nature of what is offered? 
What the Pardoner tells the pilgrim audience is not only 
what he says to the country villagers but also his 
rationale for doing so, and they in turn understand 
even more than he tells. For the audience of Chaucer's 
poem the words of the Pardoner's Tale include the 
reactions of the Host and the Knight who represent the 
pilgrim group (not necessarily by expressing the 
universally held views of the pilgrims but simply by 
being of their number and responding); the words of the 
Pardoner's Tale also convey a sense of the literate 
patterning of the tale which is part of Chaucer's not 
the Pardoner's conception. Such echoes as those of the 
Roman de la Rose and De planctu naturae or of stock 
criticism of pardoners help place the Pardoner and his 
tale in a further perspective. For Chaucer's readers 
what is offered is a complex design where foregrounds 
and backgrounds of actuality, book learning and earlier 
literature interact to produce a complex dynamic whole.
When the Pardoner is asked to tell 'som moral thyng' 
rather than a tale of ribaudye he sets out, after the 
pause for refreshment at the alestake, to demonstrate 
his considerable talents in a display which he is at 
pains to point out is customary.137 The 'honest thyng' — 
it is significant that he moves the adjective from the 
sphere of the will to that of the intellect — which he 
tells is the tale of himself, of what he does and what 
he is or has become; it is both a history of the events 
which he either sets in motion or exploits and a state­
ment of his spiritual state. But the application of his 
sermon has validity for others as well as himself, and 
his tale is not only about his own spir'cual condition 
but also that of whoever chooses to live by similar 
standards. He offers the pilgrim audience a view of 
his own practices as a pardoner and while the practices 
are dishonest, he clearly implies that his vivid descrip­
tion of them is accurate, so that what he offers to the 
pilgrims is a truth, an 'honest thyng.1 When the 
Pardoner pretends to the ignorant people that his relics 
and their miraculous powers are genuine or that he has 
the power to absolve them a poena et a culpa he lies to 
them, but in describing his activities to the pilgrims 
he tells the truth.
In De trinitate (15.15.24) St Augustine explores the 
situation of someone who lies, who uses a false word:
Quid, quod etian mentiri possumus? Quod cum 
facimus, utique volentes et scientes falsum 
verbum habemus: ubi verum verbum est mentiri
nos ? hoc enim scimus. Et cum mentitos nos 
esse confitemur, verum dicimus: quod scimus
enim dicimus; scimus namgue nos esse mentitos.
(PL 42 1077)
- What then, about the possibility of also telling a 
lie? When we do this, then indeed we willingly 
and knowingly have a false word, and in this case 
the true word is that we lie, for we know this.
And when we confess that we have lied, we speak 
the truth, for we are saying what we know, and we 
know that we have lied.
{Fathers of the Church, 45, p. 488)
The Pardoner describes his actions in church with perfect 
clarity; he is not confused about their moral implications, 
simply uninterested in them. Now it is in the nature of a 
truth that its application is dictated by its own quality, 
not simply by the quality of its annunciator, and when 
the Pardoner describes his habit of preaching on the text 
Radix malorum est cupiditas what is conveyed is a truth 
with far wider implications than those for which he 
selects his text. The relation of the Pardoner's 
spiritual predicament to that of the characters of his 
tale has often been noted, and at the end of the tale, 
when the Pardoner asks the Host to offer to his relics 
[VI (C) 941 ff.], the Host makes clear his perception 
of this relation.
In the Roman de la Rose, in a passage which is recalled 
here, and to which I have previously referred (see p. 56 
and nn. 70, 71; p. 117) Reason justifies her use of the 
word coillons by pointing out to the verbally squeamish 
Lover (who has objected to her pronouncing it) that after 
God created all that exists he gave her the task of 
naming all the parts of his creation. Both the parts 
and the words which describe them are good. Without 
words to describe realities man can neither know adequate­
ly nor communicate his knowledge. God, says Reason, 
wanted her to name whatever exists:
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il vost que nons leur trouvasse 
A mon plaisir e ies nomasse 
Proprement e comunement..
Pour creistre nostre entendement;
B la parole me dona,
Ou mout tres precieus don a.
<RR 7091-7096, langlois 3, pp. 29-30)
he wanted me to find names at my 
pleasure and to name things 
individually and collectively, in 
order to increase our understanding.
He gave me speech, in which there 
lies a very precious gift.
(Dahlberg, p. 135)
In his analysis of this passage John Fleming cites 
the City of God (14.23) in which St Augustine discusses 
the subjection of the sexual organs to the rational 
will in Paradise before the fall.138 St Augustine 
wr." '-.es not only about the prelapsarian reality and 
the changes wrought by Adam’s fall but he also 
surmises that while now he is somewhat abashed at 
writing upon this subject, had there been no fall his 
own and other people's attitudec to the language of 
sexuality would have been different. lie concludes by 
hoping that the devout will understand the purpose of 
his frankness and reminds his readers that he is 
writing as delicately as he can;
et quod modo de hac re nobis uolentibus 
diligentius disputare uerecundia resistit 
et conpellit ueniam honors praefato a 
pudicis auribus poscere, quur id fieret 
nulla causa esset, sed in omnia, quae de 
huius modi membris sensum cogitantis 
adtingerent, sme ullo timore obscenitatis 
liber sermo ferretur, nec ipsa uerba 
essent, quae uocarentur obscena, sed quid- 
quid inde diceretur, tarn honestum esset, 
quam de aliis cum loquimur corporis 
partibus. Quisquis ergo ad has litteras 
inpudicus accedit, culpam refugiat, non 
naturam? facta denotet suae turpitudinis, 
non uerba nostrae necessitatis; in quibus
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mihi facillime pudicus et religiosus lector uel 
auditor ignoscit, donee infidelitatem refellam, 
non da fide rerum inexpertarum, sed de sensu 
expertarum argrnnentantem. Legit enim haec 
sine offensione, qui non exhorret apostoium 
horrenda feminarum flagitia reprehendentem, 
qua dnmutauerunt naturalem usum in eum usum, 
qui est contra naturam, praecipue quia nos non 
aamnabilem obsenitatem nunc, sicut ille, 
conxmemoramus adque reprehendimus, sed in 
explicandis, quantum possumus, humanae genera- 
t-ionis effectibus uerba taraen, sicut ille, 
obscena uitamus.
(Welldon, pp. 121-122)
Finally, had there been no fall, there would 
have been none of the embarrassment I now 
feel in pursuing this matter further, and no 
need to apologize for possible offense to 
chaste ears. On the contrary, one could feel 
free to discuss every detail connected with 
sex without the least fear of indelicacy.
There would, in fact, be no such thing as an 
unbecoming word and no reference to one part 
of the body could be any more improper than 
reference to the other parts. Therefore, if 
some of my readers have been shocked, let 
them put this down to their fallen nature, 
not to their nature as such? let them blame 
the indecency of their own curiosity rather 
than the expressions I was compelled to use.
I know that every decent-minded and devout 
person who reads this book or hears it will 
readily forgive my frankness and applaud its 
purpose, namely, to help unbelievers, who 
argue solely from the data of personal 
experience, to grasp the unexperienced reali­
ties of faith. Any reader who is not shocked 
by the Apostle's plain talk in reference to 
the 'shameful lusts' of pagan women who 'have 
exchanged the natural use for that which is 
against nature,1 will certainly not be 
scandalized by any expressions of mine. After 
all, I have not called to mind any concrete 
obscenities even to condemn them, as the 
Apostle does. I am merely analysing a certain 
element involved in human procreation and, 
like the Apostle in this, I am trying to avoid 
every word that might give offense.
(Fathers of the Church, 14, pp. 401-402)
In order to communicate his understanding of his faith 
St Augustine has to use language that leaves him and 
may leave others somewhat uneasy although, he observes, 
this disquiet should be attributed to his and his 
audience’s 1 fallen nature, not . . . their nature as
That language can be extremely powerful in its imaging 
reality and can evoke intense responses is clear. When 
the Pardoner invites the Host to come and offer to his 
relics at the end of his tale, the Host's response is 
couched in the very language of Reason's debate with 
the Lover. Where Reason scorned the Lover's over­
fastidiousness , pointing out that if relics were the 
word she had chosen for testicles and testicles the 
word to express relics the Lover would be unmoved by 
the one which presently disgusts him and revulsed by 
the other, the Host crudely and devastatingly curses 
the' Pardoner:
Thou woldest make me kisse thyn olde breech,
And swere it were a relyk of a seint,
Though it were with thy fundement depeintl 
But, by the croys which that Seint Eleyne fond,
I wolde I hadde thy coillons in myn hond 
In stide of relikes or of seintuarie.
Lat kutte hem of,' I wol thee helpe hem carie;
They shul be shryned in an hogges toordI
[VI (C) 948-955]
The Pardoner, physically impotent and spiritually sterile, 
deceives the lewed peple with his fraudulent relics and 
moral-sounding speech. What the Host wishes upon him is 
a reversal not simply of language but of realities: 
enshrining the Pardoner's testicles in a hog's turd 
would exemplify his sterile meretriciousness, providing 
him with a genuine relic of his spiritual and physical 
un generacy rather than a spurious relic falsely 
associated with spiritual regeneration. The Pardoner's
reaction to this is complete silence. For the first time 
since he began speaking his eloquence does not serve him:
This pardoner answerde nat a word;
So wrooth he was, no word ne wolde he seye.
[VI (C) 956-957]
The speech whose use he has perverted fails him in the 
face of the Host's own brutally apt use of language. 
Whatever the problems of interpretation in this episode, 
and they undoubtedly exist, it is evidence that the 
message about the Pardoner's own spiritual quality has 
been received.1^  There is no ambiguity in the Host's
response: in his curse he cuts himself off from the
Pardoner's spiritual malaise.
But although the Pardoner puts language to a morally 
perverted use he cannot destroy its intrinsic truth, 
and the messages of his tale and of his life, as he 
relates it, are distinctly presented, ue has preached 
in contempt of the Word made flesh, but his words still
eleva ‘.he word. The way in which man may avoid the
spiritual death which the Pardoner describes in his tale 
and exemplifies in his account of his own living death 
is by asking in contrition for the grace which Christ's 
incarnation renewed. And it is towards contrition that 
the Pardoner's preaching moves. When he ends his tale 
it is the Pardoner himself who observes this:
. . . And lo, sires, thus I preche.
And Jhesu Crist, that is oure soules leche.
So graunte yow his pardoun to receyve,
For that is best; 1 wol yow nat decvyve,
[VI (C) 915-918]
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Immediately afterwards he remembers what he has temporarily 
forgotten, the powers of his own relics to coin more 
tangible goods than eternal salvation and he is locked 
back in his own state of impenitence, It is the Parson 
who will return to the theme of penitence and offer it 
clearly and without reservation in the last of the 
Canterbury Tales. The Pardoner is a richly individualized 
figure of an hypocrite .l40 In the unfolding of events 
within his tale and in the pardoner's eloquent but 
unbelieving preaching Chaucer explores the power of the 
true word to reveal itself truly whatever violator attempts 
to appropriate it to a false use,141 Discussing the way 
in which a false preacher may offer truths, St- Augustine 
reminds us of the act of discrimination necessary on the 
part of the preacher's auditors:
qui sapienter et eloguenter dicit, vivit autem 
nequiter, erudit quidem multos discendi studiosos, 
guamvis animae suae sit imitills, sicut scriptum 
est. Und-: ait et Apostolus; Sive occasione, 
sive veritate, Christus annuntietur. Christus 
autem veritas est, et tamen etiam non veritate 
annuntiari veritas potest; id es, ut pravo et 
fallaci corde, quae recta et vera sunt praedicen- 
tur. Sic guippe annuntiatur Jesus Christus ab 
eis qui sua quaerunt, non quae Jesu Christi.
Sed quoniam boni fideles non quemlibet hominum, 
sed ipsum Dominum obedienter audiunt, qui ait.
Quae dicunt, facite; quae autem faciunt, facere 
nolites dicunt enim, et non faciunt? ideo 
audiuntur utiliter, qui etiam utiliter non agunt 
. . . .  Multis ittique prosunt dicendo quae non 
faciunt; sed longe pluribus prodessent faciendo 
quae dicunt . . . .  Denique Apostolus scribens 
ad Timotheum, cum dixisset, Nemo adolescentiam 
tuam contenmat; subiecit unde non contemneretur, 
ntque ait: Sed forma esto fidelium in sermone,
in conversatione, in dilectione, in fide, in 
castitate.
(De doctrina Christiana, 4.27.59-6U,
168, pp. 340-342)
he who speaks wisely and eloquently, but lives 
wickedly, may benefit many students, although, 
as it is written, he 'is unprofitable to his own 
soul.' Whence the Apostle also said, 'Whether
as a pretext, or in truth IletJ Christ be preached. 
For Christ is the Truth, and, moreover, the truth 
may be announced but not in truth, that is, evil 
and fallacious hearts may preach what is right 
and true. Thus indeea is Jesus Christ announced 
by those who '•seek the things that are their own, 
not the things th:.t are Jesus Christ's.' But 
since the good faithful do not obey any man, but 
obediently hear that Lord who said ‘All things 
therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, 
observe and do: but according to tneir works do
ye not? for they say, and do not,* thus they may 
hear usefully those who do not act usefully.
. . . .  And thus they benefit many by preaching 
what they do not practice; but many more would 
be benefited if they were to do what they say. 
. . . .  Hence, when the Apostle, writing to 
Timothy, said, 'Let no man despise thy youth,1 
he added the reason why he was not to oe 
despised and said, 'but be thou an example of 
the faithful in word, in conduct, in charity, 
in faith, in chastity.1
(Robertson, pp. 164-165)
Yet while St Augustine warns the faithful to reject bad 
examples, to observe what they say not what they do, he 
obviously intends this advice in regard to action not 
contemplation. What such a man as the Pardoner does is 
important too, both because he is part of G.J's 
creation and because in his habituation in sin he 
provides an illustration of a choice which others may 
avoid. Chaucer has been at pains to parallel the 
Pardoner and the Parson to the evident detriment of 
the Pardoner.1^  The comparison brings into sharper 
focus the sterility of what the Pardoner is and what 
he desires.
The complicity which the Pardoner — insultingly, 
jestingly or hopefully (who can know what is in his 
mind! — demands of the Host when he asks him to donate 
to his relics is one which implies a union with scandal 
which the Host will noc countenance. Yet the vehemence 
of the Host's reaction is checked by the action of a 
wiser man. The Knight is the man of whom the persona
told us 'he nevere yet no vileynye ne sayde/ In al his 
lyf unto no manere wight* II (A) 70-71]. The Pardoner, 
one might think, would provide a test case for tolerance. 
But the Knight's caritas knows no alloy; to hate the sin 
is legitimate, to judge the man is God's task, and the 
Knight's drawing the Pardoner and the Host together 
provides a fitting ending to the Pardoner1s Tale:
But right anon the worthy Knyght bigan.
Whan that he saugh that al the peple lough,
'Namoore of this, for it is right ynoughl 
Sire Pardoner, be glad and rayrie of cheere?
And ye, sire Boost, that been to me so deere,
I prey yow that ye kisse the Pardoner.
And Pardoner, I prey thee, drawe thee neer.
And, as we diden, lat us laughe and pleyr.‘
Anon they kiste, and ryden forth hir weye .
IVI (Cl 960-96 8]
No man is wholly evil and no man's actions need be totally 
incomprehensible. All men are created in the divine image 
and partake of God's goodness. By including the Pardoner 
in his Canterbury Tales and describing him in self- 
revealing if not self-revelatory close focus Chaucer 
enables his audience to look long and carefully at the 
implications of choosing to live in God's despite.
For all his brash self-commendation the Pardoner is a 
man whom few others will feel moved to praise. His 
hollowness finds a fitting correlative in his angry 
silence at the Host's words. But the last word is not 
his silence but the Knight's speech, enabling the kiss 
of reconciliation and the mending of the rift in the 
company's harmony. Within the pilgrim group that 
contains men such as the Knight, the Pardoner's 
destructiveness is containable, and within Chaucer's 
language his silence and the Knight's voice both speak 
of the possibilities of human choice.
1The Pardoner exploits the language of faith in an attempt 
to satisfy his cupidity. However contemptuous he is of 
people he rates eloquence, or at least his own eloquence, 
highly. His language is a type of magic that does work, 
using it effectively is his blsynesse and it is clear 
that there are times when he finds a destructive joy in 
it. The joyless Manciple is a man of other interests 
and his secular situation demands different talents from 
him. There is no mention of his speech in his General 
Prologue portrait although the portrait affirms his 
competence as a manciple: he is a paragon amongst
achatours of vitaille. His portrait hints that he earns 
more than he receives as wages, certainly he is described 
as deceiving the heep of lerned men who employ him. The 
Manciple handles the affairs of his learned masters with 
dexterity and he is obviously too prudent to gainsay hi" 
own interests where these conflict with those of his 
employers. For such a man language is likely to resonate 
differently from the way it does for the flamboyant 
Pardoner. They share a common self-absorption, but the 
ways each expresses and satisfies it differ. While the 
Pardoner is at pains to brazen out his life as well as 
his sermons the Manciple's activities require dis­
cretion in speech and in overt action in order to keep 
his covert gains unremarked. There is a stylistic 
correlative of the Manciple's inconspicuousness in his 
General Prologue portrait. Although it begins by 
describing him it keeps slipping off from direct to 
related focus — upon other achatours who could learn 
from him in lines 568-569, upon his success at outwitting 
his masters as an instance of God's grace in lines 573- 
575, upon the lawyers whom he serves in lines 576-585. 
Only five of the twenty lines of his portrait are 
squarely focused upon himself.
It comes as somewhat of a surprise that the Manciple 
should turn conspicuously vocal in the episode in which 
the Host accosts the Cook, but traditional rivalry under­
lies his initial remarks, When the Host demands a 
tale as penance from the drunken Cook the Manciple 
interposes. He excuses the Cook a poena in a speech 
[IX (H> 25-451 which makes perfectly clear his contempt 
for the Cook. If the Cook provides an object lesson on 
the text 'dronkenesse . . .  is the horrible sepulture of 
mannes resoun1 [X (I) 8223 the Manciple is nothing if 
not sober, rational and malicious. When the Host 
jestingly points out to him that the Cook may attempt 
to avenge himself one day by disclosing the Manciple's 
dishonest practices, the Manciple listens in earnest. 
Self-interest is a serious matter. The Manciple 
immediately embarks upon his plan to ingratiate him­
self with the wine-besotted Cook lest sobriety should 
prove even less attractive to him. The gift of a 
bottle of wine amply redresses the grievance and the 
Manciple is free to tell his tale in support of his 
belief that while it is possible to extricate oneself 
from the results of unpremeditated speech, language is 
perilous and it is safer to choose silence.*^
The tale which he tells, the Ovidian legend of Phoebus, 
Coronis and the raven (Meta. 2, 531-562) , has numerous 
homiletic digressions which enrich its narrative 
content and suggest how the tale lends itself to 
diverse directing.145 One of the points which it 
could illustrate quite simply, which is not made by 
the Manciple, is that of 'un serviteur fidSle mal 
rScompens#. His final summing up of 'this ensaumple' 
is a m§lange of moral and expedient advice expressing 
only the disadvantages of speaking out without exploring 
any of the questions raised by the problem of knowing an 
important truth unknown to someone whom it affects
closely. Unlike Dame Prudence in Melibee or the Parson 
who define clearly how and what anyone should and should 
not say in given circumstances,1^ '' the Manciple finds 
it best finally to Pdvise silence:
My sone, be war, and be noon auctour newe
Of tidynges, wheither they been false or trewe,
IIX (H) 359-361]
Obviously the Manciple is correct in perceiving that 
language is powerful, that its honest and open use may 
expose the user to danger and that the man who does 
not commit himself at all in speech can neither be 
judged nor blamed. But such a man denies an essential 
part of his humanity. Language was given to man to 
aid his understanding and to enable communication.
To reject any language that may win disapproval is to 
abandon a precious part of man’s humanity, it is to 
choose to be less than a man. For the Manciple, 
prosperous petty official, apt in dishonest practice, 
this is acceptable. But the Manciple's Tale is 
placed directly before the Parson1s Tale [see X (I) 1] 
and in the person of the Parson, Chaucer lets a truer 
valuer of the moral potential of language speak.
The Knight is the first pilgrim described in the General 
Prologue and the first character to tell his tale. The 
Parson who tells the last tale is positioned at the 
centre of the General Prologue, where together with the 
Physician, he flanks the redoubtable Wife of Bath.
Last of the pilgrims in the General Prologue is the 
Pardoner. Parson and Pardoner, as remarked earlier, 
both choose to preach but while the Pardoner's constancy 
in preaching the word in season and out of season arises 
from his cupidity (it pays to do so) the Parson's 
constancy expresses genuine conviction: 'Why sholde I
sowen draf out of my fest,/ Whan I may sowen whete, if
that me leste?1 [X (II 35-36J. Both men acknowledge and 
use the power of words but are contrasted in their means 
and ends. The Pardoner is dominated by his ravenous 
cupidity;
I wol have moneie, wolle, chese, and whete,
A1 were it yeven of the povereste page,
Or of the povereste wydwe in a village,
A2 sholde hir children sterve for famyne.
Nay, I wol drynke licour of the vyne,
And have a joly wenche in every toun.
IVI (C) 448-453]
The parson preaches in love of his fellowmen and faith 
in 'the endelees blisse of hevene.' At the core of the 
Pardoner's sermon is an old story 'for lewed people 
loven tales olde' [VI (C) 437]. The Parson, asked by 
the Host to 'telle us a fable anon' [X (I) 29], 
firmly refuses to tell any fable, adducing 'Paul that 
writeth unto Tymothee' as authority for his attitude.
The Pardoner also cites St Paul's writing to Timothy 
but puts his authority to more mundane use. If the 
Host had momentarily hoped for a second Nun’s Priest's 
Tale his hopes are not to be realized. Yet the 
Parson's offering is well suited to its place at the 
end of the Canterbury Tales. The sermon on penance, 
the seven deadly sins and their remedia does 'shewe 
. . . the wey, in this viage,/ Of thilke parfit glorious 
pilgrymage/ That highte Jerusalem celestial1 [X (I) 
49-51] and it transfers our attention from the abundant 
pleasures of the journey through the Canterbury Tales 
(in which the pilgrims certainly did not ride 'doumb as 
a stoon' {I (A) 774]) to the blisse that is perdurable.
4 THE TRUE LIE: A RETURN TO SIMPLICITY,
-THE PARSON AND THE POET
Throughout the Canterbury Tales Chaucer has shown the 
range of literature, its multiplex capacity for exploring 
and revealing (as well as concealing) trutns. In the 
Parson's Tale he uses language which no longer dramatizes 
human choices but analyses their religious and moral 
implications The abstraction of the language 
distances the Parson's Tale from the vitality of the 
actualization of living situations in the earlier tales 
and aligns the tale in direct address to ourselves as 
Chaucer's audience. The pilgrim audience to whom the 
Parson speaks in his prologue is replaced in the 
retraction by Chaucer1s own audience even as the 
Parson (whose tale has no epilogue or connecting end- 
link) is replaced by Chaucer speaking in his own person. 
Both Parson and Chaucer speak of 'moralitee and hooly- 
nesse' but one speaks from within the fiction one 
simultaneously within and without. With the Parson1s 
Tale L’.ie Canterbury Tales looks directly at its audience 
whose members are no longer responding to an imaging 
of reality vivified in words but to a religious 
exhortation which only indirectly provides commentary 
on the moral choices of the pilgrims but directly 
addresses itself to the audience's lives: its truth
is also the audience's.
The Parson's sermon is encyclopaedic in its subject 
matter and comprehensive in its treatment. It has none 
of the blandishments of 'thise poetical muses’ but its 
unadorned prose offers truths central to Christian 
doctrine: the nature of fallen man's relation to God
and the means whereby man may avail himself of God's 
grace and use the pilgrimage of this life to achieve 
salvation.
The Canterbury Tales' varied range of subject matter and 
genres gives way in the parson's Tale to a tale which 
answers to its generic title largely in that it is a 
telling, an act of communication in words. It is no 
fiction. Yet despite his expressed contempt for fable 
the Parson is himself a fiction: the idealized
religious man exists only verbally and notionally.
His sermon would still have retained its morality had 
Chaucer translated and condensed its sources without 
introducing his work into the Canterbury Tales. Yet 
outside the Canterbury Tales the work would only 
manifest its own innate worth and Chaucer's act of 
devotion in translating it. Within the poem it is 
also the Parson's fruyt. the verbal deed which reveals 
the pilgrim's character and so confirms the persona's 
judgment of him in the General Prologue. Its inclusion 
has another effect, it not only incorporates its 
vertuous mateere but also the expression of an attitude 
to the scope of fiction. The true lie which may faith­
fully reflect the human condition in whatever mode seems 
suitable to its author is capacious enough to include 
multiple perception of value, including the perception 
of its own value as worthless. While Chaucer's morality 
is unlikely to underlie the Miller's or Reeve's values 
it underlies their inclusion. Since such men exist in 
the world literature which explores the pilgrimage of 
this life legitimately includes them: God's 'compaignye
of sondry folk, by aventure yfalle in felaweshipe,1 is 
far more diverse than Chaucer's. Like the Parson Chaucer 
believes in the grace of God which enables salvation but 
the Parson's uncompromising attitude to fable is clearly 
not shared by Chaucer. The Parson seems to imply that 
all fable is worthless. Certainly he refuses to tell 
any fable preferring to offer the wheat he does have in 
his hand, the bread of religion. Preaching not tale- 
telling is his vocation and he preaches well. But one
of -Chaucer* s vocations, perhaps the only work he did 
which he did feel as vocation, was making and his under­
standing of fiction is different from that of the 
Parson. After telling a tale whose fabulous quality is 
consistently highlighted the Nun's Priest proclaims 
what Chaucer repeats in his retraction:
For selnt Paul seith that al that writen is,
To oure doctrine it is ywrite, ywis;
Taketh the fruyt, and lat the chaf be stille.
[(B2) 4631-4633]
Both the Nun’s Priest and the Parson associates happiness 
with their tales although the types of tales they tell 
are so different.14®
All learning does not focus upon the same lessons nor 
are last things the only things. In the Parson's dis­
paragement of fable Chaucer demonstrates another extreme 
from that which he raised in the debate on the inclusion 
or exclusion of cherles tales. The inclusion of the 
Parson's argument against fable within the poem places 
it, like the argument for including ribaudye, in a 
meaningful literary and moral context. While some 
tales are morally mere draf this is true of none of 
the Canterbury Tales, all of which express the imprint 
of Chaucer, whatever the limitations of their apparent 
authors, and the Tales itself is sufficiently capacious 
and generous in spirit to include within its ambit a 
wide variety of attitudes as well as to give pride of 
place to the tale of the pilgrim to whom literature is 
most suspect.
Broadly speaking there are two schools of thought regard­
ing Chaucer's retractions. There are those critics who 
believe either that they are merely conventional, a 
perfunctory expression of appropriately religious
sentiments at the end of a secular festschrift or that 
they satirize denials of the value of such tales as 
Chaucer has told. Opposed to this school of thought, 
which seeks to reduce the significance of the leve- 
takynqe, are those critics who judge that in it Chaucer 
expresses an attitude to which he actually subscribed, 
that unlike much of the Canterbury Tales it is not built 
upon ironies and is written in earnest. 150 That the 
first person narrator and the poet are not identical has 
long been accepted both on the grounds of characterization 
which E. Talbot Donaldson raised in 'Chaucer the Pilgrim' 
and because of an awareness that the use of the first 
person narrator in the middle ages was no necessary sign 
of close identification with the author.^1 But to use 
the first person singular was obviously not to deny the 
possibility that the sen"iments expressed were those of 
the author. The voice which speaks in the leve-takynqe 
echoes the rubric's stress on makynge: 'Heere taketh
the makere of this book his leve.' Whether the rubric 
is Chaucer’s or merely a scribal addition we cannot know, 
but what succeeds it is Chaucer's. In a highly inform­
ative article on the conventional background to Chaucer's 
retraction, Olive Sayce argues that the latter represents 
a merely convent!' na.l exercise and that we should look to 
the retraction not to understand how Chaucer felt about 
his art near the end of his life but to see him explore 
tensions between traditional ecclesiastical attitudes to 
literature and more modern secular literary aspirations. 
She writes:
Structurally the passage [i.e. the retraction] 
can be shown to be entirely in keeping with 
the general pattern of medieval prologues and 
epilogues, and in particular to be an instance 
of the well-attested topos of regret for worldly 
works. All its formulations can be closely 
parallelled elsewhere. Thematically, however, 
it reflects the tension between traditional
- ecclesiastical teaching and the growing autonomy 
of secular literature. Far from being a personal 
confession of literary sin, it is a conventional 
structural motif which is used as the vehicle for 
the expression of opposing aesthetic standpoints.
(pp. 245-246)
She suggests that there is a logical inconsistency i.n 
critics' recognizing the discrepancy between the persona 
within the poem and Chaucer the poet beyond it and their 
not perceiving that the retraction, which is also placed 
within the poem is associated with the first person 
narrator not Chaucer himself.
While it is clear that Chaucer uses conventional motifs 
in the retraction, what is not clear is that by doing 
so he moves away from expressing his own views. Chaucer 
lived within a specific social context by which his 
subject matter and style were both influenced. That 
many people wrote conventional prologues and epilogues 
to their poems, some in good faith some doubtless m  
relatively unreflecting imitation of a current mode, 
tells us little about Chaucer's motives in adopting 
time-honoured conventions. It is the way that Chaucer 
uses them, not the fact that he uses them that may 
indicate his purpose.
In Group I the pilgrimage to Canterbury, itself a figure 
of the journey though life to God, gives way to the 
Parson's attempt 'To shewe . . . the wey in this viage/
Of thilke parfit glorious pilgrymage/ That highte 
Jerusalem celestial' (X (I) 49-51]. After the Parson's 
Tale there is no further reference to any of the pilgrim 
company. The narrative frame disappears anti only the 
words of the maker of this book are left. In the leve- 
takynge Chaucer describes a different reality from that 
expressed within the narrative frame. It is as an author
1that he speaks not as a pilgrim, and in his plea to his 
audience he accepts responsibility for the writing of 
the Canterbury Tales not simply for reporting uhe events 
of the journey. The fiction that the pilgrimage actually 
occurred is no longer protected and Chaucer addresses 
himself directly to his actual audience and to his God.
He addresses his audience first, commending his litel 
tretys to it, and asking its members to thank 'Lord 
Jhesu Crist of whom procedith al wit and al goodnesse'
[X U) 1081] for whatever they like in it, <nd to 
attribute its weaknesses to 'the defaute of ihis] 
unkonnynge and nat [his] wyl, that wo-.Je ful fayn have 
seyd befctre if [he] hadde had konnynge1 [X (I) 10823 .
In this he expresses the gap between God and man: God
in whose perfect being there is no falling off and 
from whom all goodness derives and man in his imper­
fection time bound and fallible attempting to perceive 
the good and do well which he does not always achieve, 
for while in God intention and execution are one in 
man there is a large gap between them. His wyl was 
good, he tells us, but his konnynge was not perfect. 
Recalling the end of the Nun's Priest's Tale he cites 
St Paul's words again — 'For oure book seith, "Al that is 
writen is wrlten for oure doctrine,“ and that is myn 
entente' [X (I) 1083] — and applies them now to his 
own writing in the Canterbury Tales. His intention 
was to present a worthy mirror of the world, where his 
uxt has failed his image is marred, and others may not 
clearly perceive what he intended clearly but executed 
only in part. The frustrations as well as the delights 
of human creativity underlie the formal topoi in the 
retraction yet also present in Chaucer1s citation of 
this text is a sense of the gap between the type of 
writing which is solely 'writen for oure doctrine * and 
the type which Chaucer has created in the Canterbury
When Chaucer talks in the following section of the 
rt:i raction of revoking 'the tales of Canterbury, thilke 
that sovrnen into synne1 the clause admits of multiple 
interpretation. He does not say whether he means 
specific tales or parts of tales or large parts of the 
entire poem or even in what way they 1sownen into synne.' 
Is he considering his own purely human pride in creating 
such works of art, mere 'worldly vantitees,1 is he 
considering thair subject matter or the fact that they 
may cause others to sin in thought or act? We cannot 
krow although it does -seem to me that at the time of 
writing this section, which was probably close to his 
death, Chaucer had simply changed his mind about his 
secular art. This surmise seems strengthened by the 
wholesale nature of Chaucer's retractions, which include 
almost his entire secular canon. In such an attitude 
he had many predecessors. One thinks of Boccaccio in 
his later ysars and of St Augustine's retraction of his 
enthusiastic acclaim of poetry in De ordine.1^
The vigour with which the Canterbury Tales defends 
literature's capacity to illustrate and mirror human 
truths has given way in the retraction to its maXer's 
contemplation of last — and prime — things. Yet even 
this is not wholly true. The retraction of his earlier 
works is unequivocally expressed but the qualification 
in the revocation of the Canterbury Tales sets up 
ambiguities which are not contained by speculation 
regarding his criteria of selection there but which 
spread to the entire revocation. As Olive Sayce has 
pointed out in the act of revoking he names his canon 
and thus ensures that its name will live, associated 
with his own in the manuscripts that bespeak his literary 
works.Communicated is the pull between his love of 
his literary creations and the knowledge that in absolute 
terms, if no . the relative terms of man living in the
world, the fascination with the world and the things 
of the world which they express must finally be left 
behind.
When Chaucer writes that ' "al that is writen is writen 
for oure doctrine," and that is myn entente' and then 
continues to revoke much that he wrote, there is not 
necessarily a contradiction. One distinction, that 
between intention and execution has already been dis­
cussed; another, that between Chaucer's position at 
the end of his life and his readers' in their own lives, 
may be mentioned. For the poet it is particularly 
necessary to take final spiritual stock of his writing 
since he is near to death; for his readers the type of 
stocktaking is different. For people still 'nel mezzo 
del cammin di nostra vita' what the Canterbury Tales 
has to offer, albeit imperfectly expressed, is still 
valid; it reflects their world in a way which not 
only gives pleasure but also aids insight into the 
nature of the worldly reality which they inhabit and 
into art's capacity to do this. But to the poet that 
part of his life is past and this poem as well as his 
earlier secular poems are too equivocal, balance too 
adeptly secular and religious impulses to be part of 
what he wishes to place before God. At the day of 
judgment ’nat oonly . . . our defautes shullen be 
jugged, but eek . . . alle oure werkes shullen openly 
be knows. And, as seith St Bernard, "Ther ne shal no 
pledynge availle, ne no sleighte; we shullen yeven 
rekenynge of everich ydel word." . . . .  For cartes 
ther availleth noon essoyne ne excusacioun' [X (II 
165-166, 164].
After reclaiming M s  explicitly pious works, Chaucer 
prays for the grace that will enable him to achieve the 
salvation of his soul. The three parts of his leve- 
takynge all stress aspects of his own agency ar.i their 
implications. First Chaucer describes his agency in 
relation to the writing of the Canterbury Tales and the
gap between will and execution exhibited there, secondly
in relation to his desire for salvation and his 
revocation of almost all his poetic works as 'worldly 
vanitees' and finally in his submitting himself to the 
grace of God. Throughout he stresses his relation to 
God (which is paramount) and to his audience who are 
both directfid ci.wards God 'of whom procedeth al . . . 
goodnesse' and petitioned to pray for the poet. In the 
naming of the canon in the retractions and endorsements 
and in the plea to the audience of his poem to pray for 
his soul Chaucer stresses the actual relations of poet, 
poem and audience to the God who is 'kynge of kynges.1 
Whatever we may feel about the judgments Chaucer passes
upon his works we do not doubt his right to pass them.
The poems are his, he has made them and it is his 
judgment that must decide their present value to him. 
Although not to uss for the way in which we read the 
Canterbury Tales depends upon our choice? once Chaucer 
has created the poem our use of the poem is our 
responsibility. Throughout the Canterbury Tales 
Chaucer has described the pilgrims as though they 
truly live and freely make their choices. Here at 
the end of the poem he accepts responsibility for 
his fiction openly. There is a logical consistency 
in this, one which Chaucer does not dilate upon in the 
retraction but which is nevertheless there ■'mplicit in 
the work which was 'writen for oure doctrine.1 In 
giving free will to his pilgrims Chaucer creates the 
illusion that they live, and at the end of the
Canterbury Tales in the leve-tskynge Chaucer takes leave 
and makes us take leave also of his pilgrims as people.
In the ending of the fiction is a return to truth.
This underlies all the explicit functions of the passage. 
Here the illusion of life which is all that any human 
artist may create is highlighted in the stress which is 
given to the only actual beings whose wills operate in 
relation to Chaucer's poem: the poet, his audience and
his God.
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. . . aiunt, poesim omnino nullam aut futiJem facultatem atque 
ridiculam, poetas homines esse fabulosos, i * illos, ut despecttori 
utantur vocabulo, non nunquam fabulones appellant, rura silvas et
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nmtana colentes, eo gaod noribus nec urbanitate valeant. Preterea 
eorum poerrata esse dicunt ctecura nlms atgue mendacia lasciviis 
plena et deorum gentilium nugis atgue ineptiis referta, asserentia 
lovem, guendam aldulterum et spurcidum hominem, nunc deorum patrem, 
nunc celorum regm, nunc ignem, nunc aerem, nunc hcmlnem, nunc 
taurum, nunc aguilam, et huixismodl inconvenientia: sic et lunonem 
et alios infinites, eos muJtorum naninum celebres facientia.
Mentium insuper seductores clamitant esse poetas ac suasores 
criminum, et, ut turpiori, si possint, conmaculent nota, predicant 
eos phylosophorum symias esse; firrrantes inde, poetarum libros 
legisse aut ten ere, pregrande piaculum, ac, nulla facta distinctione, 
autoritate, ut aiunt, fulciti Platonis, eos nedum e danibus, sed ex 
urbibus esse pellendos, et eorum scenicas ireretriculas, Boetio 
approbante in exitium usque dulces, detestabiles fore atgue 
eiciendas et renuendas onninoi
They say poetry is absolutely of no account, and the making of 
poetry a useless and absurd craft; that poets are tale-rrmgers, 
or, in lower terms, liars; that they live in the country anmg 
the woods and mountains because they lack manners and polish.
They say, besides, that their poems are false, obscure, lewd and 
replete with absurd and silly tales of pagan gods, and that they 
make Jove, who was, in point of fact, an obscene and adulterous 
man, now the father of geds, new king of heaven, now fire, or 
air, or nan, or bull, or eagle, or similar irrelevant things; 
in like manner poets exalt to fane Juno and infinite others under 
various names. Again and again they cry out that poets are seducers 
of the mind, prompters of crime, and to make their foul charge, 
fouler, if possible, they say they are philosophers' apes, that it 
is a heinous crime to read or possess the books of poets; and then, 
without making any distinction, tney prep themselves ip, as they 
say, with Plato's authority to the effect that poets ought to be 
turned out-of-doors — nay, out of bewn, and that the Muses, their 
munming mistresses, as Boethius says, being sweet with deadly 
sweetness, are detestable, and should be driven out with them and 
utterly rejected.
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8. In citing Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy I have used 
the Robinson edition of Chaucer1s translation throughout. The 
edition of the original used is that of the Loeb Classical Library, 
ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Lcndon: Heinemann and Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, [1962]).
9. Genealogie deorum gentlllum, 14,19. See also 14.5 and 14.14.
10. Plato's strictures were approvingly surrmarisedby St Augustine
in De civitate Dei, 2.14:
fin forte Graeco Platoni potius palna danda est, gui cum ratione 
formaret, qualis esse civitas debeat, tairquam adversaries veritatis 
poetas censuit urbe pellendos? Iste vero at deorum iniurias indigne 
tulit et fucari corrurrpique figmentis aniiros civium noluit.
Perhaps the palm should be given to the Greek Plato. In conceiving 
the ccnstituticn of ti*ie ideal State, he thought it proper to exclude 
fran the city the poets, as enemies of the truth. He would tolerate 
no insults to the gods, nor permit the minds of the people to be 
misled and perverted by fictions.
St Augustine: De civitate Dei, ed. J. E. C. Welldon, 2 vols.
(London: S.P.C.K., 1924), 1, p. 72. The translation is that of 
D. B. Zene and G. G. Walsh, Fathers of the church (3 vols.: 8,14,24
[Washington: C.U.A., 1950, 1952, 1954]), 8, p. 93. This is not the 
only attitude to the worth of the fictional arts expressed by St 
Augustine. The attitudes expressed in De ordine (1.8.24; 2.4.13; 
2.11.32-34; 2.14.39-41), Solilcxrula (2.10) and De rosica (6.1.1.) 
provide interesting contrasts. See below, pp. 23-30.
11. Primary sources are cited where relevant in the te;± and 
are included in the bibliography. Of the secondary literature I 
have consulted C. A. Patrides, The Phoenix and the Ladder: The 
Rise and Decline of the Christian View of History, UCES, 29 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1964) and 
the enlarged version published as The Grand Design of God: The 
Literary Form of the Christian View of History (lcndon: Routledge, 
1972); of the works cited this contains the irost comprehensive 
bibliography. I have also consulted Erich Auerbach, Dante: Poet 
of the Secular World, trans. Ralph Mannheim (1929; trans. Chicago:
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Chicago Univ. Press, 1961) ? 'Figura,' Scenes from the Drama of 
European Literature (1944? New York: Meridiar, 1959), pp.11-76; Mimesis: 
She Representation of Reality in tfestern Literature, trans. Willard 
R. Trask (1946; Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1953); C. David 
Benson, 'The Knight's Tale as History,1 Chaucer Review, 3 (1968), 
pp. 107-123; M. w. Blcanfield, 'Chaucer's Sense of History,1 JEGP,
51 (1952), pp. 301-313, reprinted in Essays and Explorations 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 13-26; Oscar 
Cullman, Christ and Time (Imdon: SCM, 1962); Etienne Gilson,
History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1955); The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1936), especially 'The Middle Ages and
History,1 pp. 383-402; Louis Green, Chronicle into History: An Essay 
on the interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth Century 
Chronicles (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1972); Charles Homer 
Haskins, 'Historical Writing,' The Renaissance of the Twelfth 
Century (1927; rpt. New York: Meridian, 1960); Reinhold Niebuhr,
Faith and Hiscory: A Comparison of Christian and Modem Views of 
History (New York: Scribner's, 1949); Charles S. Singleton, Dante 
Studies Cne: Comedia Elements of Structure (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1954}; Dante Studies Two: Journey to Beatrice 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958); An Essay on the 
Vita Nuova (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958).
12. The Parson, whan the Host asks to knltte up al this feeste,
opens his sermon with a statement oi God's desire to ensure nan's 
salvation, and concludes it with a description of the endelees 
blisse of hevene wtiich is the reward of living norally [X (I)
75-80, 1076-1080j.
13. See Patrides, The Grand Design of God, pp. 1-12. See also 
St Augustine, Civitate Dei 12.10, 12.12, 12.14, 12.18, 12.20, 12.21.
14. See Civ. Dei, 7.31, 14.11, 20.6.
15. The Parson's conclusion to the first part of his sermon
sums this up succintly:
For soothly oure sweete lord Jhesu Crist hath spared us 
so debonairly in oure folies, that if he ne hadde pitee 
of mannes soule, a sory song we myghten alle synge.
[X (I) 315]
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16. I have used this phrase which recalls St Augustine's 
description of the 'place1 which exists within the soul even 
though it has no extension in space, to suggest the interaction 
of the transcendent and the immanent. See Confessions (13.7) and 
te doctrina Christiana (1.17.16-22.21).
17. This is of course fundamental to the Parson's choice of 
tale, for the vertuous mateere that the Parson elects to tell the 
pilgrims demonstrates clearly and comprehensively the nature of 
the knowledge which it is vital that Christian man should under­
stand, and the use to which it should be put — conversion from 
sin to a state of grace through penitence not once or sporadically 
but throughout huius rrortalitatis vita.
18. See Ernst Robert Curtius, European literature and the Latin 
Middle Ages, trans. by Willard R. Trask, Bollingen Series, 36 
(original Bern: A. Rrancke A. G. Verlag, 1948: trans. New York: 
Pantheon, 1953), pp. 3l0ff. for the bode topos. it was used in the 
Old Testament as well as the New, and it stresses both God's 
authorship of his creation and the literal-historical linearity
of its development. Both the jewish and the western European 
Christian traditions held firm at all times to the concept of the 
literal historicity of the events at the centre of their religious 
doctrines and by doing so imbued history with great moral signifi­
cance. See further Patrides, 0£. cit. n. 11. See also St Augustine 
De trinitate,15.9.15,PL 42, 1068-1069, quoted below, pp. 10-11.
19. Hugh of St Victor, Eruditlonls didascallcae liber septimus,
PL 176, 814; St Bonaventure, Breviloquium 2.11, both quoted by 
Charles S. Singleton, An Essay on the Vita Nuova, pp. 38-39.
20. St Thomas Aquinas, Surtma theoloqlca, 1.1.10., resp. 1, 617, 
trans. C. S. Singleton, Dante Studies One, p. 88.
21. St Augustine, De trinitate, 15.9.15, PL 42, 1068-1069, 
trans. Stephen McKenna, Fathers of the Church (Washington: OR,
1963), 45, p. 471.
22. See, for example. Civ. Dei 7.32.
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23. Whether or not the letter is authentic is irrelevant to nry 
purpose in quoting from it here. The text which I have used is 
Paget Tbynbee's revised edition of E. Moore1 s Le Ope re di Dante 
Alighieri (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963). The translation 
is by Phillip H. Wicks teed in The Latin Works of Dante Alighieri 
(London: Dent, 1934).
24. Contrast, e.g., D. W. Robertson jnr's explication in
A Preface to Chaucer: Studies in Medieval Perspectives (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1962).
25. On the literary triplications of the christianizing of 
Europe, see Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular Vtorld, pp. 10-14.
26. But not to deny its humour. CDnpare E. Talbot Donaldson's 
ccnrnent that to insist 'that Chaucer was not a moralist, but a 
comic writer (is to make] a distinction without a difference' 
('Chaucer the Pilgrim,' PMLA, 69 1954 , 928-936; reprinted in 
Speaking of Chaucer (London: Athlone Press, 1970], p. 10).
27. For discussion of the relation of poet and persona see 
pp. 54-62, 63-64, 66, 143 below and nn. 69, 76.
28. For a detailed discussion of changing and maintained 
attitudes see E. R. Curtius, 'Poetry and Philosophy1 and 'Poetry 
and Theology,' European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, 
pp. 203-227. See also Bigar de Bruyne, The Esthetics of the 
Middle Ages, trans. Eileen B. Henessy (1946; New York: Ungar,
1963), Alice S. Miskimin, The Renaissance Chaucer (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1975), especially 'Apologies for 
Poetry: Originality and Counterfeit Art,' pp. 132-155; I have 
found Charles G. Osgood's introduction and notes in Boccaccio on 
Poetry particularly illuminating. For a discussion of the 
allegorical synthesis of philosophy, theology and poetry effected 
by the Chartrians, see Winthrop wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry 
in the Twelfth Century (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1972). 
See also the excellent 'Dante's "Allegory of Poets" and the 
Medieval Theory of Poetic Fiction,' by R. H. Green, Canparative 
Literature, 9 (1957), 118-128 and the convincing reply by
C. S. Singleton, loc. cit., 129-135.
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29. Chaucer's Indebtedness to Boethius 'nedeth noon auctorite to 
preve;’ his translating the Consolation of Philosophy is perhaps the 
loving counterpart of Dante's placing Boethius, 1'anim santa, in 
the Heaven of the Sun (Paradiso 10.121-129). On the influential 
position Boethius held in medieval thought see Frederick Cppleston,
A History of Philosophy: Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to 
Bonaventure (New York; Eoubleday U950] 1962), pp. 116-119;
Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 
pp. 97-106; David Khcwles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought 
(london: Longman, 19G2), pp. 51-55? Gordon leff, Medieval Thought: 
St Augustine to Ockham (Hamondsworth: Penguin, [19581 1962),
pp. 47-50; see also the introduction to Chaucer's translation of 
the Consolation in Robinson, pp. 319-320. For a brief account 
of the genre of prosimBtricum, see Curtius, p. 151.
30. Fabula: Explorations in the Uses of Myth in Medieval 
Platonism (L^den and Cologne: E. J. Brill, 1974),p. 4.
31. See Republic, Books 2, 3 and 10, translated by vf. H. D. House, 
Great Dialogues of Plato (New York: The New American Library, 1956). 
The quotation is frcm 10.607B.
32. See R. Klibansky, Ihe Continuity of the Platonic Tradition 
during the Middle Ages: Outlines of a carpus Platonicurti (London: 
Warburg Institute, 1939)? for the role that St Augustine played in 
transmitting Platonic ideas in Western Europe, see R. R. Bolgar,
The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1954), p. 175. Osgood offers an extensive lire 
of descent for this specific attitude to poetry from St Augustine 
to Boccaccio, p. 179, n. 1.
33. On the implications of Plato's endorsement and use of 
fictitious situation see Ludwig Edelstein, 'Ihe Function of the 
Myth in Plato's Philosophy,' Journal of the History of Idf ;s,
10 (1949), 463-481, and Drew Hyland, 'Why Plato Wrote Dialogues,' 
Philosophy and Ehetoric. 1 (1968), 38-50.
34. Other passages, cited by Edelstein, 466, in which Plato 
affirms the true lie include Republic 2, 377A and Timaeus 29D; 
see also Republic 10, 614A.
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35. Republic, 10 passim, eap. 600-607.
36. Macrobius, CcmnEntary on the Dream of Scipio, trans. with an 
introduction and notes by W. H. StahJ, Be cords of Civilization, 
Sources & Studies, 48 (New York and london: COlurrbia Univ. Press 
[1952], 1966), p. 10.
37. Etor Chaucer's kncwled^ and use of Macrobius1 Ctannentary see 
J. A. W. Bennett, Parlenent of Foules; An Interpretation 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), pp. 32-33,
38. I have not read William's CciTnentary on the CCntnantary of 
Macrobius and am relying on Dronke's account of it in Fabula
13-78.
39. St Augustine (354-430)? Macrobius (fl. ca. 400). Neither 
the exact identity nor the precise dates of the author of the 
CCTTKiantary on tte Somnium Scipionis are known. Stahl states that 
’Macrobius was probably bom in the third quarter of the fourth 
century' and cites tvro opinions on the dating of the connentary — 
Georgii: after 395 and 'scare tine before 410;' Wissota: somewhat 
earlier (Stahl, p.5).
40. St Augustine, Ds ordine, PL 32, translated by R. P. Russell 
as Divine Providence and the Problem of Evil, Fathers of the Church, 
5 (New York: dKR, 1948).
41. See also tebert C. Taliaferro's introduction, Fathers cf 
the Church, 2 (New York: CIMA, 1947), especially pp. 163-164.
42. (2.10.18, PL 32 893), trans. T. F. Gilligan, Fathers of the 
Church, 5 (New York: CIMA, 1948), pp. 401-402.
43. Qxipare Boccaccio, Genealogy, 14.9 and 14.13.
44. I am assuming historical records' 'truth;' because it is not 
directly relevant to my point here I emit discussion of the area of 
blurring between literal histories and histories which contain a 
fair proportion of fable theneelves.
45. See M. W. Bloomfield, 'Authenticating Realism and the 
Itealism of Chaucer,1 Thought, 39 (1964), 335-358; reprinted in the 
author's Essays and Explorations (Cantoridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press, 1970), pp. 175-198.
46. See Wstherbee, Platonism and Poetry, cited in n. 28.
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47. See pp. 6-15 above. For an account of the distinction between 
poetic allegory {the allegory of a = b) and theologian's allegory 
(the allegory of a + b + c . . .) see Dante's definition in the 
Qpnvivio (2.1.2-4), in the letter to Can Grande (quoted on pp. 12-3.3), 
and Charles s. Singleton, 'Appendix: the TWo Kinds of Allegory,'
Dante Strjies One, pp. 84-54, from which the quotation above is taken. 
See also M. w. Bloomfield, 'Allegory as Interpretation, * N£H, 3 
(1971-1972), 301-312.
48. 1 am using realism to express a different concept and in 
relation to different expectations from Donald Howard in The Idea 
of the Canterbury Tales (Berkeley and los Angeles: California Univ. 
Press, 1976), pp. 160-164. Howard stresses the limitations of the 
realism in the narrative frame, pointing out that a number of 
necessary activities - lodging overnight, stopping for food and 
drink - and likely sights - the pilgrimage shrines alary the 
Canterbury Way, the actual towns, rather than the snortiiand msntion 
of a few of their nairas — are not incorporated into the description 
of the pilgrinage. His model of realistic writing primarily implies 
accurate imitation of the phyrical world; mine is focused upon 
Chaucer's representation, in literal rather than allegorical terms, 
of what was a medieval reality, the world’s being seen as Gad’s 
good creation, possessing an ideal realism in that it proclaims its 
Maker in its act of being (see Civ. Del, 11.21).
49. ftot in every instance nor to a constant degree, but congruency 
of tale and teller is far nore carman than its absence and because
it predominates in the tales is far more powerful stylistically than 
the presence of the few tales which seem to bear little or no 
relation to what vre are told of their tellers.
CHKPSER TOO
50. In calling the poem 'whole1 I am not intending to deny its 
incomplete state; what an hypothetical totality of th? Canterbury 
Tales vrould have included is obviously a ‘tter of pure speculation; 
but in the poem as ws have it, the narrative xrane's structure 
offers a consistency which is not ire rely dependent upon the presence 
of an undoubted beginning in the General Prologue and conclusion in
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the Parson's Prologue and leve-taklnq, but also upon the clarity 
with which certain issues related to the nature of the poem have 
been raised, explored and resolved. See also Howard, The Idea of 
the Canterbury Tales, pp. 27-29, 162-173, whose sense of the poem 
as 'unfinished but conplete* is most persuasively argued.
51. See belcw n. 60.
52. This is not predominantly true of the entire narration.
While the presence of the persona is again felt in the Prologue 
to the Miller's Tale, once the question of inclusion or exclusiu.. 
of cherles tales has been raised and resolved, Chaucer does not 
find it necessary to sustain the device of first person narration 
systematically throughout the Tales. The subjectivity of the 
account is established in relation to the narrator, but its 
relative objectivity is also stressed, as indeed it must be if 
the readers are to respond to the narration as they would to an 
actual historical account. The pilgrims' own individual responses 
to their canton sit. .cion are largely presented without the diffuse 
view of a fairly unreliable narrator, whose own characterization 
has in any case indicated the reader's need to be aware of potential 
bias lung before the pilgrims speak in their cwn voices. It is 
only in the General Prologue portraits that a clearly articulated 
sense of the persona's value judgments is sustained almost invariably. 
The persona's overt presence is again manifest in the Group where 
'Chaucer' tells the only verse tale he kncws. Sir Thopas, and once
he has been cut short, launches into that 'litel thyng in prose,' 
the Tale of Melibee. In the opening lines of the leve-taking, the 
persona and poet are not readily extricable: whose voice pre­
dominates depends upon the claim being made about what has been 
read or heard — is it reherslnq or making that is being connended 
to the poem'- audience? By X (I) 1084ff. it is clear, even if there 
be difficulties of tone, that Chauc._ is speaking in his own 
person and the act of making is at issue. For most of the poem, 
once the fiction of personal historical authentication is stated, 
its implications briefly and richly suggested in lines I (A) 716-746 
and 3168-3186, it is left to subsist in such irenifestations as 
regular usage of first person possessive and personal pronouns,
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particularly in the plural. The Host is alnost invariably tented 'our 
Hast,' and the pilgrims' unaniirous responses are always described in 
the first not third person plural, although all other, individual, 
responses are reported in the third person. In most of the links it 
is the use of the possessive 'our' applied to the Host rather than 
the explicit presence of a first person narrator which establishes 
the persona's presence as relater of the action; 'our' here being a 
designation whose major stress is upon the concept of cammity in 
the corrpany of sortdry folk which the persona joined rather than upon 
the individual himself. The occurrences of 'oure Hoost(e)' are 
legion; in pervasiveness they far outweigh the otbe^ . devices 
regularly used - the use of first person singular and plural 
naninative pronouns, and direct second per sen addressing of the 
audience by the person:.
53. Or would he in. an ideal world. In fact relatively few of 
the Canterbury pilgrims journey with the ’ful devout corage' that 
the persona tells us was his when he prepared to go on pilgrimage, 
but their enjqyment of the journey, if not their concern to arrive, 
establishes tneir plausibility as 'the experience of day by day' 
should prove.
54. Cti the relation of tine and eternity see St Augustine,
City of God, 11.6 and Confessions, 11, passim.
55. In Chaucer and the Cbuntry of the Stars: Poetic Uses of 
Astrological Imagery (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970}, 
p. 166, pp. 166-167, n. 3.
56. Oil the occurrence and function of descriptions of spring 
in classical and medieval poetry, see Curtius, pp. 120ff., 13Sff., 
and Janes J. Wilhelm, "frie Cruelest Month: Spring, Nature, and 
Love in Classical and Msdieval Lyrics (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 
1965}. Wilhelm's reading in classical and troubadour poetry led 
him to conclusions differing in their level of generality from 
Curtius's; he questions Curtius's assumptions that descriptions
of spring in classical literature were almost invariably idealized.
In Poetic Individuality in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon press, 
1970), Peter Dronke, like Wilhelm, takes Curtius's study as his 
starting-point, here .in order to express the limitations of his
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method in estabJ tshing a sense of the uniqueness of individual poets1 
attempts to express reality both by using established forms directed 
to specific ends and by departing frcm them. See also Donald Howard, 
The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 92-93. Howard's reading of the 
Canterbury Tales is the most far-reaching recent one that I have 
encountered, inviting reassessment of many aspects of the poem.
57. On Chaucer’s use of the historical present see larry Benson, 
'Chaucer's Historical Presents Its Meaning and Uses,1 English 
Studies, 42 (1961), 65-75. Mf interpretation of the usage here is 
influenced by his article, although the implications with which I 
am concerned differ sligntly frcsn those which he treats. Analysing 
the function of the historical present (in conjunction with a 
preterite), he shows that 'these present verbs are used in a 
manner which demonstrates the historical present's durative 
implication, its connotation of continuing action' (d . 67).
58. The movement of the passage from elemental ratter, through 
animate plant life to animal life, and thence to man follows a 
traditional pattern of ascending hierarchies in created nature; 
the development is from that which has mere essence, through that 
which also has animation and the powers of generation, to that 
which has notion and sense perception too, and then to nan who 
alone of corporal beings has an imrortal soul and can freely choose 
to journey in virtue towards God. For a similar procession, see 
St Augustine, De quantitate animae, ch. 35.
59. The discrepancy between the implicit demands of the nature 
of moral reality and man's responses is almost inevitably a 
subject of concern to any Christian thinker attempting to explore 
ran's place and role in the universe. Etienne Gilson describes 
St Bonaventure's grappling with this:
In relation to [God] man can see both his origin and his goal, and 
so arrives at the recognition that he has a history. He sees his 
life as a passage between a beginning and a conclusion; and this 
certitude is capital — its effects upon his other certitudes is 
such that it completely transforms them. Not only has ♦■he life of 
man a history; the universe as a whole has a history . . . .  And . . .
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the history of the universe is seen by us as a drama in which we 
have a part, a drara whose conclusion, after all digressions and 
divagations, must be our beatitude or misery for all eternity 
. . . .  [St Bonaventure] thinks precisely because it is for him a 
problan of eternal life or death to knorf what one must think; he 
trembles at the mere imagined possibility that he might, in a moment 
of distraction, lose sight of [the truth]. It is his agony to see 
that practically no one is thinking about it; and that man made by 
a God, remade by the blood of a God, is ever busy at his own 
unmaking — as if all that can choose between nothingness and being 
did, in blind folly, choose nothingness. (The Philosophy of St 
Bonaventure, trans. Dcm llltyd Trethcwan and P. J. Sheed [London; 
Sheed and ward, 1938], pp. 473-474). The form of St Bonaventure's 
speculations, their immediate purpose and level of intensity all 
differ from Chaucer's poetic realization, but both saint and poet 
share concern to communicate understanding of the same fundamental 
human and divine reality.
60. An excellent overview, extensively annotated, of the topos 
hono viator in the medieval period may be found in Gerhart B.
Ladner, 'Haro Viator; Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order,' 
Speculum, 42 (1967), 233-259. See also Samuel C. Giew, The 
Pilgrimage of Life (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1962), 
esp. 'Strangers and Pilgrims,' pp. 174-225, which, though primarily 
concerned with discussion of english literature of the renaissance, 
traces the historical development of the ideas and images discussed. 
There is discussion of St Bonaventure1 s treatment of the concept of 
the journey to God in Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy of 
St Bonaventure, in Anthony Nemetz, ’The Itinerarium Mentis in Deum: 
the Human Condition,' in S. Bonaventura 1274-1974, ed. Guy Bougerol 
et al. (Bore; Collegia S. Bonaventura, 1973), 2, pp. 345-359, and 
in Bernard M: Ginn, ‘Ascension and Introversion in the Itinerarium 
Mentis in Psum,' op. clt., 3, pp. 535-552. Charles S. Singleton, 
'The Allegorical Journey,1 Dante Studies Two, pp. 3-14, explores 
Dante's use of the topos of the journey in the Divine Comedy; see 
also Lydgate's english version of Guillame's Pilgrimage of the Life
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of Man, EEIS, 3 vols., 77 (1889), 83 (19011, 92 (1904), and Ztosenmd 
Tuve, 'Guillane's Pilgriirege,' Allegorical Imagery: Sate Medieval 
Books and their Posterity (Princeton: Princeton ttiiv. Press, 1960), 
pp. 145-218. On actual medieval pilgrimage see Jonathan Sumption, 
PUqrlitaqe: to Baage of Medieval perfection (London: Faber, 1975). 
On Chaucer's use of the topos, see tolph Baldwin, The Unity of the 
Canterbury Tales, Anglistica, 5 (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 
1955); W. H. Clawson, 'The Framework of the Canterbury Tales,1 mg,
20 (1950-1951), 137-154, esp. 145-146, 154; Arthur W. Hoffman, 
'Chaucer's Prologue to Pilgrimage: Die Two Voices, ’ Etfl, 21 (1954), 
1-16; Donald R. Havard, The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 28-30, 
159-164, 196-199 and passim; Esther C. Quinn, 1 Religion in Chaucer's 
Canterbury Tales,' in Geoffrey Chaucer; P. O^ llection of Original 
Articles, ed. George D. Econcmou (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), 
pp. 55-71.
61. St Augustine uses the image in De doctrina Christiana to 
characterise one who does not prefer an immutable wise life to a 
imitable one:
Et hoc gui non videt (i.e. which is better), ita est quasi caecus 
in sole, cui nihil prodest ipsis locis oculorum eius tarn clarae 
ac praeaentis lucis fulgor infusus. Qui autem videt et refugit, 
cmsuetudine unibrarum camalium invalidam mentis aciem gerit.
Pravorum igitur norum quasi contrariis flatibus ab ipsa patria 
repercjtiuntur hcmines; posteriora atgoe inferiora sectantes, quam 
illiri quod esse melius atque praestantius confitentur.
Quapropter, cum ilia veritate perfruendum sit, quae incommtabiliter 
vivit, et in ea Trinitas Deus, auctor et conditor universtitatis, 
rebus quas ccmdidit consulat; purgandus est aniims, ut et perspicere 
illam lucem valeat, et inhaeren; perspectae. Quam purgationem quasi 
antulationen quandaro, et quasi navd.gationeir, and patriam esse 
arbitrenur. Non enim ad ewi qui ubiquc praesans est, locis roovemur, 
sed bono studio tmisque noribus. (1.9.9 - 1.10.10, B.A.C.,l68,p.72.)
And he who does not see it is like a blind man in the sun who profits 
nothing when his eyesotikets are infused with the brilliance of the 
clear and iimediate light. But he who sees the truth and flees has
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weakened the acuteness of his mind through the habit of carnal 
shadows. For man are driven back fran their country by evil habits 
as by contrary breezes, seeking things fortlier back fron and inferior 
to that which they confess to be better and rare worthy.
Therefore, since that truth is to be enjoyed which lives inimitably, 
and since God the Trinity, the Author and Founder of the universe, 
cares for His creatures through that truth, the mind should be cleansed 
so that it is able to see that light and to cling to it ones it is 
seen. Let u® consider this cleansing to be as a journey or voyage 
hare. But we do not care to Him who is everywhere present by moving 
from place to place, but by good endeavour and good habits.
(Robertson, pp, 12-13).
62. St Thomas Aquinas, On the Truth of th holic Faith: Sumrra 
Contra Gentiles, Bock TWo: Creation, trans. . ?. Anderson
{New York: Doubleday, 1956).
63. See also Jill Mann, Chaucer and Medieval Estates Satire:
The Literature of Social Classes and the General Prologue to the 
Canterbury Tales (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973).
64. On the artist as creator, on God as an artist and on the 
analogous relation of iran as maker to God as Creator of the universe 
see E. R. Curtius, 'God as Maker,' European Literature, pp. 544-546, 
Milton C. Nahm, 'The Theological Background of the Theory of the 
Artist as Creator,' JHI, 6 (1947), 363-372 and Margaret F. Nims, 
‘Translatio: "Difficult Statement" in Medieval Poetic Theory,'
UTQ, 43 (1974), 215-230. The ideas are carmonplaces and examples 
abound throughout the middle ages; on their use during the 
renaissance see Alastalx Fowler, Triumphal Forms: Structural 
Patterns in Elizabethan Poetry (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1970), pp. 15-17. See also below pp. 23 ff.
65. See above n. 52.
66. That this is a literary stylistic device rather than a mark 
of tha actual points beyond the narrator's claim to Chaucer's 
creation of plausible fiction. On the convention of the first 
person narrator see n. 76 below.
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67. tompare St Augustine's dlscusslCTi of tiire in Confessions, 11, 
passim, especially 11.13 and 11.20, v*ilch are quoted below?
Nec tu tempore t^ rrpora praecedis: alicquln non omia terrpora praece- 
deres. sed praecedis omnia praeterita celsitudine semper praesentis 
aetemitatis, et superas omia futura, quia ilia futura sunt et cum 
verierint, praeterita erunt? tu auten idem ipse es et anni tul non 
deficient . . . .  anni tui cranes simul stant, quondam stant .... 
anni tui dies unus, et dies tuus non cotidLe, sed hodie, quia 
hodiemus tuus roi cedit crastino? neque enim succedit hestemo. 
hodiemus tuus aetemitas . . . (loeb, p. 234, p. 236.)
Furthermore, altl'iough you are before tine, it is not in time that 
you proceed it. %f this were so, you would not be before all tine.
It is in eternity, which is supreme over time because it is a never- 
ending present, that you are at once before all past tine and after 
all future tiire ....  Your years are completely picsent to you all 
at once, because they are at a permanent standstill . . . .  Your 
years are one day, yet your day does not cone daily but is always 
today, because your today does not give place to any tavorrw nor 
does it take the place of any yesterday. Your today is eternity. 
(Pine-Coffin, p. 263.)
Quod autem nunc liquet et claret, nec futura sunt nec praeterita, 
nec prcprie dicitur: terrpora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens et 
futurum,sed fortasse propria diceretur: tenpora sunt tria,
praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentib'js, praesens de 
futuris. sunt enim iiaec in anima tria quaedam, et alibi ea non. 
video: praesens de praeteritis msroria, praesens de praesentibus 
contuitus, pratsens de futuris eagjectrtio. si haec permittimur 
dicere, tria tenpora video fateorque tria sunt. (Loeb, p. 252.)
Peon what we liave said it is abundantly clear that neither the 
future nor the past exist, and therefore it. is not strictly 
correct to say that there are. three times, past, present, and 
future. It might be correct to say that there are three times, 
a present of past things, a present of present things, and a 
present of future things. Sane such different times do exist in
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the mind, but ncwhere else that I can see. The present of past 
things is the irerrory; the present of present things is direct 
perception; and the present of future things is expectation. If 
we may speak in these terms, I can see tiiree tines and I admit that 
they do exist. (Pine-Goff.ln, p. 269.)
63. I have discussed the attitudes and expectations associated 
with historical and literary accounts earlier (see above, ch. 1, 
passim).
69. Just how far the persona's artistry differs frm the poet’s , 
Chaucer rakes clear later in the allocation of literary talent to 
his alter ego witnessed by Sir Thopas whose rocking-horse rhythm 
and string of cliched absurdities makes it achieve the strange 
aldheny of sealing interminable in two hvuidred and five and a half
70. In the dialogue of Raison and Amant in the Roman de la Fbse 
(RR 6928-7229) a closely related issue is esqplored; whereas Chaucer 
treats his persona’s scruples with respect for they relate to a 
genuine problem, Jean de Msun depicts Arrant’s squeamishness as
mere fatuity, it reflects no genuine concern but irerely a mindlessly 
stereotyped conventionality autanatically emerging in response not 
to vtfiat Raison means but to her pronouncing coil Ions. In the toran 
Amant whose ardent desire is to possess the Itose (a 'lady' and 
object of desire which by the end of the poem =. become concretized 
as fenale genitalia) objects to Raison's use 't the word colllons as 
unseemly for one of her sex and status. It is certainly true that 
he remains constant to his sense of verbal propriety till the end, 
for although he violates the Rose he does so in the highly refined 
language of euphemism: he is the devout pilgrim, the Rose the
slirine which he wishes to enter and at which, by his cwn strenuous 
efforts, he arrives. Remarkable in the travesty both of religious 
devotion and sexual desire is the degree of coyness generated by so 
portentously handled a trar-sposition of situation.
71. Ed. and trans. John Warrington (London: Dent and New York: 
Dutton, 1965), p. 15. Chaucer alludes to the idea again at IX (H) 
207-210; he translated this reference to Plato in the Consolation
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of Philosophy (3 jar. 12. 205-207) and would have known the similar 
justification by Raison in the Ranan de la Rose, 11. 7099ff. (see 
previous note); the same concept is introduced in 11. 15177-15194 
where the authority cited is not Plato but Sallust. See also City 
of God, 14.23, cited by John V. Fleming, The Roman de la Rose:
A Study in Allegory and Iconography (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1969), p. 134.
72. For a discussion of the complex structure of the Canterbury 
Ifeles see John teyerle, 'Thematic Interlace in "The Canterbury Tales",' 
Essays and Studies, 29 (1976), 107-121. Leyerle argues most 
persuasively for viewing the Canterbury tales 'as a poem, even in its 
unfinished state, [which knits up] a number of threads in complex 
patterns, a design vhich may be called thematic interlace1 (108-109). 
CHAPTER THREE
73. See above pp. 33-35, 37-38.
74. See the discussion of the relation of art and nature in RR 
16005-16072 (langlois 4, pp. 129-131). Chaucer draws explicitly 
upon aspects of this relation in the Physician's Tale [VI (C) 5-40], 
itself derived frcm the retelling of Livy's history of Virginia in 
the Raman.
75. In an illuminating article on 'the literature group1 ('Sentence 
and Solaas in Fragment VII of the Canterbury Tales: Harry Bailly as 
Horseback Editor,' PMLA, 82 [1967], 226-235), Alan Gaylord discusses 
the Host's criteria. He does, hcwever, simplify the implications of 
solaas by stressing one set of connotations at the expense of another 
in a manner which is not wholly borne out by Chaucer's use of the 
term in the poem. He says 'If "sentence" belongs to the Latin world 
of preaching and teaching, "solaas," despite its ultimate source in 
the latin solatium, belongs to the Romance. We find it, with its 
aristocratic French relatives "solas" and "solacier," in courtly 
literature as a tievelojznent frcm a traditional minstrel term. In
its most innocent use, it means simply "comfort" or "relief," but 
it always has attached to it the sense of (physical) pleasure and 
the joys of court; in Msdieval romance, in fact, it is often a 
euphemism for sexual dalliance' (p. 230? my italics). The Knight,
168
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interrupting the Monk's catalogue of disasters [ 3957-3969J, 
uses the sense of solas related to spiritual canfort as does the 
Parson, who describes its absence in hell [X (I) 206] and the folly 
of seeking 'an ydel solas of worldly thynges' when 'the soule hath 
lost the comfort of God' [X (I) 740]. Like ironia, whereby one can 
affirm and deny simultaneously, the Host's categories may admit 
simultaneously a sense of union and opposition depending upon the 
perception of the auditor.
76. There is always some discrepancy between a man and his public 
self even if it be only that between the whole and a part. Even in 
an hypothetical culture in which verisimilitude in art were extolled 
above all other formal stylistic considerations, literary trans­
lation of actuality would still involve the irreducible gap between 
the experience itself and the words designed to express it. When a 
post creates a literary self there is, as well as the distance 
between the actual and its translation into words, the gap between 
his own sense of himself and whatever ne intends communicating: none 
of Chaucer's poetic personae serve the sole function of realistic self­
portraiture. All in varying degrees are intermediaries between their 
author his narrative and his audience. The distinction with which I 
am concerned here is specific: that based upon the differences 
between the claim of task that the persona makes and the actual task 
of writing implicit in the poem's existence, and between the persona's 
bumbling personality and indifferent literary accomplishments, 
lovingly depicted in the poem, and 'Chaucer . . . that had suche a 
name/ Of fairs makyng that (was] withouten wene/ Fayrest in our tong.' 
(lydgate. The Floure of Curtesye, 34, Spurgeon, 1, p. 15). Leo Spitzer 
in 'Notes on the Poetic and the Empirical "I" in Medieval Authors,' 
iraditio, 4 (1946), 414-422 demonstrates that the gap between the 
presented and the actual self may widen sufficiently to permit the 
unblinking incorporation of details of another author's biography along 
with his arguments. See also M. W. Bloomfield, cited above, n. 45, 
on the use of a first person narrator as an authenticating device.
The locus cimsejcus in Chaucer's use of the persona is E. Talbot 
Donaldson's 'Chaucer the Pilgrim,' cited in n. 26. There is an
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excellent discussion in Miskimin, cited in n. 28, pp. 81-95, which 
gives much needed stress to the complexity of Chaucer's usage and 
the limitations of generalizations about it that over-simplify in 
the interests of clarity. Ben Kunpel, in 'The Narrator of the 
Canterbury Tales,' EIB, 20 (1953), 77-86, offers a brief review of 
earlier critics’ attitudes to the persona, himself concluding that 
Chaucer underplays his role and certainly was not 'trying to express 
through him his cwn personality' (86). a.. 'Chaucer's Self-Portrait 
and Dante's,1 Medium Aevi-ci, 29 {I960), 119-120, A. L. Kellogg relates 
the Host's content on the persona at (B2) 695-697 to Purqatorio 19, 
40-53, concluding that 'in choosing a teodel for his final self- 
portrait [Chaucer] chose that figure of Dante which nost fully 
suggested to him the distancing and objectification great art 
requires ’ — a correspondence that seems far more closely confirmed 
by the text than John M. Major's thesis that the narrator 'reveals 
himself to be, like his creator, perceptive, witty, sophisticated, 
playful, toler?Jit, detached, and, above all, ironic' {'The Personality 
of Chaucer the Pilgrim,' PMLA, 75 [1960], 160) — a catalogue which 
might well have anused as well as gratified the author of '0 Gaufred, 
deere mister soverayn.1
77. In reality the present in vhich the persona resolves to 
record experiences of the pilgrimage could not be conterminous, 
except by artifice, with the present of his actual record which 
would succeed it; the synchrony keeps both the decision and the 
record in close focus: we see the persona's intentions and their 
realization simultaneously.
78. On Chaucer's 'class libel1 of allocation of virtuous tales 
to gentil folk and vileynous ones to cherles, see Derek Brewer,
'Class Distinction in Chaucer,' Speculum, 43 {1968), 290-305.
79. I am assuring the integrity of intentions of the reporter, 
but even then reports may be untrue, the shifting sands of 
subjectivity making perception as dependent upon the beholder
as the beheld (see Boece, 4 pr.4 176-218; 5 pr.4 133-143, 211-219).
A report, however, does recount actualities unlike a literary tale 
which iruy be pure fiction.
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80. A most stimulating article on literary games is John Leyerle, 
'The Gam= and Play of Hero,1 Concepts of the Hero in the Middle 
Ages and the Renaissance, ed. torman T. Bums and Christqpher J. 
Iteagan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), pp. 33- 
100; for the seriousness of man at play see Jchan Huizinga, Homo 
Ludens: A Study of the Play-Elemant in Culture (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1955). See also Gerhard Joseph, 'Chaucerian "Game" - 
'"Earnest" and the "Argument of Herberyage" in the Canterbury Tales,' 
Chaucer asview, 5 (1970), 83-96; the article focuses upon 'the 
crucial re la tic ship of jest and seriousness ... in Chaucer's 
art' — that is the playfulness rather than play-element of game.
81. St Augustine describes the complex interaction of parts in 
the harmonious order of existence in Civ. Dei, 19.13:
Pax itague corporis est ordinata terrperatura partium, pax aninee 
inrationalis ordinata requie? adpetitiomzn, pax aninee rationalis 
ordinata cognitionis actionisque oonsensio, pax corporis et animae 
ordinata vita et salus animantis, pax hominis irortalis et Dei 
ordinata in fide sub aetema lege cbcedientia, pax honinum ordinata 
ooncordia, pax danijs ordinata inrcarandi dboediendique concordia 
cohabitantium, pax civitatis ordinata incerandi adque dboediertii 
concordia civium, pax caelestis civitatis ordLiatissim et 
concordissima societas fruendi Ceo et invicesn in Deo, pax oimiurn 
rerum tranquil litas ordinis. Qn3o est parium disparimque rerm 
sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.
(Vfelldon, 2, p. 424.)
The peace, then, of the oody lies in the ordered equilibrium of 
all its parts; the peace of the irrational soul, in the balanced 
adjustment of its appetites? the peace of the reasoning soul, in 
the hamonious correspondence of conduct and conviction; the peace 
of body and soul taken together, in the well-ordered life and 
health of the living viiole. Peace between a mortal man and his 
Maker consists in ordered obedience, guided by faith, under God's 
eternal law; peace between man and nan consists in regulated 
fellowship, ihe peace of a hare lies in the ordered harmony of 
authority and obedience between the members of a family living
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together. The peace of the political community is an ordered harmony 
of authority and obedience between citizens. The peace of the 
heavenly City lies in a perfectly ordered and harmonious coirnunion 
of those who find their joy in God and in one another in God.
Peace, in its final sense, is the calm that cores of order. Order 
is an arrangement of like and unlike tilings whereby each of them 
is disposed in its proper place.
(Fathers of the Church, 24, pp. 217-218)
82. The edition of the Tteseida which I have used is that of 
Salvatore Battaglia, Tfeseida (Florence: Sansoni, 1938). The trans­
lation is that of Bernadette Marie McOoy, The Book of Theseus:
Tfeseida delle Nozze d'Bnilia (New York: Medieval Text Association, 
1974).
83. See above pp. 6-9, 13-14.
84. See also Civ. Dei, fc.5, 10.1 and Conf., 7.9.
85. See M. w. Bloomfield's 'Chaucer's Sense of History,' cited 
in n. 11 above. The Christian narrative vantage point need not and 
does not in the Canterbury Tales negate attempts to delineate 
faithfully what 'was tho the gyse,' indeed its presence enables a 
juxtaposition of past and present, whereby both their equivalences 
and disparities are highlighted.
86. Oatpare St Augustine's cmrents in the City of God, where 
after discussing the diversity of views possible regarding vtfiat is 
supremely good and what is supremely evil, he says:
Si ergo quaeratur a nobis, quid civitas Dsi de his singulis 
interrogate respondeat ac priiror de fimbus tmorum malorumgue 
quid sentiat; respondebit aetemam vitam esse surrmum bonum, 
aetemam vero mortem sumnum malum; propter illam proinde 
adipiscendam istanque vitandam recte nobis esse vivendum.
Prcpter quod scriptum est: lustus ex fide vivit; quoniam neque
bonum nostrum iam viderrus, unde oportet ut credendo quaeramus, 
neque ipsum recte vivere nobis ex nobis est, nisi credentes adiuvet 
et orantes qui et ipsam fidem dedit, qua nos ab illo adiuvandos 
esse credamus.
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1111 autem, gui in ista vita fines bonorum et malorum esse putave:njnt, 
sive in corpora sive in anirro sive in utroquf: ponentes sunrnum bomm, 
adgue, ut id explicatius elcquar, sive in voli^ tat-e sive in vlrtute 
sive in utiraque; sive in quiets sive in virtute sive in utraque; 
sive in volitate simil et quiete sive in virtute sive in utrisque, 
sive in primis naturae sive in virtute sive in utrisque; hie beati 
esse et a se ipsis beati fieri mira vanitate voluermt. Inrisit. hos 
Veritas per prophetam dicentem: Daninus novit coqitaticnes heminum 
vc'-, sicut hoc testinmium posuit apostolus Paulus: Dominus no\,it 
cogitationes sapientium, qioiiam vanae sunt.
(19.4., Vfelldon, 2, pp. 406-407)
If I am asked what stand the City of God would take on the issues 
raised and, first, what this City thinks of the supreme good and 
ultimate evil, the answer would be: She holds that eternal life 
is the supreme good and eternal death the supreme evil, and that we 
should live rightly in order to obtain the one and avoid the other. 
Hence the Scriptural expression, 'the just man lives by faith' — 
by faith, for the fact is that we do not now behold our good and, 
therefore, mist, seek it by faith; nor can we of ourselves even live 
rightly, unless He who gives us faith helps us to believe and pray, 
for it takes faith to believe that we need His help.
Those who think that the supreme good and evil are to be found in 
this life are mistaken. It makes no difference whether it is in the 
body or in the soul or in both — or, specifically, in pleasure or 
virtue or in both - that they seek the supreme good. Ohey seek in 
vain whether they look to serenity, to virtue, or to both; whether 
to pleasure plus serenity, or to virtue, or to all three; or to the 
satisfaction of our innate exigencies, or to virtue, or to both.
It is in vain that men look for beatitude cm earth or in human 
nature. Divine Truth as expressed in the Prophet's words, makes 
them look fcolish: 'The lord knows the thoughts of ran' or, as the
text is quoted by St Pauls "ttie lord knows the thoughts of the 
wise that they are vain.1
(Fathers of the Church, 24, pp. 194-195)
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87. Perhaps 'choice' is itself a deceptive term here since, at 
least initially, the tiro knights are described as acted upcn by love 
[I %  1077-1079, 1095-1097, 1112-1122]; whether their subjection to 
Cupid's will is voluntary or not is, hrwever, not really in issue 
here — except, naturally, in so far as it concerns themselves; what 
is, is the nature of such service, its process and rewards. Palanon 
and Arcita live by their love ethic whose limitations are exemplified 
throughout the narrative.
88. For an explication of this see William R. Elton, King Taar and 
the Gods (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1968).
89. See Charles Muscatine's discussion of formal elements in the 
Canterbury Tales in Oiaucer and the French Tradition: A Study in 
Style and Meaning (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1964), pp. 175-190, for an analysis of a different structural 
principle, the tension between order and chaos. See also Dale 
Underwood, 'The First of the Canterbury Tales,' ELH, 26 (1959),
455-469; Richard Neuse, "Ihe Knight: The First Mover in Chaucer's 
Human Comedy,' University of Toronto Quarterly, 31 (1961-1962),
299-315; if. P. Bolton, 'The Topic of the Knight's Tale,' Chaucer 
Review, 1 (1966-1967), 217-227; Robert S. Haller, 'The Knight's
Tale and the Epic Tradition,' Chaucer Review, 1 (1966-1967), 67-84; 
David Benson, "Ihe Kni^t's Tale as History,1 cited in n. 11;
Douglas Brooks and Alastair Fowler, 'The Meaning of Chaucer's 
Knight's Tale,' tedium Aevum, 39 (1970), 123-146.
90. See St Augustine, De quantitate aninae, 33.72 (PL 32 1074-1075? 
Fathers of the Church, 2, p. 139) on roerrory as the pcwer of the soul 
which is ‘the recorder and ccsipHer' of great achievements; Frances
A. Yates, The Art of Memory (london: Itoutledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) 
co classical memory systems and their history in the middle ages;
Robert 0. Payne, The Key of Reroarbrance: A Study of Chaucer's 
Poetics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 63-72, 
on Chaucer's awareness of the role of books as a key of remembrance. 
Donald Howard treats extensively Chaucer's use of concepts of memory 
in Tte Idea of the Canterbury Tales, see especially pp. 134-209.
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91. There the Knight assumes the authority to Stynte 'the Maik of 
his tale' and the Bast heartily endorses the Knight's intemption, 
consenting 'pardee, no renedie/ It is for to biwaillene conpleyne/
That tiiat is doone' [(B2) 2784-2786]. The Monk's limited understanding 
of fortune and of tragedy underlie the rejection of his tale.
92. The senses of 'quite' are found in OED, quit, v. Ill, 12;
11.11; III. 13; and I.l.b. respectively.
93. In Chaucer and the French TraditionA Suzdy in Style and 
teaning, pp. 223-230.
94. In tedieval Literature and Folklore Studies: Essays in tfonour 
of Francis lee Uttley, edited by Jeroie Uandel and Bruce A. Jfcsenberg 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1970), pp. 205-211.
95. See 'Moral Education,' Moral Education: Five lectures, 
edited by Nancy F. and Theodore R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1970), pp. 85-107.
96. What Beryl Smalley quotes from Henry from Huntingdon's 
Historia Rnqlorum 'praising Homer, wbcm he counts as an historian 
and exalts above all "philosophers"' could readily be said of the 
gentil Knight's vertuous tale: 'HCTner and his like present virtues
and vices more vividly in their exenpla than do philosophers in their 
sen ten tiae. They benefit not only spiritual men, but even seculars, 
attracting them to good and dissuading them fran evil.' Fran
1 Sallust in the Middle Ages,1 in Classical Influences an European 
Culture AD 500-1500, edited by R. R. Bolgar (Cambridge: Cairbridge 
University Press, 1971), pp. 165-175; the quotation is from p. 166.
See also Boccaccio, Ds gen, deor, 14.17.
97. Cn the Miller's blaspheny see Beryl B. Rowland, 'Chaucer's 
Blasphemous Churl: A tew Interpretation of the Miller's Tale,1 
Qiaucer and Middle English Studies: In Honour of Russell Hope 
Bobbins, ed. Beryl Rowland (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), 
pp. 43-55; see also tile same author's 'ThePI®/ of the Miller's Tale:
A Gams Within a Gams,' Chaucer Review, 5 (1970), 140-146. C*i the 
irrationality of the Miller's Tble universe see Morton W. Bloomfield, 
'The Miller's Tale — An UnBoethian Interpretation,' cited in n. 93.
On the symbolism of the flood and its functioning in the tale, see 
Oiamcey wood, Chaucer and the Country of the Stars, pp. 167-171.
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See also Gardiner Stillwell, "Ihe Language of love in Chaucer's 
Miller's and Beeve's Tales and in the Old Frendi Fabliaux,'
Journal of Ehglish and. German Philology, 54 (1955), 693-699.
98. FDr a more balanced view of the relationship between objective 
reality and subjective viewing, conpare Boece, 5. pr. 3.
99. See above yp. 58-60 and n. 71. See also Ds civitate Dai, 14.11.
100. On tiie Peeve's lale see particularly Paul A. Olson, "Die 
Baeva's Tfcie; Chaucer's ffeasure for Measure,1 Studies in Philology,
59 (1962), 1-17. See also M. Copland, 'The Reeve's Tale; Harlotrie 
or Sermonyng?' Medium Aevum, 31 0962), 14-32; Den aid R. Howard,
The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 239-247; R. E. Kaske, 'An 
Aube in the Beeve's Tale,' StH, 26 (1959), 295-320; A. H. Jteclaine, 
'Oiaucer's wine-Cask Enage: Vford play in the Peeve's Proloc,ue,1 
Medium Aevim, 31 (1962), 129-131.
101. In 'Translatio: "Difficult Statement" in Mrdieval Poetic 
Theory.' See above n. 64.
102. See the pioneering work of Kate Oelzner Petersen, The Sources 
of the Parson's Tale, RadclifSe College Monographs, 12 (Boston: 
Atheneum Press, 1901), and the later analysis and corrective of 
Germaine Denpstej;, 'The Parson's Tale,' Sources and analogues,
pp. 723-760.
103. See Paul E. Beichner, 'Chaucer's Man of Law and Dlsparitas 
Cultus,' Speculum, 23 (1948), 70-75; Edward A. Block, 'Originality, 
Controlling Purpose and Craftsmanship in Chaucer's Man of Law's Tale,' 
EMIA, 68 (1953), 572-616; Zforton W. Bloanfield, "Ihe Man of Law's 
Tale: A Tragedy of Victimisation and a Christian Comedy,' PMLA,
87 (1972), 384-390. See also Alfred David, 'Hie Man of taw Against 
Chaucer: A Casa in Poetics,' PMLA, 82 (1967), 217-225 and his 
reworking of this article in Ihe Strurrpet Muse: Art and Morals in 
Chaucer's Poatry (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 
1976). See also Pcdney Eelasanta's discussion of Chaucer's use of 
irony in relation to the Man of Law in 'And of Great Reverence: 
Chaucer's Man of law,' Chai?oer Review, 5 (1970-1971), 280-310.
John H. Fisher discusses tne relationship of Chaucer to Gcwer in 
cfa^ ter five of his John Gower: Moral Philosopher and Friend of
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Chaucer (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 286-292 in particular? Robert 
Enzer Lewis, 'Chaucer's Artistic Use of Rope Innocent Ill's De miseria 
humane conditionis in the Man of law's Prologue and Tale,' PMLA, 81 
(1966), 485-492 together with pages 32-39 of the introduction to his 
edition of De miseria condicionis humane (Athens: toe University of 
Ueorgia Press, 1978) are indispensable to an understanding of Chaucer's 
use of Pope Innocent in the Man of Law's Tale. Martin Stevens, 'The 
Bq/al Stanza in Early English Literature,' PMLA, 94 (1979), 62-76 is 
an interesting article offering a possible explanation for the 
apparent anomoly of the Man of Law's statement that he will tell a 
tale in prase and the rhyme royal stanzas of his actual tale. William 
L. Sullivan, 'Chaucer's Man of law as a Literary Critic,' MLN, 68 
(1953), 1-8 is an early article dis .ussing the Man of Law's poor 
literary judgment. Chauncey Wood, Chaucer and the Country of the 
Stars, pp. 192-244 argues convincingly that the Man of Law is best 
approached 'through a study of his interpretations' of 'his story and 
of the world around him' which, 'by mediaeval standards, are mainly 
misinterpretations' (p. 194).
104. See pp. 53-62 above.
105. Just hew unusual an attitude this is for a fourteenth century 
man may easily escape us, conditioned as we are by our historical 
position as port romantics.
106. In his prologue the Man of Law enthusiastically praises 
material wealth and co-deims material poverty, his pious tale rejoices 
in Constance's abundant spiritual resources which are subject neither 
to good nor ill fortune but there is, as Chauncey Wood and Rodney 
Eelasanta have shewn (see n. 103 for references), considerable ironic 
tension between the tenor of the tale's narrative and the contents
of its narrator.
107. See above pp. 53-64 for general discussion of the role of the 
first person narrator and the nature of Chaucer's truth claim in the 
Canterbury Tales.
108. Although Martin Stevens's article (see n. 103) suggests that 
'in prose' has a different meaning from its modem one, his findings 
do not alter the parallel situations of Man of Law and persona.
NOTES to pages 101-106
109. While Lrte Man of law in his role as literary critic provides 
a false detraction of Qiaucer's work, Chaucer provides another 
assessment based on different criteria in the retraction. Here 
the Man of law condemns Chaucer's lack of skill in execution; 
there Chaucer judges his work in relation to its morality.
110. On the effect of breaking boundaries of realism see
M.W. Bloomfield, 'The Merchant's Tale; A Tragiccmady of the Neglect 
of Counsel — The Limits of Art,1 Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 
ed. S. WSntzel (Chapel Hill: U. of North Carolina Press, 1978) 
pp. 37-50, especially pp. 44-48.
11. See, for example, Boece, 5 pr. 6, 13-26 for a definition of 
the physical nature of tine and eternity and 5 pr. 6 passim for the 
moral obligation attendant upon man living in the world.
112. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 4-5.
113. See Robinson, Explanatory Notes, p. 690.
114. See Quinones, pp. 106-171 passim.
115. See Robert Enzer Lewis's article and the introduction to 
his edition of the work for the Chaucer Library, both cited above
116. See 2.3-2.14; 2.16; 2.26-2.28; 2.3-2.4 also raises the
role of those concerned with law and the administration of justice 
and includes stock criticism which nay have influenced Chaucer's 
depiction of the Man of Law.
117. From the drift of the headlink it is clear that for the
Man of Law a thrifty tale is one which has conventionally acceptable 
subject matter rather than one which is informed by its teller's 
virtue. That one my use the potential for well-doing or saying 
inherent in any subject matter apparently does not strike the Man 
of Law. In this too he is at odds with the poet Chaucer who stands 
behind the persona in his justification of the inclusion of cherles 
tales in the Canterbury Tales. Chaucer raises a related issue in 
the Pardoner's Prologue where the Pardoner himself observes the gap 
between his own immorality and the ethical quality of his tale 
[VI (Cl 400-411, 456-462]. The discussion of the relation of speaker 
and spoken in St Augustine's Ds doctrina Christiana, 4.27-29
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illuminates the attitudes of the Man of Law, the Clerk and the 
Pardoner. See be la, pp. 132-134 and 122-132 -passim.
118. Da gen, cteor. 14.4, Osgood's translation, from which the 
english version of the oomparison of lawyers and poets is also taken. 
Osgood provides a series of references in Ms note to this passage 
(p. 148, n. 3). Many other references are cited in Cwst, Literature 
and Pulpit, pp. 338-349 and Mann, Estates Satire, pp. 86-91.
Primaiy sources include Innocent III, Ds miseria, 2.4; Ranan de la 
Jtose, 5091-5100; Boccaccio, db gen, dear. 14.4 ard 15.10; de Bury, 
Riilctoifrlon, ch. 11.
119. In a letter to Boccaccio (Epistolae seniles, 17.3, quoted in 
part by R. D. French, A Chaucer Handbook, secmd edition [New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955], p. 312}, Petrarch writes tiiat he 
first learnt Boccaccio's tale by heart so that he could recite it
to others, and then wished to translate it into latin for those who 
know no Italian; it 'always pleased ms when I heard it years ago, 
and I should judge that it pleased you to such an extent that you 
deemed it not unworthy of your Italian prose, and of the end of 
your book, where die teaching of the rhetoricians requires that 
natter of greater import should be placed.1
120. Ovid, Mstarrorphoses, 5. 294-678.
121. On Petrarch's influence in and after the fourteenth century 
see Bolgar, The Classical Heritage, pp. 246-264.
122. See 'Sentence and Solaas in Rragirent VII of the Canterbury 
Tales: Harry Bailly as Horseback Editor,' PML&, 82 (1967), 226-235. 
While I disagree with aspects of Gaylord's interpretation, 
particularly with his definition of solaas, his sense of the 
fragment as exploring literary quality seems to be indisputable.
123. I am not implying that all tales are or should be mirret.ic, 
although scne liveliness of idea, verbal style or imitative quality 
is necessary to retain an audience's interest. Certainly Chaucer's 
choice of Sir Ihopas as the tale which purportedly introduces his 
own talents would hardly occasion a ripple of unease amongst those 
moralists who fear the dangers of art's imitation of reality:
no english Pygmalion the persona and no Galatea Sir Thopas.
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124. See E. Talbot EOnaldson, Chaucer's Poetry, rp. 934-937. 
Donaldson makes clear the subtlety of Chaucer's parodic achieve­
ment in Sir Thopas, but ry paint, uhlch is not contradicted by 
Donaldson's rerarks, is sinply that on the level that the pilgrims 
react to the tale Sir Thogas is anticlimactic.
125. The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 309-315.
126. See Charles Muscatine, Chav,per and the French Tradition, 
p. 242: 'Through tragedy, eloquence, heroics, science, court 
flattery, courtly love, domesticity, dreams, scholarship, 
authority, antifeminism, patient humility and rural hullabaloo, 
there is scarcely a Chaucerian topic that is excluded fron its 
purview and its criticism.' Pamela Kean, Chaucer and the Making 
of English Poetry, 2, pp. 133-139, discusses the relation of the 
Nun's Priest's Tale to the Monk's Tale. Alfred David, Strumpet 
Muse, pp. 223-231, makes some excellent points about the tale's 
complexity.
127. See John Spelts, Chaucer the Maker, pp. 187-193; Charles 
Muscatine, Chaucer and the French Tradition, p. 242; Bernard S. Levy 
and George R. Adama, 'Chaucer's Paradise Lost and Regained,1 
Medieval Studies, 29 (1967), 178-192.
128. This does not imply t’lat the tale dees not resolve its 
narrative complication, slnply that the issues raised within it 
are open-ended.
129. The Manciple's Tale does not treat Christian faith but it 
is about belief in the truth of an account and its consequences.
130. Criticism on the Pardoner's Tale is particularly abundant. 
Tuo useful articles on the state of play until 1970 are G. G. Sedge- 
wide, 'Ohe Progress of Chaucer's Pardoner, 1880-1940,' M Q , 1 
(1940), 431-458 and John Halverson, 'Chaucer's Pardoner and the 
Progress of Criticism,' Chaucer Review, 4 (1970), 184-202.
Jtobert P. Miller's "Chaucer's Pardoner, the Scriptural Eunuch and 
the Pardoner's Tale,' Speculum, 30 (1955), 180-199, is a tajor 
analysis offering data relating the presentation of the Pardoner 
to patristic writing. An excellent related article is Lee W. 
Patterson, 'Chaucerian Confession: Penitential Literature and
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the Pardoner,1 Madievalia et Humanistica, n.s. 7; Medieval Poetics 
(1976), 153-174. E. P. Amoils relates 'Fruitfulness and Sterility 
in the Physician's ami Pardoner's Tales,1 English Studies in Africa, 
17 (1974), 17-37, to an immediate source in the Penan de la Rose. 
Nancy Owen describes the sezrm structure of the Pardoner's Tale 
in 'The Pardoner's Introduction, Prologue and Tale: Sermon and 
Fabliau,1 OBGP, 66 (1967), 543-547. Alfred David discusses the 
Pardoner and his tale in The Strumpet Muse, pp. 193-206. Donald 
Howard devotes the last c apter of The Idea of the Canterbury Tales 
to a careful discussion of the relation of 'The Pardoner and the 
Parson,' pp. 333-387. Further works are cited in subsequent 
footnotes.
131. See below pp. 127-132.
132. See St Augustine’s discussion of inner wards and their 
outward expression, their relation to the Wbrd, speech and the 
manner in which a Christian teacher should use language in
De trinitate, 9.6-9.12 and chapter 15 passim, in De maglstro, 
passim, and te doctrina Christiana, book four passim. His various 
analyses make clear the religious significance of language and 
the christocentricity of his own treatment of language. The 
Pardoner's use of language, like tuat of the Parson after him, 
may fruitfully be discussed in terms drawn broadly fran this view.
133. St Augustine describes the task of the interpreter of 
Christian faith as a labour of words in De doctrina Christiana, 
4.4.6. What this labour entails is explored in I & II Timothy, 
see below n. 136.
134. The corruption of pardoners was notorious and has been 
frequently discussed by critics. See, e.g., Owst, Literature and 
Pulpit, fp. 372-374 and A. L. Kellogg and L. A. Haselmayer 
'Chaucer's Satire of the Pardoner,1 PMLA, 66 (1951), 251-277.
135. See below pp. 133-134.
136. in his first epjstle to Timothy St Paul describes good 
Christians and good churchmen, in his second he describes and warns 
against the activities of bad Christians and impious churchmen.
The following verses are particularly pertinent to the Pardoner's
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Tale; I Tim. 3, passim, 4.16, 5,1, 6.10 (which provides the text, 
'Radix . . . malorum est opiditAS1), 6.27-18; II Tim. 2.4, 3.5,
4.2. The allusion to St Paul's letters relates Tirrothy and the 
Pardoner and provides a sub textual coment on the vapidity/ of the 
Pardoner's assumption of the role of preadier. For him it is only 
an act. H does not put on the garments of light he masks himself 
in them or as he puts it 'Thus spitte. I out ny venym under hewe/
Of hoolynesse, to serren hooly and trewe1 [VI (C) 421-422].
137. In Tte Strurrpet Muse Alfred David writes 'I said above that 
the Cleric's vras the best of the tales of "noralitee and hoolynesse,” 
yet an excellent case could he made that the Pardoner's Tale 
deserves that honor,' and there is validity .in his judgn&nt.
For all the Pardoner's depravity, the Pardoner's Tale is morally 
sound and superbly executed. On the psychology of the Pardoner's 
behaviour, see A. L. Kellogg, 'An Augustdnian Interpretation of 
Chaucer's Pardoner,' Speculum, 26 (1951), 465-481.
1j8. See n. 71.
139. It is not only the Host whose reaction is intense.
The many critical attempts to offer what Chaucer withholds, the 
precise motivation of the Pardoner in lines 919-945, testify to 
the difficulties raised by thd s action and to the fact that 
people tend to feel strongly about it. The action seems to make 
no ready sense, and the lack of clarity after so much has been 
revealed sets up powerful uncertainties. Even whether the 
Pardoner's account of his practice in church is true is not 
totally certain, hfoen a man tells what he knows or desires vre 
have to take the fidelity of his report on trust since no one 
save he can see into his mind. It is only when he tells of 
general human truths that we can refer them to our own judgment 
since we too know these. See De trinitate, 9.6.9.
140. 'Ypocrite,' says the Parson, 'is he that hideth to shews
hym swich as he is, and sherjeth hym swich as he noght i&-' [x (I) 394]. 
Although there are elements of the characters of Genius in both 
the Roman de la Rose and De planctu naturae in the Pardoner, he is 
far closer to Faux Sentolant in tlie Banan than to either of these.
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141. The village audiences are vulnerable to the Pardoner's 
manipulation of language but Chaucer is writing about them not 
for them. His cwn audience is very different from that of the 
Pardoner. Cn the audience1s need to be alert, see Ds doctrina 
Christiana, 4.17.34 as well as 4.27.59-60 which is partially 
quoted belcw, pp. 133- "-^4.
142. See Donald Reward, The Idea of the Canterbury Tales, 
pp. 333-387.
143. CSi the traditional rivalry of manciples and cooks see 
Mariel Bowden, A Ccffmsntary on the General Prologue to the 
Canterbury Tales (New York: Maanillan, 1962), p. 258.
144. Just how precious language is and how perilous it may 
prove is seen in a different light in the Second Nun's Tale 
of St Cecilia who preaches her faith and is finally condemned 
to death for her refusal to recant and save her life at the 
cost of her integrity. The use of language in the Seccnd Nun's 
Tale is particularly interesting. The events occur before 
Christianity was an established state religion and a substantial 
part of the text consists of glosses exp3 icating the meaning of 
aspects of reality seen in the new perspective of Christianity 
by the people whom St Cecilia and Pope Urban influence.
Miraculous intervention in the irundane world discussed as 
well as described. Ihere is explication of the mysterious nature 
of the triune God and the inage of this mystery in man's 
tripartite soul. St Cecilia's encounter with Almachius, the 
wicked judge, is described as a battle of wits in which two types 
of power, spiritual and political, are verbally opposed.
145. There is no single narrative source or source of the 
digressions in the Manciple1s Tale. See James A. Work, Bryan
and Dempster, pp. 699-700. Work prints a number of possible sources 
and analogues (Bryan and Deirpster, pp. 701-722). Gower has an 
abbreviated version of the tale in Confessio fimantis, 3, 768-835 
tftecaulay 2, pp. 246-248), where the actual tale occupies only 
lines 783-817 and the introductory and concluding lines relate the 
tale to the dangers of unpremeditated speech, cheste and janglynge.
N3ISS to pages 137-146
The lengthy retelling in Ovide Moralist, 2, 2121-2622 (de Boer 1, 
pp. 217-228), includes the inset story of the crew who warns the 
raven against speaking out and the account of Coronis1 pregnancy 
and the posthumous birth of Phoebus' son, neither of which Chaucer 
or Gtwer uses. While the crew's story largely repeats the 
implications of the raven's, the introduction of the birth of 
Asclepius, reknowned healer, would give the tale a benevolence 
it lacks.
146. Ed. C. de Boer, Ovide Moralist, 5 vols. (Wiesbaden; Ifertin 
Sandig, 1966); the quotation is fran de Beer's surmary of lines 
2455-2622, vol. 1, p. 168.
147. Dane Prudence discusses this with her customary thorough­
ness in her account of true and false counselling, (B^ ) 2191-2650. 
The entire Melibee may be viewed as an extended plea for the use 
of reasoned and judicious thinking and discussion to replace 
hasty and warlike action. The Parson treats the 'sins of the 
tongue' in [X (I) 582-6531. Both evidently believe in the 
efficacy of their cwn powers of speech and make their points 
unambiguously and constructively.
148. The only tale which used a similar discursive mode earlier 
was the Melibee, those range of subject ratter is far more 
localized than that of the Parson's Tale.
149. See (B2) 4007, 4639 and X (I) 46-51, 75, 1076-1080 for 
explicit references.
150. See James D. Gordon, 'Chaucer’s Retraction: A Review of 
Opinion,1 in Studies in Medieval Literature in Honor of Professor 
Albert Croll Baugh, ed. MacEdward leach (Philadelphia: Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1961), pp. 81-96. For later references see 
also p. 231 of the excellent article by Olive Sayce, 'Chaucer's 
"Retractions": The Conclusion of the Canterbury Tales and its 
Place in Literary Tradition,' Medium Aevum, 40 (1971), 230-248.
151. Leo Spitzer, 'Notes on the Poetic and the Empirical ”1" 
in Medieval Authors,' cited in n. 76 above.
152. See above, pp. 27-28.
mis to page 146.
153. The Indefatigable Manciple had an appropriate text to offer 
on the intractability of expressed words: 'Thyng that is seyd is
seyti, and forth it gooth,/ Thou^ i hyn repents, or be hym never© 
so lootii* [IX (H) 355-356]. Cne can repent of the activity but 
its results remin, and the statement which they make is their 
own, and nay well uc very different fran the one the aging poet 
saw fit to make.
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